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13. The corporation has entered into various logging contracts for the logging of timber on 
corporate property, and sui;h logging is substantially depleting the value of the property. 
The corporation shall immediately ceMe all logging of timber on corporate properly. 
In the event no corrective action is taken within the next ien day, and since you.have ign6.ied our 
earlier demands made· on December 6,. 1999 and Januazy. 21, 2000, an action agaiQS~ the 
followLTJ.g individuals and entities· will bi commenced: with no further notice to you: ..... : 
1. Mr. William V. Mccann, Jr., as an officer, director and _shareholder of Mccann Ranch & 
Livestock Co.; ·· 
2. McCann Ranch & Livestock Co:, an Idaho corporation;.and 
3. Gary E. Meisn~r, as Trus~ee· of the William V. McCann, Sr. Stock Trust, and as a director 
and shareholder ofMcCannRanch & Livestock Co. 
Attached for your review is a draft Complaint for Damages for Recovery of Corporate Property> 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Negligence, Conversion, Self-Dealing, and Conflicting Interest 
.Transactions which shall be filed in the event the corporation does not und_ertake the above 
demanded actions. 
As we have previously discussed on numerous occasions, many of the above demanded issues 
may subject the corporation; its directors and its officers to substantial penalties imposed by the 
Internal Revenue Service. For this reason, we request that immediate attention be giVen to this 
dema.rtd, and that the abo;ve demanded.actions be undertaken. We simply cannot allow you to 
postpone action on these demands another .60 days that without risk to the Corporatipn.and Mr. 
Ron McCann in ~s position as a director of the corporation. · 
. ~ . . . 
Thank you for your consideration: 
cc: Ron Mccann 
· Bob My~rs 
Gary E. Meisner 
V ecy truly yours, 
.. 
dJ~!ttf~ 
MARlS BAL TINS. 
TAM;ARA W. MUROCK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, individually and as ) 
a shareholder of McCANN RANCH & ) 
LNESTOCK CO., ) 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., as an officer, 
director and shareholder ofMcCANN 
RANCH & LIVESTOCK CO., GARY E. 
Iv1EISNER as a director and shareholder of 
McCANN RANCH & LNESTOCK CO., 
and McCANN RANCH & LNESTOCK 
CO., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
--------,----------
) 
( 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 00-01111 
OP;i:NION AND ORDER RE: PENDING 
MOTIONS 
This Court heard argument on the pending motions of the parties and now, being fully 
advised, issues its opinion and order pursuant to LRC.P. 52(a). The motions pending are: 
A. Defendant Mc Cann' s Motion to Strike portions of the plaintiff's affidavits 
B. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the complaint and for attorney's fees 
C. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the complaint 
D. DefendantMeisner's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 
E. Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow costs and attorney's fees to the defendant corporation 
and William V. McCann, Jr. 
Defendants withdrew the motion to continue at the hearing. 
OPINION AND ORDER - I 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
203 Waz B - N\if 
The facts of this case are largely undisputed by the parties, whereas nearly every legal issue is 
hotly contested. A timeline of events is set forth in the following chart: 
Date Event 
1974-1977 The McCann parents gift equal shares of the Corporation to their sons Bill and 
Ronald (36.7% each). 
1997 Defendant William Jr. works for the Corporation part-time ( about 50% ). 
Octo_ber 27, 1997 Bill McCann, Sr. passes away. The remaining 26.6% of the corporate stock is 
placed into a trust for the benefit of mother Gertrude, pursuant to Bill Sr.' s will. 
The trustee of that family trust, Gary Meisner, is given the power and discretion 
to redeem shares of stock to provide income to Gertrude. Upon her death, son 
Bill gets the remaining shares then in the trust. 
December 1998 The Board votes to pay Gertrude an annual consultation fee of $48,000. The 
Trustee (Meisner) does not redeem any stock. 
September 1998- Plaintiff's former counsel (David Savage) requests certain financial and 
February 1999 property-related information regarding the Corporation. Cumer Green, 
provides much of the information to Savage, as Plaintiff is entitled to such 
information as a shareholder. 
Spring 1999 Plaintiff hires new counsel (Maris Baltins) who requests a meeting with Green. 
April 1999 Green sends three letters to Baltins to set up a meeting. 
May 1, 1999 According to Plaintiff, the Board doubles Defendant Bill Jr.'s salary to 
$144,000 per year. Plaintiff believes this is umeasonable and excessive. He 
maintains that some of this income should be characterized as a corporate 
dividend, and some amount paid to the other two shareholders as a dividend. 
May 11, 1999 Green and B altins meet. 
May 12, 1999 Green sends additional financial information to Baltins. The Corporation's 
June 9, 1999 Board changes the number of directors from 3 to 4, and appoints Ron as a 
director. The Board declines to hire Ron to help manage the corporation, citing 
no need for another manager and the apparently poor personal relationship 
between the brothers. The Board asks directors Durkin and Meisner to 
investigate whether the Corporation should declare dividends, at Plaintiff's 
request. 
October 20, 1999 Plaintiff objects to corporate logging operations and asks the Corporation to 
stop all logging. The Idaho Department of Land evaluates the logging 
operations and reportedly gives them high marks. The Board votes to continue 
logging as planned. 
OPINION AND ORDER - 2 
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Date Event 
October- . Green provides additional information to Baltins, including personal and real 
December 1999 property lists, bank accounts, itemizations of debts, depreciation schedules, 
ShopKo information, hay inventories, insurance policies, logging information, 
and similar documents. 
January 2000 Baltins requests to have an accountant review the 1999 corporate records and 
Green consents. 
April 12, 2000 Baltins sends a letter accusmg Green of not cooperating lil producing 
documents. 
April 18, 2000 Green sends a letter explaining that Savage was provided all of the 1998 
documents and Plaintiff's designated accountant Myers reviewed them; that the 
1999 documents had been sitting at the corporate office awaiting Myers' review 
for several weeks; and that Myers had not yet reviewed them because it was tax 
return time and he was busy. The letter also addresses some of the allegations 
contained in the original complaint(~, loans from the Corporation and payroll 
records). 
April 20, 2000 Baltins sends a letter to Green raising issues contained in the complaint (the 
alleged personal use of a corporate truck and payment of travel and other 
expenses of non-employees). 
May 4, 2000 Green sends a letter documenting his agreement with Baltins that they would 
follow a procedure whereby: 
1. Baltins would give Green written demands for information on the 
Corporation; 
2. Green would gather the documents and make them available for inspection; 
C 3. Upon review, Baltins would provide a list of items to be addressed at the 
Board meeting related to alleged misuse of corporate assets; 
4. After investigation by the Corporation, the Corporation would schedule a 
Board meeting and address the issues. 
May 15,2000 Baltins sends Green a letter listing issues to be addressed at a Board meeting 
(see 3, above). 
May 17, 2000 Green responds to a letter regarding use of credit cards, Steve Carlton's 
compensation, and loans to the Estate and Gertrude ( all raised in the 
Complaint). 
May 31, 2000 Green informs Baltins that the earliest date for a Board meeting is August 2, 
2000, in Boise at Green's Office. Green gives Baltins two more weeks to 
submit additional issues to be addressed.by the Board at the meeting. 
June 1, 1999 l;3altins objects to delaying the Board meeting until August. He claims the 
Corporation has been stalling and using delay tactics. Green notes, "It doesn't 
OPil'TTON AND ORDER - 3 
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Date 
June 19, 2000 
August 8, 2000 
August 9, 2000 
September 6, 
2000 
Event 
. appear that you are examining the corporate records with an eye toward 
settlement, but with the objective of trying to 'get' something on someone. 
Nevertheless, the Corporation has fielded your complaints and asked its 
President to study the allegations and prepare appropriate responses. Ibis can't 
be done in a couple of weeks." 
Ronald McCann files a shareholder derivative and individual complaint in Nez 
Perce County District Court. 
Meisner sends Defendant Bill Jr. a letter requesting a shareholder's meeting for 
the purpose of removing Plaintiff from the Board of Directors, pursuant to 
corporate Bylaws. 
The Court holds its first hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss. Ibis 
Court orders-1hat the action is stayed for ninety (90) days, and that issues raised 
in the complaint which are not resolved by the Board of Directors under LC. 
§30-1-742(2), can be raised after the expiration of the 90-day period. The Court 
indicates that Plaintiffs counsel is obligated to amend the complaint to narrow 
the issues down to those not resolved by the Board. The Court grants Meisner's 
motion to dismiss him from the action in his trustee capacity, and grants him 
costs and attorney's fees. 
The Board meets; all parties and their counsel are present. The Board responds 
to all but three of Plaintiffs complaint allegations, which required further 
clarification from Ron on what he was alleging. The Board votes to, inter alia, 
continue logging; to adopt Defendant Bill Jr.'s report on expenditures to non-
employees and require some reimbursement of the Corporation; and to correct 
misidentified employee payments on the books. The Board again offers Myers 
full access to the corporate books and records. 
The Board votes to have members Meisner and Durkin review Defendant Bill 
Jr.'s compensation plan and report back within 90 days. The Board votes to 
have Meisner ·and Durkin review the dividends issue and report back by 
September 6, 2000. 
The Board also votes to indemnify the defendant directors for their costs and 
attorney's fees being incurred in Plaintiffs lawsuit. 
The shareholders meet and elect to remove Ronald Mccann as a director of the 
Corporation. The number of directors is reduced bayk to three. 
The Board meets and addresses the remaining issues of consultant 
compensation of Gertrude McCann; loans to the Estate (which had been repaid 
with interest in July); the loan to Gertrude (Corporation voted to deduct the loan 
from the rent it owed her for use of her shop); and the option to pay estate taxes 
through the sale of trust stock. 
OPJNION AND ORDER ~ 4 
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Date 
September 8, 
2000 
October 2000 
November 2000 
Event 
. Plaintiff objects to paying Gertrude back rent for the shop for over twelve years. 
He also objects to paying Gertrude deferred compensation of $106,000 instead 
of an annual consultant's fee, arguing it is not deductible and could result in tax 
penalties. Toe Board later elects to pay the rent owed to Gertrude and agrees 
with Ron that deferred compensation is not warranted. (The Board ultimately 
voted to pay Gertrude $500 per month as rent for use of the shop.) 
The Board affirms Defendant's compensation program and directs that it 
continue. Toe Board declines to pay dividends in light of the costs and 
expenses being incurred in defending the corporation and directors from the 
Ronald Mccann lawsuit. 
The Board determines that, save for one claim, it has acted upon all. concerns 
and that it would not be in the best interests of the Corporation to pursue or 
.continue a derivative action. Plaintiff provided no more information or 
explanation on the four claims upon which the Board had requested 
clarification, so the Board elects not to pursue them further. 
AB to the new item recently raised, Defendant Bill Jr. is going to investigate. 
The Board determines, after conducting its inquiry, that no further actions are 
necessary on behalf of the Corporation. 
Green sends Baltins a letter following up on events of the September 6th 
meeting, and requesting that Ron now dismiss the lawsuit or face the possibility 
of incurring liability for paying the defendant's costs and attorney's fees. 
The attorneys of the brothers are discussing mediating the remaining issues. 
A special shareholder's meeting is scheduled. Plaintiff files his motion to 
amend the complaint to add claims against the defendants. This prompts a new 
series of motions to dismiss from the defendants. 
A. . MOTION TO STRIKE 
This Court agrees that the opinions contained in paragraphs (3) and (4) of the Myers affidavit 
(dated October 31, 2000) are inadmissible under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 702. There is no 
foundation laid to establish that Myers is qualified to give such opinions, and no indication of personal 
lmowlecj.ge of all of the underlying facts alleged in those paragraphs. Those portions of the Myers 
affidavit must be stricken from consideration. 
Regarding Ronald McCann's affidavit (dated October 23, 2000), the Court agrees that 
conclusory allegations with no factual foundation or which are not supported by the record are 
OPJNION AND ORDER - 5 
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inadmissible). Others paragraphs containing purely legal analysis are also inadmissible; this Court 
decides what law applies to this case} The Court will give those allegations the weight they deserve 
in determining this motion. Regardless, the allegations are in large part irrelevant to the motions to 
dismiss based on either LC. §30-1-762 or on standing grounds, and are of minimal relevance to the 
costs and fees issues. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND & DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
The Notice Requirement Plaintiff again failed to follow the statutory prerequisite to filing 
suit contained in I.C. §30-1-742(2): 
No shareholder may commence a derivative action until ... ninety (90) days have expired from 
the date the [written] demand was made [upon the corporation to take suitable action] unless 
the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand bas been rejected by the corporation 
or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 
ninety (90) day period. 
The corporations act gives this Court the discretion to altemately stay the action: 
If the corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or 
complaint, the court may stay any derivative proceeding for such period as the court deems 
appropriate. 
LC. §30-1-743. This Court previously chose the latter route, believing it to be in the interest of 
judicial economy. 
This Court's prior order staying the action hinged upon the additional requirement that 
Plaintiff afford the corporation the required amount of time to consider the claims contained in the 
complaint, as the parties had previously agreed among themselves in May of 2000. Trus Court also 
indicated that it would permit amendment of the complaint in the future to consider properly raised 
claims not resolved by this procedure. 
! Such allegations are contained in portions of paragraphs 7, 8, 9, I 0, 11, I 3, I 8, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 32. 
i Such allegations are contained in paragraphs 6, and 23 .. 
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Plaintiff has moved to add new allegations against the defendant corporation which were 
never raised before (some of which could not have been), and which should have been contained in a 
written ninety-day demand upon the corporation. 
The proposed Amended Complaint alleges that written demands under Section 30-1-742 have 
been futile in the past, and further that the Corporation failed to correct all improper acts since the 
summer of 1999. There is no futility exception in Idaho's Business Corporations Act.~ Further, the 
record does not support this allegation. In fact, the vast majority of Plaintiff's original claims have 
been resolved by the Corporation; the mere fact that not all were resolved in his favor does not 
warrant further court intervention under the statutory scheme. 
Ibis Court attempted to group the issues listed in the proposed amended complaint according 
to whether they arise out of the original claims which the Board has already considered ("old") or 
whether they have not been considered ("new") under section 30-1-742: 
No.· Claim Category 
1 Excessive salary paid to Bill Jr. New± 
2 Deferred compensation to Gertrude of$106,000 New~ 
3 Indemnifying Bill Jr. and Meisner for Fees & Costs New 
4 Failing to reimburse the Corporation for damages caused by New 
the alleged incorrect actions which the Board corrected in 
August and September 
5 Failing to collect the $87,896 receivable from the Estate for New 
the Corporation 
6 Removing Ron as a director New 
All claims are subject to the ninety-day written demand requirement. Plaintiff has again attempted to 
circumvent the ninety-day requirement, and has not followed the Court's previous ruling regarding 
l There~ an irreparable harm exception, but Plaintiff has not alleged or established this exception, 
i This claim is vaguely referenced in early letters between Green and Bal tins, but was not included in the demand letter of 
June 2000. However, it was fully addressed by the Board at the August and September 2000 Board meetings. 
1 Tb.is is now moot because the Board elected not to compensate Gertrude, Plaintiffs counsel at the hearing raised the 
alternate claim that the payment of rent to Gertrude was improper, but this is not contained in the proposed Amended 
Complaint and cannot be considered. 
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staying the case. The prior remedy afforded Plaintiff for violating LC. §30-1-742 thus did not 
promote judicial economy, as this Court anticipated that it would. 
Individual Claims. The defendants are also correct that the plaintiff, in both complaints, is 
attempting to assert individual claims which are actually derivative claims on behalf of the 
Corporation. Plaintiff can bring an individual action where he has suffered a special injury distinct 
from that of the other shareholders. The above claims (1) through (6) do not affect Ronald McCann 
specially. Individual actions generally include claims to enforce shareholder's rights to inspect books 
or vote or redeem stock; to compel dividends; to have the corporation dissolved; and to enforce a 
shareholder's agreement. They generally do not include suits alleging violation of duties by corporate 
officers, such as negligence, mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive compensation or squeeze outs. 
All of the plaintiff's claims fall in the latter category and are therefore "derivative," subject to the 
ninety-day demand requirement, and not properly added to this case. Further, the claims listed by the 
plaintiff in the amended complaint also allege derivative claims (self-dealing, negligence, breach of 
duties, conversion, and waste), which cannot be asserted by Ronald McCann as an individual. 
Therefore, all claims asserted are subject to Section 30-1-742. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint must be denied. 
Furthermore, because Plaintiff's counsel failed to follow the dictates of I. C. §30-1-742 for a second 
time, this Court is forced to use its discretionary authority to dismiss this action with prejudice. 
Otherwise, the purpose behind Section 30-1-742 ~ will be thwarted, and the shareholders will 
never be forced to cooperate with each other in the corporate context as anticipated by the statute. 
111.is Court believes it is only encouraging controversy by allowing this action to proceed, at the cost 
of the corporation's and the individual parties' pocketbooks. 
OPINION AND ORDER - 8 
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C. MEISNER'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
Plaintiff filed a combined objection to all three of the defendants' memoranda of costs and 
fees, which was late as regards Gary Meisner. Plaintiff withdrew his objection to the award to 
Meisner of attorney's fees and costs for this reason. Before Plaintiff's counsel ,.vithdrew this 
objection, however, he represented that none of the claims had been dismissed, that the action was 
merely stayed, and that all of the defendant's briefs and motions were substantially identical and 
duplicative. Clearly, this was not true with regard to Meisner's briefs. Further, the claim against 
Meisner as Trustee was dismissed with prejudice. Baltins inadvertently painted his arguments with a 
broad brush against all three of the defendants, thus misstating some of the facts ofrecord. 
This Court may sanction Plaintiff's counsel as a warning to pay particular attention when 
making representations of fact in a brief, which in this case to some minor extent may have increased 
the cost of this litigation to defendant Meisner. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read 
the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, 
motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
This Court does not believe that Plaintiff Ron Mccann or his counsel should be required to pay any 
sanction. It is not convinced that the objection was interposed for an improper purpose, and was 
primarily meant to address the cost bills submitted separately by the defendant corporation and 
WilliamMcCann, Jr. 
D. OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiff contends that no one has prevailed in this action because it has merely been stayed 
and all claims remain for resolution by the Court. Such is not the case now that this Court is granting 
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the defendants' motions to dismiss. As a consequence of the previous stay, the parties were able to 
resolve the vast majority of claims raised in the original complaint. The statute provides that on 
terrmnation of a derivative proceeding, this Court may: 
Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, 
incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was commenced or 
maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose; ... 
I.C. §30-1-746(2). This Court must therefore find an improper motive or other a lack ofreasonable 
cause to sue in order to award costs and attorney's fees under the statute. The Court finds that this 
action was commenced without reasonable cause in light of the clear dictates of I.C. §30-1-742. 
--------Plaintifffurther maintained the action by filing the motion to amend raising new claims also subject to 
LC. §30-1-742. This Court is convinced that this action was filed without reasonable cause only to the 
extent it violated the ninety-day filing prerequisite, and therefore qualifies for an award of fees and 
costs under LC. §30-1-744 and LR.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
Plaintiff's counsel did not assert any particularized objections to items of costs listed in either 
defendant's Mccann or the corporation's memorandum of costs, except ·to allege that they are 
repetitive. This Court has the discretion to award all or some of the costs sought. In Mr. Green's case, 
secretarial time is not a proper attorney fee because it is not work by an attorney or a paralegal. 
· Therefore, this Court discounts Mr. Green's memorandum ofcosts by $1,065.00. 
In :Mr. Clark's case, the discretionary costs sought are not exceptional to the practice oflaw or 
to this type of case. Therefore, this Court discounts Mr. Clark's memorandum of costs by $400. 73. 
ORDER 
Plaintiff's motion to amend is DENJED. Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. 
Plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendant Meisner's motion for sanctions is DENIED. 
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Defendant Corporation is AW ARD ED $23,442.50 as costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 
attorney's fees pursuant to LC. §30-1-746 and LR.C.P. 56(e). 
---DATED this_&_ day ofJanuary, 2001. 
I, the undersigned., her~y certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed or delivered on the~-:_ day of January, 2001, on: 
TAMARA W. :vfUROCK (for PlaintiffMcCann) 
Winston & Cashatt 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 107 A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
MARIS BALTINS (for PlaintiffMcCann) 
Winston & Cashatt 
601 W. Suite 1000 
Spokane,WA 99201 
:MJCHAEL E. McNICHOLS (for Meisner) 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
MERLYN W. CLARK (for Defendant McCann) 
Hawley, Troxell 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
CD.MERL. GREEN (for Corporation) 
Green Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2597 
Boise, ID 83701 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
By~~S 
Dep 
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IN THE SUPREME COlJRTOF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Natu.re of the Case. 
Ronald R McCann brought suit against McCann anch & Livestock Co., an Idaho 
corporation (the "Corporation"), and William V. Mc ann, Jr. and Gary E. Meisner, together 
constituting the majority shareholders 
fiduciary duties, negligence, conversion, self-dealing and conflicting interest transactions. 
Ronald McCann filed suit in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a minority 
shareholder in a derivative action. 
B. Proceedings Below. 
The Trial Court dismissed Ronald McCann's suit with prejudice, and by order dated 
January 5, 2001, awarded costs and attorney fees to William McCann, Jr .. in the amount of 
$11,548.23, to Gary Meisner in the amount of $5,645.00, and to McCann Ranch & Livestock Co. 
in the amount of $23,422.50. On Awil 12, 2001, the Trial Court heard argument on defendants' 
suppiemental- memorandums of costs and attorney fees whereby defendants requested an 
additional award of $71,827.64. The court has yet to issue an order on such memorandums, and 
the total costs and attorney fees awarded is currently undetermined. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
l. Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co. 
Ronald Mccann is a minority shareholder of McCann Ranch & Livestock Co. ("the 
Corporation"). (R Vol. I, p. 2, LL. 8-9) The Corporation is closely-held and made up of the 
1 
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following three shareholders: (1) Ronald :vfcCann as a 36.7% shareholder; (2) William 11cCann 
Jr., as a 36.7 % shareholder; and (3) Gary Meisner, trustee of the William V. McCann, Sr. Stock 
Trust, as a 26.6% shareholder. (R Vol. I, p. 2, LL. 8-9, 12-22) The Corporation's board of 
directors consists of the following individuals: (1) William McCann, Jr., (2) Gary Meisner, and 
(3) Larry Durkin. (R Vol. I, p. 2, LL. 12-18; p. 50, 12-14) 
2. The William V. McCann, Sr. Stock Trust 
The William V. McCann, Sr. Stock Trust (the "McCann Trust") was created in the Last 
Will and Testament of William Mccann, Sr., the deceased father of Ronald McCann and 
William McCann, Jr. (R Vol. I, pp. 19-20) The trust's primary beneficiary is Anna G. McCann 
("Mrs. McCann''), the mother of Ronald McCann and William McCann, Jr. (R Vol. I, pp. 19-20) 
Mr. McCann, Sr.'s will bequeathed 66,600 shares (26.6%) of the Corporation's common 
stock to Gary Meisner as trustee of the McCann Trust, and directs Mr. Meisner as follows: 
(a) To pay estate taxes due at Mr. McCann Sr.' s death by selling (redeeming) to the 
Corporation whatever shares of stock are necessary to enable the estate to pay the taxes; 
(b) To vote the Corporation's stock so as to create an income insofar as possible for 
Mrs. McCann; 
(c) To pay and apply the trust income for Mrs. McCann's benefit; and 
(d) Upon Mrs. McCann's death, to distribute the trust's stock plus any accumulated 
income to William McCann, Jr. as his sole and separate property. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 19-20) 
2 
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3. Corporate Activities after William Mccann, Sr.' s Death. 
After William McCann, Sr.'s death in 1997, William Mccann, Jr. and Gary Meisner 
combined their voting power to effectively deprive Ronald McCann of any voice in the 
management of the Corporation's affairs, and to confer substantial corporate benefits to the 
majority shareholders and selected third parties, to the exclusion of Ronald McCann. (R Vol. I, 
pp. 4-9; 33-37; 50-51; 52, LL. 1-9) 
Under their control, the majority shareholders received substantial compensation, loans, 
and other corporate distributions and benefits. (Tr Vol. I, p. 83, LL. 3-14) Since Mr. Mccann, 
Sr.'s death, William Mccann, Jr. received corporate benefits in excess of $300,000, and Anna 
Mccann received corporate benefits in excess of $200,000. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (I) 
Supplemental Memorandum ... lodged November 2, 2000, Exhibit "A," p. 4, LL. 13-14; p. 7, 
LL. 14-24; p. 8, LL. 1-3, 21-25; p. 9, LL. 1-7) During this same period, however, Ronald 
Mccann received corporate benefits valued at less than $500. (Tr Vol. I, p.83, LL. 3-10) 
The following corporate transactions were improperly undertaken as a means of 
benefiting the majority shareholders to the exclusion of Ronald McCann: 
(a) A corporate loan in excess of $255,000 was made to the estate of Mr. Mccann, 
Sr. for payment of estate taxes. (Tr Vol. I, p. 19, LL. 20-23; p. 20, LL. 14-25; p. 21, LL. 1-5; R 
Vol. I, p. 3, LL. 23-26; p. 4, LL. 1-10) 
(b) The Corporation is paying an annual salary in the amount of $144,000 to William 
McCann, Jr. (Tr Vol. I, p. 23, 5-9; R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (I) Supplemental 
3 
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Memorandum ... lodged November 2, 2000, Exhibit "A," p. 4; LL. 13-14) 
(c) The Corporation has failed to seek payment for a corporate loan/officer's 
receivable to Anna McCann, formerly an obligation of the estate of Mr. McCann, Sr., in an 
amount exceeding $81,000. (R Vol. I, p. 4, LL. 11-15; p.221, Record Exhibit (1) Supplemental 
Memorandum . .. lodged November 2, 2000, p. 7, LL. 25-26) 
(d) The Corporation paid annual consulting fees in the amount of $48,000 to Anna 
McCann when no services were performed in exchange. (R. Vol. I, p. 4, LL. 16-26) 
( e) Corporate property is being extensively logged. (R Vol. I, p. 8, LL. 16-21) 
(f) Corporate expenditures, use and payment of corporate employees and property, 
and various other transactions are being made to improperly benefit the majority shareholders, 
their family and their friends. (R Vol. I, pp. 5-8) 
(g) Payments to a corporate employee were improperly characterized as 
miscellaneous payments reportable on a Form 1099, rather than a Form W-2. (R Vol. I, p. 8, LL. 
23-26; p. 9, LL. 1-4) 
4. Ronald McCann's Demands upon the Corporation. 
In the summer of 1999, Ronald McCann began identifying improper corporate activities 
to the Corporation's board of directors. (Tr Vol. I, p. 19, LL. 24-25; p. 20, LL. 1-6) Various 
meetings and discussions took place throughout the period extending from the latter half of 1999 
and the beginning of 2000. (Tr Vol. I, p. 20, LL. 1-25; p. 21, LL. 1-11) During these meetings 
and discussions, Ronald McCann made repeated oral demands that the Corporation correct the 
4 
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improper activities. (Tr Vol. I, p. 20, LL. 1-25; p. 21, LL. 1-11) Correspondence from the 
Corporation's counsel confirms these demands were made. (R Vol. I, p. 220, Record Exhibit 
Affidavit of Maris Ba[tins ... filed August 3, 2000, Exhibit "B") 
Ronald McCann also made the following written demands upon the Corporation: 
(a) By letter dated September 13, 1999, Ronald McCann's attorney stated: "On behalf 
of Mr. Ron McCann, I again reiterate the request that no hunting or logging take place ... It is 
Mr. Ron McCann' s opinion that any further logging will cause irreparable harm to the real 
property. (R Vol. I, p. 220, Record Exhibit Affidavit of Maris Bal tins ... filed August 3, 2 000, 
Exhibit "A") (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit A) 
(b) By letter dated December 6, 1999, counsel for Ronald Mccann notified the 
Corporation of the impropriety of corporate payments to William McCann, Jr. and Anna 
McCann and made demand for correction of such payments. 
* * * 
... I too have noticed and identified certain problems regarding the use of 
corporate assets and the payment of corporate property which, while so often 
practiced in the context of closely held corporations, must be avoided if we are to 
regard the corporation as a separate legal entity with primary allegiance to all its 
shareholders. 
I have already raised this concern by suggesting that Mr. Ron McCann be paid a 
salary equal to his brother for the service he contributes to the welfare of the 
corporation. This idea was not accepted. We therefore must ask that all amounts 
paid to or for the benefit of all family members be done in the context of 
legitimate compensation or as a distribution on shares. 
* * * 
The estate and Mrs. McCann are indebted to the corporation to the extent of 
$256,000.00 and $81,000.00 respectively. Instead of creating an income streani 
for Mrs. McCann through the appropriate means of redemption of shares, an 
improper and unsupportable consulting fee has been created ... 
5 
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These are ultra vires acts which are improper under state and federal law and are 
counter to Mr. Mccann, Sr. 's directions in his Will. 
* * * 
It is Mr. Ron McCann 's request that the above mentioned problems be corrected 
so that the proper equity ownership of the corporation is reflected in the books 
and records. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 15-25; p. 29, LL. 1-6; R Vol. I, p. 220, Record Exhibit Affidavit of Maris 
Baltins . .. filed August 3, 2000, Exhibit "A") (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit B) 
(c) By letter dated January 21, 2000, Ronald McCann repeated his demands to cease 
logging corporate property. Mr. McCann's attorney stated: 
I was very disappointed to learn that Mr. Bill McCann has given direction to start 
logging ... after our discussion that such action is not legally required and after 
Mr. Ron McCann 's repeated requests to cease logging on the property . .. 
* * * 
In order to get this matter back on track toward resolution it is my request that you 
ask Mr. Bill McCann to get the loggers to cease their activities. 
(R Vol. I, p. 220, Record Exhibit Affidavit of Maris Baltins . .. filed August 3, 2000, Exhibit 
"A") (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit C) 
(d) By letter dated June 9, 2000, Ronald McCann again made demand: 
Since December 1999, we have patiently waited for the corporation to take action 
to remedy those issues we have outlined as being serious violations of law and 
otherwise not in the best interests of the corporation. Despite our repeated 
attempts, however, the corporation has engaged in numerous tactics to delay the 
resolution of these matters. 
As a result, this letter, in addition to those provided to you on behalf of the 
corporation on December 6, 1999 and January 21, 2000, serves as written 
demand pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-742 by Ron McCann upon the 
corporation to take suitable action to remedy the ... illegal or improper activities 
of the corporation ... 
(R Vol. I, p. 33) 
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5. Ronald Mccann Files Suit. 
Despite Ronald McCann's repeated oral and written requests since the summer of 1999, 
the Corporation, controlled by William Mccann, Jr. and Gary Meisner, did not correct the 
improper corporate activities. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (1) Supplemental Memorandum . 
. . lodged November 2, 2000, p. 2, LL. 22-25) 
Finally, on June 19, 2000, Ronald McCann filed a complaint against the Corporation and 
the majority shareholders/directors. (R Vol. I, pp. 1-37) The Corporation and majority 
shareholders/directors filed motions to dismiss the Complaint, alleging the suit was filed prior to 
the expiration of 90 days after written demand was made upon the corporation to take suitable 
action, and was therefore in violation of I.C. § 30-1-742(2). (Tr Vol. I, pp. 1-38; R Vol. I, pp. 
38-39; 40-42; 43-46) 
During the August 8, 2000 hearing, the Trial Court did not address existing Idaho law 
authorizing a minority shareholder in a closely-held corporation to bring a direct action rather 
than a derivative action. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 1-38) It appears the court assumed Ronald McCann was 
required to bring his suit derivatively, and pursuant to LC.§ 30-1-742(2) could not commence 
his action until the expiration of 90 days after written demand. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 1-38) 
The Trial Court held Ronald McCann' s letter to the Corporation dated December 6, 1999 
was not a demand as contemplated by I.C. § 30-1-742, and that a proper demand was not made 
until June 9, 2000. (Tr Vol. I, p. 30, LL. 10-12) The court did not reference :Mr, McCann's 
written demands and requests for corrective action of September 13, 1999 or January 21, 2000. 
7 
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(Tr Vol. I, pp. 1-38) The court then ordered the proceedings stayed for a period of 90 days after 
June 9, 2000, and in the event the matter was not resolved and all issues were not fully 
compromised at the end of the 90-day period, the court would permit :Mr. McCann to proceed by 
\ - I' ' 
' 
way of an amended complaint and eliminate issues that lia"ve-been resolved. (Tr Vol. I, p. 30, 
_____,_ -=--:;;, __ --:, J. 
LL. 12-18; p. 31, LL. 9-18) 
6. Corporate Activities During the Stayed Period. 
During the stayed period, the Corporation's board of directors and officers :finally began 
- . 
addressing Ronald McCann's demands. By the end of the stayed period, the following corrective 
actions were undertaken: 
(a) The Corporation recovered $286,928.32 as reimbursement of the loan to the estate 
of William McCann, Sr. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit Affidavit in Support . .. filed October 
16, 2000, Exhibit "D") 
(b) The Corporation ceased disguising payments to an employee as miscellaneous 
payments reportable on a Form 1099. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit Affidavit in Support ... 
filed October 16, 2000, Exhibit "D") 
( c) The Corporation was reimbursed for work perfonned by two of its employees on 
behalf of William McCann, Jr. and his family. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit 4ffidavit in 
Support_ .. filed October 16, 2000, Exhibit "D") 
(d) Five of the twenty-seven improper corporate expenditures identified by Ronald 
McCann were reimbursed to the Corporation. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit Affidavit in 
8 
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At the end of the 90 day period the following improper activities remained uncorrected: 
(i) The Corporation continues making improper payments to Anna Mccann. The 
Corporation ceased making "consulting fee payments," and then attempted to recharacterize the 
payments as deferred compensation. After concerns were raised that characterizing the payments 
as deferred compensation may not withstand scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service, the 
Corporation created alleged "back rental." (Tr Vol. I, p. 46, LL. 17-25; p. 47, LL. 1-15) The 
Corporation also approved future rental of Mrs. McCann' s personal garage as a means of 
continuing payments from the Corporation. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (1) Supplemental 
Memorandum ... lodged November 2, 2000, p. 5, LL. 10-26; p. 6, LL. 1-3) 
(ii) The corporate loan/officer's receivable to Anna McCann, formerly an obligation 
of the Estate of William McCann, Sr., in an amount exceeding $81,000, remains unpaid. Instead 
of seeking repayment, the Corporation merely created phantom back rental for the use of Mrs. 
McCann's garage for a period of 12 ½ years, and offset the obligation owing to the Corporation 
by the amount allegedly owing as "rent." (Tr Vol. I, p. 92, LL. 2-8; R Vol. I, p. 221, Record 
Exhibit (1) Supplemental Memorandum ... lodged November 2, 2000, p. 5, LL. 10-26; p. 6, LL. 
1-3; p. 7, LL. 25-26) 
(iii) The Corporation continues making excessive compensation payments to William 
McCann, Jr. In fact, during the stayed period, the Corporation affirmed an increase of William 
McCann, Jr.'s compensation from $58,000 to $144,000 per year. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record 
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Exbibit (I) Supplemental Memorandum . .. lodged November 2, 2000, p. 4, LL. 6-11) 
(iv) The Corporation was not reimbursed for work performed by a corporate employee 
on behalf of William McCann, Jr. and his family. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit Affidavit in 
Support . .. filed October 16, 2000, Exhibit "G") 
(v) The Corporation continues to extensively log timber on its property. (R Vol. I, p. 
221, Record Exhibit Affidavit in Support . .. filed October 16, 2000, Exhibit "G") 
(vi) The Corporation has not been reimbursed for twenty-two of the Improper 
corporate expenditures identified by Ronald McCann. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit Affidavit 
in Support . .. filed October 16, 2000, Exhibit "G") 
By the end of the 90-day period, the majority/shareholders caused the following 
additional improper activities: 
(1) The Corporation reimbursed and indemnified William McCann, Jr. and Gary 
Meisner' s their costs and fees relating to the lawsuit. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit Affidavit 
in Support . . . filed October 16, 2000, Exhibit "G") 
(2) Ronald Mccann was removed from the board of directors for bringing the lawsuit 
against the Corporation. (R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (I) Supplemental Memorandum ... 
lodged November 2, 2000, Exhibit "G") 
7. Trial Court's Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions. 
At the expiration of the stayed period, the Corporation, William McCann, Jr. and Gary 
Meisner renewed their motions to dismiss the Complaint. Ronald McCann then filed a 
10 
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Supplemental Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Amend Complaint. After hearing, the 
Trial Court issued its Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions. (Exhibit D) The court denied 
Ronald McCann's Motion to Amend Complaint, and dismissed the action with prejudice. (R 
Vol. I, pp. 171-181) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ronald McCann's individual causes 
of action. 
Whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ronald McCann's shareholder 
derivative causes of action. 
C. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Ronald McCann's Motion to Amend 
Complaint. 
D. Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs against Ronald 
McCann. 
Whether Ronald McCann is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
If, on a motion to dismiss made under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in I.RC.P. 56. See I.R.C.P. 12(b). I.RC.P. 56 permits 
entry of summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
11 
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moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. · See I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
When reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the standard of review is 
the same as that used by the district court in passing on the motion. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 
598, 610, 850 P.2d 749 (1993). Standards applicable to summary judgment require the district 
court and Supreme Court upon review, to liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor 
of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the 
non.moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). 
Motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution. If the record contains. 
conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary 
judgment must be denied. Id. The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the 
moving party. East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 686, 687, 837 P.2d 812, 813 
(Idaho App. 1991). 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court erred in dismissing Ronald McCann's individual causes of action 
because Idaho law specifically allows a shareholder in a closely-held corporation to bring a 
direct action. 
In its Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions, the Trial Court stated: 
Toe defendants are also correct that the plaintiff, in both complaints, is attempting 
to assert individual claims which are actually derivative claims on behalf of the 
corporation. Plaintiff can bring an individual action where he has suffered a 
special injury distinct from that of the other shareholders. The ... claims ... do 
not affect Ronald Mccann specially. Individual actions generally include claims 
to enforce shareholder's rights to inspect books or vote or redeem stock; to 
compel dividends; to have the corporation dissolved; and to enforce a 
shareholder's agreement. They generally do not include suits alleging violation of 
12 
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duties by corporate officers, such as negligence, mismanagement, self-dealing, 
excessive compensation or squeeze outs. All of the plaintiff's claims fall in the 
latter category and are therefore "derivative," subject to the ninety-day demand 
requirement, and not properly added to this case. Further, the claims listed by 
the plaintiff in the amended complaint also allege derivative claims (self-dealing, 
negligence, breach of duties, conversion, and waste), which cannot be asserted by 
Ronald McCann as an individual. Therefore, all claims asserted are subject to 
Section 30-1-742. 
(R Vol. I, p.178) (Emphasis added) This holcling is in direct contravention with the Idaho 
Su:pre:ine Cour_t cas~ v. Mall~lO Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986). (Exhibit E) 
The gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint in Steelman was nearly identical to that here. 
The majority shareholders/directors were attempting to squeeze out the minority shareholder, and 
--------
had breached their :fiduciary duties as directors by conspiring together to wrong the minority 
- ' 
shareholder, to appropriate to themselves the funds and business of the corporation, and to take 
from the minority shareholder bis just and lawful share of the corporation. Id. at 513. 
The Steelman court recognized the fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders and 
directors to a minority shareholder, and expressly rejected the argument that an action by a 
shareholder is subject to dismissal because it is a "direct action" rather than a shareholder's 
derivative suit. The court articulated the rule,Jollowed in I~aho that a minority shareholder in a 
. ---- ---------~ 
closely-held corporation may bring a direct action against both the corporation and the majority 
shareholders/directors. for activities undertaken in violation of the majority shareholders 8.:4d 
-----directors' :fiduciary duties. Id. at 513. 
--
.... -----
One basis for this rule is that in a closely-held corporation, management and ownership 
are substantially identical to the extent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judgment of the 
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directors will be independent of that of the stockholders. Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 
13, 1997 SD 25, 57 (1997), citing Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 
813, 820 (1966). The reasoning behind a derivative action is therefore irrelevant in the context 
of a closely-held corporation. Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga 772, 774, 301 S.E. 2d 49, 50 (1983). 
The derivative-direct distinction makes little sense when the only interested parties are two sets 
of shareholders, one who is in control and the other who is not. In this context, the debate over 
derivative status can become purely technical. Landstrom, 561 N.W.2d at 13, citing O'Neal & 
Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations, § 8.11 (3d ed. 1989); see also Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 
Ariz. 410, 621 P.2d 916 (1980) (minority shareholder has standing to sue both derivatively and 
directly). 
--
------
The fac.,:wofSteelman are n~~dentical those before this Court. Ronald McCann is a ( ~==-_._::;::_..=~>•_•••UJ_'_ 
minority share~y-held corporation and brings suit against the Corporation and its 
-.. ~ . 
majority shareholders/directors for violations of the majority shareholders/directors' fiduciary 
duties. Although the Trial Court expressly noted Mr. McCann's allegations of negligence, 
mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive compensation and a "squeeze out," it failed to make any 
reference to existing Idaho law as announced by Steelman. In fact, the Trial Court's analysis is 
in direct contravention to Idaho law. Applying the proper Idaho law to the facts of this case, Mr. 
Mccann is entitled to bring his action directly with.out making written demand upon the 
Corporation, and prior to the expiration of 90 days from such demand. Toe Trial Court therefore 
erred in dismissing Mr. McCann's individual action. 
14 
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B. The Trial Court erred in dismissing Ronald McCann's derivative action. 
1. The Trial Court erred in holding Ronald McCann failed to comply with the demand 
requirement ofl.C. § 30-1-742. 
Under LC. § 30-1-742, a shareholder cannot commence a derivative proceeding until: 
(1) A written demand has been made upon the corporation to talce suitable 
action;and · 
(2) Ninety (90) days have expired from the date the demand was made unless 
the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the 
corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting 
for the expiration of the ninety (90) day period. 
The demand requirement should be construed equitably and each case should be 
considered upon its particular facts. See 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 2275 (1986), citing 
Cohen v. Industrial Finance Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 494 (NY 1942); see also Recchion v. Kirby, 
637 F.Supp. 1309, 1318 (W.D. Pa 1986). In order to determine whether the demand is adequate, 
the Court must look to its purpose. Recchion, 637 F.Supp. at 1318. 
The purpose of the demand requirement is to insure that all remedies within the 
corporation itself have been resorted to in vain. See Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, 500 
U.S. 90, 96 (1991). The demand, however, need not assume a particular form nor need it be 
made in any special language. See 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 2278 (1986). It need only give 
the directors a fair opportunity to initiate the action which the shareholder wants to undertake. 
Id., citing Smacblo v. Birkelo, 576 F.Supp. 1439, 1443-45 (Del. 1983). 
The courts will not require the minority shareholders minutely detail all facts upon which 
they base their demands for corporate action of directors and shareholder. See Isaac v. Milton 
15 
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Mfg. Co., 33 F.Supp. 732, 736 (Penn. 1940). Inmost instances, the shareholder need not specify 
his legal theory, every fact in support of that theory, or the precise quantum of damages. 
Recchion, 637 F.Supp. at 1309. In fact, it has been held that since a demand need not be made in 
a particular form, it may even be inferred from discussions taking place during conferences. 19 
Am Jur 2d, Corporations,§ 2278 (1986), citing Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, 
Inc, 51 Misc.2d 188,273 NYS3d 16 (1966). 
RoJ?.-ald McCann made many oral demands upon the Corporation beginning in the 
summer of 1999. These demands were repeated in letters beginning.nearly nine-months prior to 
commencement of this action. The letters specifically identified the improper corporate 
activities, provided detailed descriptions of the factual basis of such activities and the harm 
caused to the Corporation, and made repeated requests for remedial relief. Consequently, the 
Corporation and its directors were adequately alerted of the improper activities, had sufficient 
information upon which to take corrective act, and were given a fair opportunity to initiate such 
corrective action. 
The Trial Court, however, h;ld that Ronald McCann's letter of December 6, 1999 was 
not a demand as contemplated by LC. § 30-1-742, and that a proper demand was not made until 
__Iune 9, 2000. (Tr Vol. I, p. 30, LL. J0-12) The court made this holding without providing any 
basis therefor, and without addressing Mr. McCann's letters of September 13, · 1999 or January =-- - -.. . ______ _:::__ _________ ::_,_ __::,___ . : 
21, 2000. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 1-38) 
- ' -.. 
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Ronald McCann, it is evident that Mr. 
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McCann made.re~pon--the Corporatio . The Trial Court therefore erred 
in dismissing Mr. McCann's derivative action. 
2. The facts and circumstances meet the exceptions to the demand requirement. 
a. Whether a demand is excused is a question of fact. 
It is a question of fact whether a shareholder is excused from making formal demand for 
legal action upon the Corporation. Knutsen v. Frushour, 92 Idaho 37, 41, 436 P.2d 521, 525 
(1968). The Complaint was dismissed entirely on the Trial Court's factual conclusion that 
Ronald McCann's demands did not meet the requirements ofI.C. § 30-1-742, nor any exception 
th~reto. The determination of whether a demand is excused was a enuine issue of material fact 
prohibiting dismissal und 
b. Ronald McCann was earlier notified his demands were rejected. 
A shareholder need not wait the requisite 90 days to commence suit when the shareholder 
is earlier notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation. LC. § 30-1-742(2). 
Ronald McCann was notified on several occasions that his demands were rejected. In 
fact, by letter dated January 21, 2000, the Corporation's attorney provided one of many written 
rejections to Mr. McCann's demand to cease logging by stating: "Since last fall, I have advised 
you in response to your queries that logging would commence after December I 5\" (R Vol. I, p. 
221, Record Exhibit Affidavit in Support . .. filed October 18, 2000, Exhibit "20") This rejection 
was confrrmed by letter of June 28, 2000, wherein the Corporation's attorney states: "it is my 
understanding that the Corporation does not desire to cease logging activities." (R Vol. I, p. 221, 
17 
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Record Exhibit Affidavit in Support . . . filed October 18, 2000, Exhibit "29") 
Additionally, the fact that the Corporation and its majority shareholders/directors 
repeatedly ignored Ronald McCann's demands and continued engaging in the improper activities 
is in and of itself sufficient notice ofrejection. At least in one instance the Corporation not only 
ignored a demand, but also engaged in activities in direct contravention to the demand. By letter 
dated December 6, 1999, Ronald Mccann made a demand regarding improper corporate 
expenditures to William McCann, Jr. (Tr Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 15-25; p. 29, LL. 1-6; R Vol. I, p. 
220, Record Exhibit Affidavit of Maris Baltins ... filed August 3, 2000, Exhibit "A") The 
majority shareholders/directors not only failed to remedy these expenditures, but also 
substantially increased Mr. McCann, Jr.'s monthly salary from $4,000 to $12,000. (R Vol. I, p. 
221; Record Exhibit (1) Supplemental Memorandum .. . lodged November 2, 2000, p. 4, LL. 7-
11) 
Despite this evidence, the court addressed neither the statutorily recognized excuse for 
earlier notice of rejection, nor the evidence demonstrating such earlier notification. Reviewing 
the record in the light most favorable to Mr. McCann, the demand requirement was excused. 
c. A demand is excused as futile under the circumstances. 
In its Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions, the Trial Court states: 
The proposed Amended Complaint alleges that written demands under Section 
3 0-1-742 have been futile in the past, and further that the Corporation failed to 
correct all improper acts since the summer of 1999. There is no futility exception 
in Idaho's Business Corporation's Act. Further the record does not support this 
allegation. 
18 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Z3°! 
( 
Although the Idaho Business Corporation Act does not specilically refer to a futility 
exception, such an exception is well-established under Idaho procedural and case law. See 
l.R.C.P. 23(f); see also Knutsen., 92 Idaho at 41. 
I.R.C.P. 23(f) clearly contemplates the existence of a futility exception in Idaho law. It 
states in pertinent part: 
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the 
plaintiff to obtain the action which plaintiff desires from the directors or 
comparable authority ... and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort. 
(Emphasis added) The plan language of the rule would be of no consequence and even illogical 
if no futility exception existed under Idaho law. 
Nearly one hundred years of Idaho case law recognizes the futility exception. See e.g., 
Knutsen, 92 Idaho at 41 (a stockholder must show the corporation has refused a demand to sue or 
that such demand is excused as futile under the circumstances); Fortner v. Cornell, 66 Idaho 512, 
613 P.2d 299 (1945); Stedtfeld v. Eddy, 45 Idaho 584, 264 P. 381 (1928) (stockholder may sue 
where corporation is in control of directors whose acts are questioned and it would be unavailing 
to make application to them to bring suit); Morton v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 241 P. 
1014 (1925) (stockholder may institute action without demand where such demand would be 
futile or useless on the theory that the offending parties would be unlikely to start proceedings 
against themselves); Ryan v. Old Veteran Mining Co., 37 Idaho 625, 218 P. 381 (1923) 
(stockholder may maintain action where the officers whose acts are complained of are in 
complete control of the company); Smith v. Rader, 31 Idaho 423, 173 P.970, 971 (1918) 
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( demand is excused as futile when the directors themselves permit or participate in the 
wrongdoing complained of in the derivative action); see also Just v. Idaho Canal & Improvement 
Co., Ltd., 16 Idaho 639, 102 P. 381 (1909). 
Some jurisdictions will even impose a presumption of futility in certain circumstances. 
In Cathedral Estate v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1955) the court stated: "where 
the directors and controlling shareholders are antagonistic, adversely interested, or involved in 
the transaction attached, a demand on them is presumptively futile and need not be made." Id. 
The futility exception has been explained as follows: 
A realistic view should be taken of the facts pleaded as excusing a demand on 
directors that they bring suit. The court should not cajole itself into believing that 
the members of a Board of Directors elected by the dominant and accused 
majority stockholder, after accusations of wrongdoing have been made, were 
selected for membership on the Board to protect the interests of the minority 
stockholders and to assure a vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against 
the offending majority. 
Cohen, 44 F.Supp. at 494. 
Idaho clearly recognizes excuse of demand on the basis of futility. Although the 
Business Corporations Act is silent on this point, this silence does not preclude excuse on the 
bases of futility. Long-standing procedural and case law clearly demonstrate such an exception 
exists. 
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Ronald McCann under the facts 
presented in this case, it is clear that the futility exception is clearly applicable to excuse demand 
upon the Corporation. The Corporation is closely-held, and the majority shareholders/directors 
20 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
I 
r· 
I 
are the direct cause of the Corporation's continuing engagement in the improper activities. 
Additionally, nearly nine months had passed from the date of Mr. McCann's first demand until 
suit was commenced. This fact alone provides overwhelming evidence that demand was futile. 
The Trial Court therefore erred in dismissing Mr. McCann's complaint. 
3. Any alleged defect in Ronald McCann's demand was cured by the Trial Court's 90-
day stay. 
The Trial Court ordered the action stayed for a period of 90 days after June 9, 2000. (R 
Vol. I, pp. 101-103) The court explained: 
I don't believe that the proper demand was made until the 9th of June. And as a 
consequence, I believe that now I can either dismiss this case or cause it be in 
abeyance or cause a stay to issue until such time as the 90 days has run. I believe 
that the stay is more appropriate. I believe that it is consistent with the efficient 
administration of justice, quite :frankly. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 30, LL. 10-17) The court's Stay therefore cured any alleged defects in the 
demands. 
Despite this cure, the lower court dismissed the allegations set forth in the Complaint as a 
sanction for Mr. McCann's filing a Motion to Amend Complaint. The court explained: 
Because Plaintiffs counsel failed to follow the dictates of LC.§ 30-1-742 for a 
second time, this Court is forced to use its discretionary authority to dismiss this 
action with prejudice." 
(R Vol. I, p. 178) The Trial Court's dismissal of those claims in which any alleged defect was 
previously cured is contrary to the effect of the Order Staying the Action, and is error. 
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4. The requirements to dismiss a derivative action pursuant to J.C. § 30-1-744(1) were 
not met. 
A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed on motion by the corporation if the requisite 
actions set forth in LC.§ 30-1-744 have taken place. 
The lower court's Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions is unclear. Ronald McCann 
assumes that the court dismissed the derivative proceeding on the basis of LC. § 30-1-744(2)(a), 
that a majority of independent directors determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable 
inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding 
was not in the best interests of the corporation. Therefore, before dismissing the derivative 
action, the lower court was required to make the following :findings of fact: (1) that Gary Meisner 
or William McCann is an independent director; (2) that the board of directors conducted a 
reasonable inquiry into Mr. McCann's demands; and (3) that a good faith determination was 
made that the derivative action was not in the best interests of the Corporation. See LC.§ 30-1-
744. 
The Trial Court's Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions, however, contains no 
discussion of this factual determination. In fact, the only reference to LC.§ 30-1-744 is in error.1 
Additionally, the requisite factual determinations are genuine issues of material fact. The 
Trial Court therefore erred in dismissing Mr. McCann's complaint. 
1 The court stated, "This Court is convinced that this action was filed without reasonable cause only to the extent it 
violated the ninety-day filing pi:erequisite, and therefore qualifies for an award offees and costs under I.C. §30-1-
744 (sic) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)." (R. Vol. I, p. 180) 
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a William McCann, Jr. and Gary Meisner are not independent directors. 
Ronald McCann' s derivative action could not be dismissed without a majority vote of 
independent directors that the action was not in the best interests of the corporation. LC. §30-1-
744(2)(a). This vote must be taken at a meeting where the independent directors constitute a 
quorum. Id. 
The Trial Court correctly noted the requirement to factually determine whether a director 
is independent before granting dismissal under LC. § 30-1-744(2)(a): 
THE COURT: In order for this record to support that type of conclusion that you 
would like me to draw, I'm wondering, having never done this before, would I 
have a hearing to determine whether or not he is independent, take evidence on 
· the matter, talk to Mr. Meisner? And I have an affidavit that says he is not. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 73, LL. 17-22) 
The record, however, consists entirely of counsel's argument, and is void of any factual 
detennination by the court or the evidence considered to support any such determination. The 
court merely asked the Corporation's counsel: 
THE COURT: So, you're comfortable that a finding by me at this point in time that Mr. 
Meisner is, in fact, an independent director and was at the time the determination was 
made, that you're comfortable that this record as it now stands would support that type of 
determination? 
MR. GREEN: Yes, Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(fr. Vol. I, p. 74, LL. 5-,l l) Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Ronald Mccann, 
however, a determination cannot be made that either Gary Meisner ot William Mccann, Jr. are 
independent directors. 
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Although Idaho law does not define "independent director" or "good faith" as used in the 
context ofl.C. § 30-1-744, case law outside of this jurisdiction provides some guidance. 
In other jurisdictions, the meaning of "independent" is often addressed in the context of 
the "demand futility test," which requires that directors making a decision whether to institute a 
derivative action be disinterested and independent. It should be noted that I. C. § 3 0-1-744 uses 
the term "independent," but not "disinterested." These terms are not interchangeable, and case 
law attributes different meanings to each. The courts have consistently held that a director is 
interested when he appears on both sides of a transaction or expects to derive personal financial 
benefit from it. See e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984), overruled on other 
grounds. The definition of director independence, however, is much different. 
A director can be deemed disintereste4, yet fail to be deemed ~nt. if his 
:::.:---
discretion is not free from the influence of other interested persons. Seminaris v. Landa, 662 
A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995), quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993); 
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815. See also Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 195, 666N.E.2d 1034, 1038 
(1996) (a director's independence can be compromised by the undue influence exerted by an 
interested party); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (1984) (to determine whether a director is 
independent, it is necessary to look at the influences upon the director's performance of his 
duties). Furthermore, a director can be influenced by another person through a personal 
relationship. Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 26 Ohio 
St.3d 15, 22, 496 N.E.2d 959, 965 (1986) (a director is not independent when he is dominated by 
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or beholden to another person through personal or other relationships). See also Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 815; Mayerv. Adams, 167 A.2d 729, 732, afj'd 316 A.2d 619 (1974). 
Independence of a director means: 
A director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the 
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences ... The end result ... 
must be that each director has brought his or her own informed business judgment 
to bear with specificity upon the corporate merits of the issues without regard for 
or succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid business decision 
into a faithless act. . . . It is the care, attention, and sense of individual 
responsibility to the performance of one's duties ... that generally touches on 
independence. 
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16. 
Neither William McCann, Jr. nor Gary Meisner are independent directors for purposes of 
LC. § 30-1-744. William McCann, Jr. directly and significantly benefited from the corporate 
activities the subject of Ronald McCann's demands. It is doubtful that a director in William 
McCann, Jr.'s position could exercise disinterested and independent judgment in reviewing 
whether to correct corporate activities. In order to correct the corporate activities, William 
McCann, Jr. would be required to personally reimburse the Corporation. Any notion that 
William McCann, Jr. is an independent director is therefore illogical. 
As to Gary Meisner, any vote not to maintain the derivative action was influenced by Mr. 
Meisner's duties owed to Mrs. McCann as trustee of the McCann Trust. Many of the activities 
complained of by Ronald McCann are the improper payments of consulting fees, phantom back 
rental, and other corporate distributions to Mrs. McCann. The law requires Mr. Meisner exercise 
the utmost good faith and loyalty to Mrs. Mccann as the primary beneficiary of the McCann 
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Trust. As such, a vote to maintain the derivative proceeding would adversely affect Mrs. 
McCann. This, in tum, is in violation of Mr. Meisner's fiduciary duties owed to :tvrrs. Mccann. 
-
Additionally, Gary Meisner's discretion is not free from the influence of William 
McCann, Jr., an interested party. Mr. Meisner and William Mccann, Jr. have a personal 
relationship and are long-time friends. (R. Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (1) Supplemental 
Memorandum . .. lodged November 2, 2000, Exhibit "A," p. 12, LL. 15-16) Mr. Meisner has 
consistently failed to exercise his own discretion. He has essentially ceased to function as a 
director, and has instead vested the direction of the Corporation in William McCann, Jr. His 
decision was not based on the merits of the subject, but on extraneous considerations and 
influences, namely maintaining the corporate stock in trust instead of redeeming the stock as he 
was directed. These decisions are inappropriately influenced by William McCann, Jr. 
Consequently, a majority of the board of directors did not consist of independent 
directors at the time the determination was made not to maintain the derivative action. The 
Corporation therefore had the burden of proving that the requisite actions necessary to dismiss a 
derivative action under LC. § 30-1-744 were met. LC.§ 30-1-744(5). The Corporation has not 
met this burden, and dismissal of Ronald McCann' s complaint was error. 
b. A reasonable inquiry of Ronald McCann's demands was not conducted. 
A derivative proceeding cannot be dismissed unless the directors conduct a reasonable 
inquiry into a shareholder's demands. See I.C. §30-1-744. The law requires more than a 
perfunctory inquiry. See Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 857, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340, 344 
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(1992). Directors have :fiduciary duties of care and due diligence which require them to do more 
"than passively rubber-stamp the decisions of the active managers." Id. 
In this case, the' alleged inquiry was performed by William McCann, Jr., Gary Meisner, 
and Larry Durkin, the board of directors. As set forth above, William Mccann, Jr. and Gary 
Meisner are neither disinterested nor independent directors. Any investigation that could have 
been conducted by William Mccann, Jr. and Gary Meisner was tainted by their very 
involvement. An investigation by interested, dependent directors who have engaged in the very 
wrongful behavior that they are investigating is not appropriate or reasonable. The facts clearly 
indicate that the investigation was not reasonable. The Trial Court therefore erred in dismissing 
the Complaint. 
c. The decision not to maintain the derivative proceeding was not made in good faith. 
A derivative proceeding cannot be dismissed unless the directors' decision not to 
maintain the proceeding was made in good faith. See I.C. §30-1-744. 
Whether a decision not to maintain a derivative action is made in good faith is ordinarily 
determined by reference to the business judgment rule. See Country National Bank v. Mayer, 
788 F.Supp. 1136, 1144 (E.D.Cal. 1992). However, where a director or controlling stockholder 
stands to benefit personally from the decision, the law requires the majority's actions be 
"intrinsically fair" to those in the minority. See Re Reading Co., 551 F.Supp. 1205, 1215 
(E.D.Penn. 1982), aff'd without opinion 709 F.2d 1495 (3 rd Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 
711 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1983); Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F.Supp. 405, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 
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citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970); Zahn v. Transamerica 
~ 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3 rd Cir. 1947); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). 
The test of intrinsic fairness is far stricter than the decidedly weaker business judgment 
standard. 18A Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 774 (1985). This higher standard derives from the 
knowledge of human characteristics and motives that where a director or controlling stockholder 
stands to benefit personally from a decision as director or controlling stockholder, his or her 
business judgment is likely to be affected by personal interest Re Reading Co., 551 F.Supp. at 
1215. 
The invocation of the intrinsic fairness standard is predicated upon the existence of two 
factors: (1) majority control and domination, and (2) majority self-dealing. Re Reading Co., 551 
F.Supp. at 1216-17. Toe concept of control and domination has been defmed as "a direction of 
corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation ( or 
persons) doing the controlling." Id. at 1217. Self-dealing is present when the dominant party 
derives benefits in which the minority shareholders are denied the right to participate. Id. 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ronald McCann, there is sufficient 
proof of majority control, domination and self-dealing. William McCann, Jr. and Gary Meisner 
combined their voting power in such a manner to produce substantial corporate distributions and 
other benefits for the majority shareholders, to the exclusion of plaintiff, the minority 
shareholder. While corporate distributions were made to the majority shareholders in amounts 
exceeding $500,000, Ronald McCann received corporate distributions of less than $500. (Tr 
28 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
I 
l 
Vol. I, p.83, LL. 3-10; R Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (1) Supplemental Memorandum ... 
lodged November 2, 2000, Exhibit "A," p. 4, LL. 13-14; p. 7, LL. 14-24; p. 8, LL. 1-3, 21-25; p. 
9, LL. 1-7) The requisite elements of domination, control, and self-dealing are therefore present, 
and the directors' determination not to maintain the derivative proceeding must be evaluated to 
determine if it was intrinsically fair. 
If the transaction is to be tested under the intrinsic fairness test, the burden of persuasion 
1s shifted to the defendants who must show the intrinsic fairness of the entire transaction. 
Burton, 583 F.Supp. at 415; see also Zahn, 162 F.2d at 42; Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306. Viewing the 
record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, this burden cannot be met. The record is 
void of any evidence that the board's determination was intrinsically fair. 
5. A shareholder has a right to proceed in a derivative action on those improper 
corporate activities reviewed but left uncorrected. 
A shareholder is not barred from enforcing a right of action belonging to the corporation 
merely because the corporation refused to bring such action. See e.g., United Copper Securities 
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1916); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wn.2d 
748, 761, 144 P. 2d 725 (1944); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7 th Cir. 1958). Where 
a corporation has refused to bring suit, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit "where the 
directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual 
relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment." United Copper Securities Co., 
244 U.S. at 264. 
Several courts have developed the concept of when a shareholder may maintain a suit on 
29 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
r 
(. 
behalf of the corporation. For example, the Supreme Court of Washington has stated: 
Where it is shown that the stockholder has exhausted all bis available means to 
obtain within the corporation itself redress of bis grievances or the institution of 
an action in conformity with his wishes, and it appears that . . . its officers or 
directors are acting fraudulently or collusively among themselves or with others, 
in such a manner as will result in serious injury to the corporation or to the 
interests of its stockholders, then, in order to prevent a failure of justice, equity 
will permit a suit to be brought by a stockholder or stockholders to enforce a right 
of action belonging to the corporation. 
Goodwin, 19 Wn.2d at 761. 
In determining whether a shareholder can maintain an action after directors have refused, 
courts focus on the prior actions of the decision-making directors. The court in Swanson stated: 
If the directors who constitute a majority of the board and who reject the demand 
are dishonest, guilty of a breach of tmst, were participants in the fraudulent acts 
relied upon by the stockholder for the legal action which he demands, or are 
subject to the wrongful control of the alleged wrongdoers, then equitable 
jurisdiction may be invoked and he may proceed to file the suit himself. 
Id. at 858-59. 
Despite Ronald McCann's repeated demands, the Corporation has nofco:trected allofthe ,, 
• ' ' • I ., '. • ':.' ~- ., 
improper activities.'; 1/JI. McCann therefore has a right to proceed with the derivative action even 
~
after the board of directors' assertion that they have reviewed his demands. The supposed review 
and determination'not to proceed with the action was made only with the votes of<:William;:/ 
McCann, Jr. and Gary Meisner. The record contains ample evidence that William McCann, Jr. 
and Gary Miesner breached their :fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and to the minority 
shareholder. They acted collusively to personally benefit the majority shareholders to the 
exclusion of Ronald Mc Cann, and they are active participants in the improper corporate activities 
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the subject matter of tbis action. This is precisely the circumstance the courts envisioned as 
warranting a derivative suit. 
A derivative action provides a minority shareholder a forum in which to restrain 
threatened ultra vires acts on the part of the majority or to prevent any other act on the part of the 
majority which may be denominated as a breach of trust or a breach of the fiduciary duties owing 
to the minority. See 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 2261 (1986). Despite this purpose, the lower 
court dismissed the derivative action even though improper corporate activities remained 
uncorrected. Although the lower court acknowledged several outstanding and uncorrected issues 
remained, it dismissed the action merely upon the representations of the majority shareholders 
and directors that the issues were reviewed. The purpose of a derivative action, however, would 
be significantly curtailed if a shareholders' action could be so easily dismissed. Ronald McCann 
has a right to proceed with his derivative action for those uncorrected improper corporate 
activities. 
C. The Trial Court erred in denying Ronald McCann's Motion to Amend Complaint. 
A trial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See Cook v. State Dept. of Transportation, 133 Idaho 288, 296, 985 P.2d 
1150, 1158 (1999). 
I.R.C.P. 15(a) provides in pertinent part, "a party may amend a pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." I.R.C.P. 15(a) (emphasis added). 
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Courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend. Idaho Schools for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912 P.2d 644 
(1995), quoting Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 
(1986). 
LR.C.P. 15(a) has two objectives. The first is to allow claims to be determined on the 
merits rather than on technicalities. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 
871, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999); Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986). The 
second is to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim 
and the facts at issue. Id. The Courts have explained Rule 1 S(a) as follows: 
Rule lS(a) declares leave to amend "shall be freely given where justice so 
req_uires," this mandate is to be heeded. If the underlying facts or circumstances 
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded 
an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or 
declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of 
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of 
amendment, etc.--the leave sought should, as the rules require "be freely given." 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity, 128 Ida,_lio at 284; quoting Foman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
Ronald McCann's Motion to Amend Complaint was denied on two grounds. The first 
was the Trial Court's holding that Mr. Mccann asserted new claims and failed to comply with 
the 90-day written demand requirement in regard to such claims. In its Opinion and Order Re: 
Pending Motions, the court labeled the following issues as "new'' and not considered by the 
Corporation's board of directors under LC.§ 30-1-742: 
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1. Excessive salary paid to Bill Jr. 
2. Deferred compensation to Gertrude of $106,000 
3. Indemnifying Bill Jr. and Meisner for Fees & Costs 
4. Failing to reimburse the Corporation for damages caused by the alleged 
incorrect actions which the Board corrected in August and September 
5. Failing to collect the $87,896 receivable from the Estate for the Corporation 
6. Removing Ron as a director 
(R. Vol. I, p. 177) 
A review of the record, however, demonstrates that the Trial Court's holding was clearly 
erroneous. Ronald McCann' s proposed Amended Complaint did not assert new claims. William 
Mccann, Jr. 's excessive compensation was specifically pled in the original Complaint. 
Paragraph 3.13 states: 
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that defendants have 
improperly caused the expenditure of substantial corporate funds for the payment 
of compensation and other benefits to defendant William McCann, Jr. .. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 7, LL. 15-19) 
Additionally, Anna McCann's deferred compensation was merely an attempt to 
recharacterize the improper consulting fees and outstanding receivable previously set forth in the 
Complaint. (R. Vol. I, p.4, LL. 16-21) In fact, Gary Meisner's counsel expressly acknowledged 
that back rental payments to Mrs. Mccann, a plan adopted by the board in lieu of the deferred 
compensation, were made to offset Mrs. McCann's receivable owed to the Corporation. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 92, LL. 2-8) 
The $87,896 receivable from the Estate of William McCann, Sr. is also an issue 
previously raised in the Complaint. Paragraph 3 .10 states in pertinent part: 
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The defendants, in their positions as directors, shareholders and an officer, 
improperly caused the Corporation to loan $81,000 to :rvfrs. Mccann in the form 
of an Officer's Account Receivable. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 4, LL. 16-21) The corporate records :first provided to Ron Mccann reflected an 
officer's account receivable to Anna McCann in the amount of $81,000. (R. Vol. I, p. 4, LL. 16-
21) As more information was disclosed, it was discovered that this account receivable was 
actually an $87,896 receivable owed by the Estate of William Mccann, Sr. but assumed by Mrs. 
McCann. (R. Vol. I, p. 221, Record Exhibit (I) Supplemental Memorandum ... lodged 
November 2, 2000, Exhibit "A," p. 14, LL. 3-4) Consequently, this is one and the same issue, 
and was pled in the original Complaint. (R. Vol. I, p. 4, LL. 16-21) 
Further, the so-called "new" claims do not arise out of new or different facts than those 
alleged in the Complaint. The majority shareholders/directors caused the Corporation to 
indemnify William McCann, Jr. and Gary Meisner, failed to seek reimbursement for the 
Corporation, and removed Ronald Mccann as a director, all as a direct consequence of Mr. 
McCann's demands and filing the derivative suit. These issues arise out of the same conduct and 
transactions set forth in the Complaint, and :Mr. Mccann is entitled to amend the Complaint. 
Under I.R.C.P. 15(c), the amendments relate back to the date of the original complaint because 
the claims arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. 
See I.RC.P. 15(c). Therefore, the 90-day written demand requirement was fulfilled. 
The second ground for denying the motion was the court's erroneous conclusion that a 
majority of Ronald McCann's original claims had been resolved. Many of Mr. McCann's claims 
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allegedly resolved, however, were merely recharacterized. The problems forming the basis of 
the claims still exist. For example, the Corporation was improperly paying Anna McCann so-
called "consulting fees," and refused to seek reimbursement from Mrs. McCann for an 
outstanding officer receivable/loan. The Corporation ceased paying the "consulting fees." 
However, the directors then began strategizing on how to recharacterize the payments and 
receivable in order to prevent Mrs. McCann from having to reimburse the Corporation for the 
improper payments. After the first suggestion to pay deferred compensation was rejected, the 
directors caused the Corporation to pay back and future rental for the alleged use of Mrs. 
McCann's garage. Consequently, the consulting fee and officer receivable issues were not 
resolved. They were merely recharacterized, and properly included in the proposed amended 
complaint. 
The very purpose of a derivative action would be thwarted if majority shareholders and 
directors could merely recharacterize improper corporate activities, assert they were cured, and 
require the minority shareholder make another demand identifying the recharacterized action, 
and wait yet another 90 days. Such a requirement would cause a never-ending cycle effectively 
preventing a minority shareholder from asserting his and the Corporation's rights in court. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court failed to provide any basis as to why leave should not be 
freely given. The court made no finding that granting Ronald McCann' s motion to amend would 
cause undue delay or prejudice. Even if an amended complaint reflects a new legal theory of 
recovery, the amendment will be granted if the amendment will not prejudice the defendants 
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because the basic facts giving rise to a right of recovery remain unaltered. See Christensen 
Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 871, citing Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272, 561 
P.2d 1299, 1305 (1977). Therefore, leave should have been freely given, and failure to do so was 
an abuse of discretion. 
D. The Trial Court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs against Ronald McCann. 
As set forth above, the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ronald McCann's complaint. 
Attorney fees and costs should therefore not have been awarded. Even if dismissing the 
Complaint was not in error, this is not a proper case for awarding attorney fees and costs. 
In its Opinion and Order the trial court stated: 
The court finds that this action was commenced without reasonable cause in light 
of the clear dictates of LC.§ 30-1-742. Plaintiff further maintained the action by 
filing the motion to amend raising new claims also subject to LC. § 30-1-742. 
This Court is convinced that this action was filed without reasonable cause only to 
the extent it violated the ninety-day filing prerequisite, and therefore qualifies for 
an award of fees and costs under LC. § 30-1-744 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). 
(R Vol. I, p. 180) 
The lower court's citation of LC. § 30-1-744 is in error, as it does not provide for an 
award of fees or costs. The correct citation is LC. § 30-1-746(2) which permits the award of fees 
or costs upon termination of a derivative proceeding. However, such an award can be made only 
"if [the court] finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause 
or for an improper purpose." The record clearly reflects that reasonable cause existed to file the 
Complaint. It was only after the Complaint was filed that the majority shareholders/directors 
began initiating any corrective actions. 
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Additionally, the amount of fees awarded is unreasonably excessive. A court is permitted 
to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by the attorney and need not 
blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney. See Craft Wall ofldaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 
108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324 (CtApp. 1985). To determine reasonableness, I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(3) requires the court consider various enumerated factors before fixing the amount of 
attorney fees awarded. 
The district court must provide sufficient information for the court on appeal to determine 
what standard it applied or whether it applied that standard correctly. The district court should, 
at a minimum, provide a record establishing that the court considered the factors under the rule. 
Perkins v. U.S. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427, 430, 974 P.2d 73, 76 (1999). In the absence 
of such information, the award of attorney fees should be vacated. See Perkins at 430; see also 
Hacket v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,263, 706 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1985). 
Although this action was commenced less than seven months before it was dismissed, the 
Trial Court has already awarded attorney fees against Ronald McCann in the amount of 
$40,615.73, and may award an additional $71,827.64 when it issues its order on the supplemental 
memorandums on costs and attorney fees. The Trial Court provided no basis on the record for 
awarding such an exorbitant amount and did not make any reference to the factors set forth in 
. l.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). The Trial Court therefore erred and the award should be vacated. 
E. Ronald McCann is entitled to attorney fees on appeal 
. Pursuant to LR.AP. 40 and 41, Ronald Mc Cann requests an award of attorneys' fees and 
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costs incurred on appeal. 
On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may order the corporation to pay 
the plaintiff's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred in the proceeding if it finds 
that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation. LC.§ 30-1-746. 
The Record demonstrates that the Corporation received substantial benefits from Ronald 
McCann' s efforts. Only after the action was commenced was the Corporation reimbursed for the 
improper loan to the estate of William McCann, Sr. in the amount of $286,928.32, for work 
performed by corporate employees on behalf of William McCann, Jr. and his family, and for 
several improper expenditures personally benefiting William McCann, Jr. and his family. 
Ronald Mccann is therefore entitled to recover his attorney fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Ronald McCann requests that the Trial Court's actions be reversed, that this matter be 
remanded for proceedings which would allow Ronald McCann to fully and fairly present the 
claims asserted in the Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint, and that Mr. McCann 
be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs in.curred on appeal. 
DATED this ldh..day of June, 2001. 
draM & //Jl)l1~ 
TAMARA W. MUROCK, ISBA #5886 
MARIS BALTINS, WSBA#09107 
WINSTON & CASHATT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Ronald R. McCann 
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138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 
Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Lewiston, October 2002 Term. 
Page 1 of 15 
Ronald R. McCANN, individually and as a shareholder of Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co., Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
V. 
William V. McCANN, Jr., as an officer, director and shareholder of Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co., 
Gary E. Meisner, as a director and shareholder of Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co., and Mccann Ranch 
& Livestock Co., an Idaho corporation, Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 27229. 
Dec. 31, 2002. 
Shareholder brought action, both individually and derivatively, against corporation and two of its 
directors for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conversion, and other claims. The District Court, 
Nez Perce County, George R. Reinhardt, III, J., denied shareholder's motion to amend the complaint, 
dismissed the action, and awarded attorney fees to defendants. Sharehol.der appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Walters, J., held that: (1) shareholder's causes of action were derivative, rather than 
individual, in nature, and thus shareholder could not commence action until 90-day period following 
the service of written demand on corporation had expired;: (2) only the third of shareholder's letters 
was sufficient to constitute a "written demand" for corporation to take action; (3) shareholder was not 
excused from complying with written demand requirement; (4) futility exception no longer applied to 
the written demand requirement; (5) directors who determined that maintenance of derivative action 
was not in best interests of corporation did not lack independence or good faith; (6) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying shareholder's motion to amend his complaint; and (7) corporation and 
directors were entitled to award of attorney fees in trial court and on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
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action, and shareholder's third letter was copied to the directors, sufficiently detailed the alleged 
wrongful corporate conduct, and requested that the corporation take suitable action. LC.§ 30-1-742. 
fJU fE ~~es foe this H~ 
4);;.-101 Corporations 
<-=1011X.: Members and Stockholders 
'°""'101IX(C) Suing or Defending on Behalf of Corporation 
<-101k206 Refusal of Corporation, Officers, or Stockholders to Act 
'°""'101k206(3) k. Sufficiency of Demand. Most Cited Cases 
A complaint is not a sufficient demand under statute requiring that a shareholder must make a 
written demand upon a corporation at least 90 days before commencing a derivative action. LC. § 30-
1-742. 
l2l I.if KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
<=101 Corporations 
<-=101IX Members and Stockholders 
'°""101IX(C} Suing or Defending on Behalf of Corporation 
<();;>101k206 Refusal of Corporation, Officers, or Stockholders to Act 
<-=101k206(4) k. Excuse for Failure to Demand. Most Cited Cases 
Shareholder was not excused from complying with statutory requirement that a shareholder must 
make a written demand upon corporation for action at least 90 days before commencing a derivative 
action, even though shareholder claimed that corporation was being irreparably harmed and 
corporation had previously rejected a few of shareholder's requests regarding alleged corporate 
misconduct; none of those requests indicated that legal action would be taken if corporate conduct 
was not corrected, and nothing· in record suggested that irreparable injury would result by waiting for 
the expiration of the 90-day period. § 3 -1-74 . 
llill i"-.K.e.~~es for this Heagngt~ 
<-=361 Statutes 
<();;>361VI Construction and Operation 
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<C=-361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
{=-36lk212 Presumptions to Aid Construction 
-t=361k212.l k. Knowledge of Legislature. Most Cited Cases 
Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes 
and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed. 
illJ 1£1' KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
(;;;:-361 Statutes 
<t=-361 VI Construction and Operation 
{;;;;,361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
{=-361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction 
(;;.>361k212.5 k. Intention to Change Law. Most Cited Cases 
The legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established princip!es of law unless an 
intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of no other 
reasonable construction. 
illl ~ KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
{;;>101 Corporations 
-i:=101IX Members and Stockholders 
c,,.,lOlIX(C) Suing or Defending on Behalf of Corporation 
,,e, .. 101k206 Refusal of Corporation, Officers, or Stockholders to Act 
{.-..-1Qlk206(4) k. Excuse for Failure to Demand. Most Cited Cases 
Futility exception no longer applies to the requirement that written demand precede the 
commencement of a shareholder's derivative action.~ 30-1-742. 
I13J ~ KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
(;;;,lQl Corporations 
{;;;;,lQlX Officers and Agents 
<t=lOlX(C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to Corporation and Its Members 
~101k320 Actions Between Shareholders and Officers or Agents 
(.=10lk320(5) k. Failure of Action by Corporation and Demand That Action Be Brought. Most 
Cited Cases 
Directors who determined that maintenance of derivative action, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, 
negligence, conversion, and other claims, was not in the best interests of the corporation, did not lack 
independence or good faith while making that determination, and thus derivative action was properly 
dismissed; director who was target of misconduct allegations did not participate in determination, and 
long-time friendship of one director making determination with director who was target of misconduct 
allegations did not automatica[ly taint first director's ability to be independent or to act in good faith in 
discharging his responsibilities. LC.§ 30-1-744. 
[14] Jffl" KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
,t.=302 Pleading 
<(),;,,302VI Amended and Supplemental Pleadings and Repleader 
(.=302k242 Amendment of Declaration, Complaint, Petition, or Statement 
<C?302k248 New or Different Cause of Action 
{=302k248(17) k. Miscellaneous Actions or Proceedings. Most Cited Cases 
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Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying shareholder's motion to amend his complaint, in 
derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conversion, and other claims, where 
corporation resolved all of the claims brought in original complaint during stay, and amendment 
sought to add new causes of action that did not comply with statutory requirement that a shareholder 
must make a written demand upon corporation at least 90 days before commencing a derivative 
action. LC.§ 30-1-742; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule lS(a). 
IDJ. i' KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
,(';;;;,30 Appeal and Error 
<e=30XVI Review 
{;;;.-30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
-~30k959 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings 
{.---;;;,30k959(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
A trial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed by an appellate court under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule lS(a). 
l1fil fi" KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
<()..,302_ Pleading 
(--302VI Amended a.nd Supplemental Pleadings and Repleader 
i=302k233 Leave of Court to Amend 
<e=-302k233.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason, such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory 
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc., leave to amend a complaint should, as the rule of civil procedure requires, be freely 
given. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule lS(a). 
illl ffl KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
(;.;;;-10_1_ Corporations 
<C=lOlX Officers and Agents 
<1:=lOlX(C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to Corporation and Its Members 
(,;;;,1Qlk320 Actions Between Shareholders and Officers or Agents 
<t=101k320(12) k. Damages or Amount of Recovery. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to corporation and two of its 
directors in shareholder's derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conversion, 
and other claims; where shareholder repeatedly sought to circumvent statutory requirement that a 
shareholder must make a written demand upon a corporation at least 90 days before commencing a 
derivative action, and filed a motion for an amended complaint adding new claims after being warned 
that he could not prosecute claims the corporation did not first have 90 days to consider; shareholder 
filed action without reasonable cause. LC. § 30-1-746(2). 
llfil lj KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
,(';;;;,lQl Corporations 
-O=lOlIX Members and Stockholders 
<C;a;-101IX(C) Suing or Defending on Behalf of Corporation 
<e=-101k214 k. Costs and Expenses. Most Cited Cases 
An award of attorney fees under statute providing for award of attorney fees on termination of a 
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shareholder derivative proceeding is discretionary and should be subject to review and vacated 
only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 30-1-746(2). 
I12l ~ KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
f=lQl Corporations 
,c..,.lQlX Officers and Agents 
o);o,lQlX(C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to Corporation and Its Members 
(;;.-1Qlk320 Actions Between Shareholders and Officers or Agents 
{..--;-1Qlk320(12) k. Damages or Amount of Recovery. Most Cited Cases 
Corporation and two of its directors were entitled to award of attorney fees incurred in defending 
appeal of dismissal of derivative action, under statute providing for award of attorney fees on 
termination of a derivative proceeding; district court did not misapply the law, and arguments 
presented on appeal by shareholder who brought derivative action merely sought reconsideration of 
the factual determinations and exercise of discretion made by the district court. LC.§ 30-1-746. 
**588 *231 Winston & Cashatt, Coeur d'Alene, ID./Spokane, WA., for appellant. Maris Baltins 
argued. 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, Boise, for respondent Mccann. Merlyn W. Clark appeared. 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, Lewiston, for respondent Meisner. Michael E. Mcl\Jichols argued. 
McDevitt & Miller, Boise, for respondent Mccann Ranch & Livestock Corp. Charles F. McDevitt 
appeared. 
WALTERS, Justice. 
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a shareholder's action. Ronald Mccann ("Ron") brought the 
action, both individually and derivatively, naming as defendants his brother, William Mccann, Jr. 
("Bill"), who is a director and shareholder of Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co. ("the corporation"), Gary 
Meisner, who is a director and the trustee for William Mccann, Sr.'s trust, and the corporation. The 
district court dismissed the action because of the plaintiffs failure to comply with the 90-day written 
demand requirements of LC. § 30-1-742. The district court also awarded costs and attorney fees to 
the defendants, who are the respondents in this appeal. We affirm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The district court found that the following facts were largely undisputed. Ron and Bill Mccann each 
were gifted 36.7% of the shares of the corporation in the 1970's. The remaining stock was held by 
their father, William Mccann, Sr. In 1997, Bill began working part time for the corporation. In that 
same year, William, Sr. passed away and his interest in the corporation transferred to a trust set up 
to benefit his wife, Gertrude. The trustee, Meisner, was given the power and discretion to redeem 
shares of stock to provide an income for Gertrude. Following Gertrude's death, the shares were to 
pass to Bill. 
Beginning in the latter part of 1998, the parties' attorneys began working to resolve differences 
between Ron and the corporation. Among the issues raised by Ron were: the use of corporate funds 
to pay for estate taxes, an increase in the amount of salary paid to Bill, the failure to seek repayment 
for a corporate loan, the payment of consulting fees when no services were rendered, the logging of 
timber belonging to the corporation and the improper characterization of employee payments. The 
corporation gave financial and property-related information, which Ron was entitled to as a 
shareholder, to Ron's attorney. 
t=ollowing a series of letters between the attorneys, a special board of directors meeting was 
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scheduled in August 2000 to address the many issues raised by Ron. Despite the scheduled board 
of directors meeting, Ron's attorney sent a letter to the corporation's attorney and directors pursuant 
to I.C. § 30-1-742 on June 9, 2000, demanding immediate action be taken by the corporation on 
various matters_FNi The corporation's attorney responded, requesting time to inquire into the 
allegations and prepare a response. Ten days later, however, on June 19, 2000, Ron filed his 
complaint. The complaint alleged both derivative and individual claims relating to the following causes 
of action: breach of fiduciary duties, negligence by the directors, conversion of corporate property, 
self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to 
comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 23(0 and ""'-"''.!...-.:1~"---=-'--'=-' Gary Meisner's motion also 
asserted that Ron lacked standing to sue him as the trustee. On August 3, 2000, Ron filed a motion to 
amend his complaint. 
FN 1. The matters raised in the June 9 demand letter did not encompass all of the issues 
that had been raised by Ron since 1998. The letter addressed the loan made to the estate 
and Gertrude instead of redeeming shares of stock, payments to Gertrude as consulting 
compensation, improper tax characterization of employee accounts, corporate funds 
paying for non-corporate work, expenditures for automobile services, corporate vehicles 
being used for personal use, and logging of the corporate timber property. 
A hearing on the motions to dismiss and the motion to amend was held on August 8, 2000. The 
district court found that a proper **589 *232 demand pursuant to=~)....-=.~.,__,_~ was not made 
until June 9, 2000. The district court then stayed the action for a period of 90-days from June 9 1 
2000, and determined that issues not resolved by the board of directors could be litigated after the 
90-day period ended. The district court dismissed Gary Meisner as trustee from the case1 and awarded 
to the defendants attorney fees and costs incurred in conjunction with the filing of the action. 
The board of directors of the corporation met on August 9 1 2000 1 and addressed a majority of 
Ron's claims. Another meeting of the board of directors was held on September 61 2000 1 to address 
the remaining claims. At that meeting 1 Ron was removed as a director by a majority vote of the 
shareholders. 
ill~ Following the end of the stay, Ron filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his 
motion to amend. The defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss. After hearing all of the pending 
motions, the district court issued an opinion denying Ron's motion to amend and ordering that the 
complaint be dismissed with prejudice.FN2 The district court also awarded attorney fees and costs to 
the defendants. This appeal followed. 
FN2. Although the district court's determination that the dismissal would be with 
prejudice has not been directly challenged on appeal, we conclude that this dismissal 
liould affect only the claims that Ron attempted to pursue in his complaint prior to the ismissal, and would not prevent him from properly asserting new1 unresolved claims omplying with I.C. § 30-1-742 that may arise following the order of dismissal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing Ron's individual ·causes of action? 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing Ron's shareholder derivative causes of action? 
3. Did the district court err in denying Ron's motion to amend the complaint? 
4. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees and costs to the defendants? 
5. Is either party entitled to an award of attorney fees on this appeal? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ru ~ Where a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is 
supported by information outside of the pleadings, the motion is treated as a motion for summary 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 12(b); see also Allen v. State ex rel. Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 136 Idaho 
487, 488, 36 P.3d 1275, 1276 (2001). The standard of review on appeal from an order granting 
summary judgment is the same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the summary 
judgment motion. Baxter v. Crane'& 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Lll ~ill lBJ' A district court's decision to allow the amendment of pleadings is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 
(2001). To review an exercise of discretion, this Court applies a three-factor test. The three factors 
are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 169, 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000) (citing Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr.~ Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Individual Causes of Action 
ill~ Ron contends that a shareholder in a closely-held corporation can bring a direct action for 
wrongs committed against the **590 *233 corporation; Roh argues that improper activities, which 
benefited the majority shareholders to the exclusion of the minority shareholder, should be sufficient 
for him to bring his individual action. He submits that because he is the only minority shareholder, 
there is no potential for the multiplicity of suits nor will it prejudice the rights of other shareholders. 
The respondents contend that the district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing Ron's 
individual claims. They assert that a shareholder may bring an individual action when he has suffered 
a loss separate and distinct from the other shareholders; however, an individual claim cannot be filed 
on his behalf for a wrong solely committed against the corporation. The respondents argue that Ron's 
allegations of self-dealing, negligence, breach of duties, conversion and waste were derivative claims 
against the corporation. 
The district court stated: 
Plaintiff can bring an individual action where he has suffered a special injury distinct from that of 
the other shareholders. [The alleged claims] do not affect Ronald Mccann specifically. Individual 
actions generally include claims to enforce shareholder's rights to inspect books or vote or redeem 
stock; to compel dividends; to have the corporation dissolved; and to enforce a shareholder's 
agreement. They generally do not include suits alleging violation of duties by corporate officers, such 
as negligence, mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive compensation or squeeze outs. 
The district court concluded that Ron's individual actions were derivative in nature and therefore he 
needed to comply with the statutory 90-day written demand requirement, which he failed to do. 
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Ifil !if There is very little Idaho case law concerning individual or direct (derivative) actions. In 
Steelman v. Ma!lory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986), a direct action was allowed where the 
directors breached their fiduciary duty by usurping a corporate opportunity that cou,ld have and would 
have been performed by the corporation but for a disagreement amongst the directors. Id. at 513-14, 
716 P.2d at 1285-86. This Court held that in a closely-held corporation, the corporate directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to one another, to the corporation, and to the shareholders, including the minority 
shareholders. Id. at 513, 716 P.2d at 1285. "As fiduciaries, corporate directors are bound to exercise 
the utmost good faith in managing the corporation. However, the 'business judgment rule' immunizes 
the good faith acts of directors when the directors are acting within the exercise of their honest 
business judgment." Id. (citations omitted). 
The distinction between individual and derivative actions has been explained by one treatise as 
follows: 
[I]t is generally held that a stockholder may maintain an action in his own right for an injury 
directly affecting him, although the corporation also may have a cause of action growing out of the 
same wrong, where it appears that the injury to the stockholder resulted from the violation of some 
special duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having its origin in circumstances 
independent of the plaintiff's status as a shareholder. 
19 AM.JLIR.2D Corporations§ 2249, 151 (1986). 
A stockholder's derivative action is an action brought by one or more stockholders of a corporation 
to enforce a corporate right or remedy a wrong to the corporation in cases where the corporation; 
because it is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons fails and refuses to take appropriate 
action for its own protection .... 
An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is the injury to 
the corporation or to the whole body of its stock or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual 
interest as a stockholder. 
19 AM .JLIR.2D Corporations§ 2250, 151-52 (1986}. 
The duties that Ron has alleged the directors breached in this case do not appear to be a "special 
duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having its origin in circumstances independent of 
the plaintiff's **591 *234 status as a shareholder." Ron's allegations appear to be more that the 
corporation is "controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons fails and refuses to take appropriate 
action for its own protection." Accordingly, the nature of this action should be considered a derivative 
suit. Even if there is some potential injury to Ron, Ron's alleged injuries appear to be dependent on 
his status as a shareholder, and solely an injury to the corporation but not to him personally as an 
individual. 
This Court upholds the district court's determination that the causes of action alleged by Ron were 
derivative rather than individual in nature. 
II. 
Derivative Causes of Action 
Idaho Code§ 30-1-742 provides: 
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: 
(1) A written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and 
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(2) Ninety (90) days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has 
earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury 
to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the ninety (90) day period. 
The district court found that Ron did not make his written demand to the corporation, as 
contemplated by the statute, until June 9, 2000. The district court found that Ron failed to comply 
with the statutory prerequisite of I.C. § 30-1-742(2) by filing the complaint ten days later on June 19, 
2000, and not allowing the 90-day period following the service of the demand. The district court then 
stayed the action pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-743 in order to promote judicial economy by allowing the 
90-day period to run, and with the hope that the parties would resolve the dispute. Following the stay, 
Ron moved to amend his complaint. The amended complaint sought to add new allegations that had 
not been raised previously and were not contained in the June 9 demand letter. The district court 
found that Ron had again attempted to circumvent the 90-day written demand requirement of the 
statute. The district court ruled that: 
because Plaintiff's counsel failed to follow the dictates of I.C. § 30-1-742 for a second time, this 
Court is forced to use its discretionary authority to dismiss this action with prejudice. Otherwise, the 
purpose behind Section 30-1-742 et seq. will be thwarted, and the shareholders will never be forced 
to cooperate with each other in the corporate context as anticipated by the statute; This Court 
believes it is only encouraging controversy by allowing this action to proceed, at the cost of the 
corporation's and the individual parties' pocketbooks. · 
. .. 
Ron disagrees with the district court's decision. He asserts that the demand required by the statute 
need not be in any particular form and, in some instances, can be inferred from discussions taking 
place during conferences, but the demand must alert the corporation of the requests of the 
shareholder. Ron argues that the district court erred in finding that the first demand he made to the 
corporation was June 9, 2000, despite his numerous oral demands and letters sent to the 
corporation's attorney prior to June 9. He submits that letters of December 6, 1999, and January 21, 
2000, were demands upon the corporation to take action, and the district court erred by finding only 
the June 9, 2000, letter constituted a proper demand. In reply, the respondents point out there were 
many defects with Ron's initial letters that prevent them from being considered proper written 
demand letters. First, they argue that the letters should have been served upon the corporation's 
directors rather than the corporation's attorney. Second, the respondents assert that the letters did 
not adequately detail the alleged wrongful corporate conduct or the losses suffered. Finally, they 
maintain that the letters did not demand that the corporation take suitable action as required by LC. 
§ 30-1-742. 
The sufficiency of the written demand appears to be a question of fact to be determined by the 
district court. "The demand must be made on the directors in the office at the time the shareholders' 
derivative action is **592 *235 commenced." 19 AM.JUR.2D Corporations§ 2277, 172-73, (1986). 
"THE MERE SENDING OF A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE corporation or the service upon the 
corporation's attorney of a demand that the corporation take legal action in connection with a 
transaction complained of does not meet the demand requirement." Id. 
The demand on the directors need not assume a particular form nor need it be made in any special 
language. However, the stockholder must make an earnest and sincere, and not a feigned or 
simulated, effort to induce the directors to take remedial action in the corporate name. Statements 
should be presented to the directors showing the wrong complained of, accompanied by sufficient 
responsible data which will enable the directors to determine whether litigation could be engaged in 
with some hope of success. The shareholder must state facts, not mere general charges and 
conclusions. 
The demand should give the directors a fair opportunity to initiate the action which the shareholder 
wants to undertake, and name the potential defendants, as well as the shareholder making the 
demand. 
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The shareholder should allow sufficient time for the directors to act upon the demand before 
initiating the action. The directors' response must be obtained, if possible. The shareholder must 
comply with the reasonable requests of the directors in an effort to resolve the problems before 
commencing an action. Thus, a shareholder may be required to provide additional information to the 
. directors. 
Merely bringing the allegations of the complaint to the attention of the corporation's controlling 
authority does not constitute adequate demand for board action. Moreover, the filing of a derivative 
complaint is not a sufficient demand. 
19 AM.JUR.2D Corporations§ 2278, 173-74 (1986). 
ru lffl' The initial letters from Ron are not sufficient to constitute a written demand pursuant to LC. 
§ 30-1-742. The letters were delivered only to the corporation's attorney; they were not sent to the 
directors. Further, the letters consist of discussions among the parties to resolve issues between the 
brothers, not necessarily an explicit demand upon the corporation to take suitable action. This Court 
affirms the district court's finding that the December 6, 1999, and January 21, 2000, letters do not 
constitute demand letters pursuant to LC. § 30-1-742. 
The letter of June 9, 2000, is a proper written demand upon the corporation. The letter, although 
written to the corporation's attorney, was also copied to the directors. The alleged wrongful corporate 
conduct was sufficiently detailed with facts and the letter requests that the corporation take suitable 
action. 
1fil ~ Ron also suggests that the complaint he filed was sufficient to be considered a demand 
under I.C. § 30-1-742, and that the effect of the stay cured any defects in the demand. The complaint 
is not a sufficient demand under LC.§ 30-1-742. See e.g. Lucking v. Delano, 117 F.2d 159, 160 (6th 
Cir.1941) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)). Unless one of the enumerated exceptions 
applies, a written demand and 90-days must expire before a complaint for a derivative proceeding 
may be filed. Even if the stay cured the 90-day defect for the issues contained in the June 9 letter, 
any further allegations not contained in the demand letter would be subject to the statutory demand 
and waiting period requirements. Ron's additional allegations of corporate misconduct would have to 
be presented to the directors in a subsequent written demand requesting action be taken on those 
items, as well, for the proceeding to be justiciable under I.C. § 30-1-742. 
ill~ Ron argues that he is excused from complying with the written demand requirement 
because the corporation was being irreparably harmed and because the corporation had already 
previously rejected his requests, which are the two exceptions recited in LC.§ 30-1-742. Ron also 
asserts that his attempts had been futile in the past. Under these circumstances, Ron contends, he did 
not need to wait 90-days to commence his suit as provided by the statute. 
**593 *236 The district court addressed Ron's arguments, stating: 
The proposed Amended Complaint alleges that written demands under Section 30-1-742 have 
been futile in the past, and further that the Corporation failed to correct all improper acts since the 
summer of 1999. There is no futility exception in Idaho's Business Corporations Act. Further, the 
record does not support this allegation. In fact, the vast majority of Plaintiff's original claims have 
been resolved by the Corporation; the mere fact that not all were resolved in his favor does not 
warrant further court intervention under the statutory scheme. 
In this case, Ron had made prior attempts to resolve his questions of alleged corporate 
· misconduct. However, none of the attempts proposed that legal action would be taken if the corporate 
conduct were not corrected. Although a few of Ron's requests had been rejected by the corporation in 
the past, the record does not appear to support a conclusion that demand should be excused because 
of those few rejections. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that irreparable injury 
would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period. 
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Nor are we persuaded that the futility exception previously recognized by the courts in Idaho with 
regard to shareholder derivative actions, applies in this case. The futility exception arose by case law 
under the court rule addressing such actions. See I.R.C.P. 23(D. In 1998, the legislature adopted a 
comprehensive enactment relating to the rights of parties to shareholder derivative actions as part of 
the corporations code. See 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 223, p. 766. This included LC.§ 30-1-742, 
specifying the conditions under which a shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding. 
l1Ql lifI111 ~ Neither of the two exceptions to the demand requirement set forth in LC.§ 30-1-
742 encompasses the doctrine of futility. "Statutes are construed under the assumption that the 
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed." 
Druffe/ v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856, 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). "The legislature is 
presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an intention to do so 
plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of no other reasonable 
construction." George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 
(1990). 
ill} fl Accordingly, we presume the legislature was aware of the common law futility exception 
when the statute including two exceptions to the demand requirement was adopted, but the 
legislature chose not to add a provision expressing the concept of futility as an exception. This 
appears to be a clear demonstration of the legislature's intent to no longer recognize "futility" as an 
exception to the requirement of demand as a condition preceding the institution of a shareholder's 
derivative action. This Court affirms the district court's decision that written demand was not excused 
in this case and holds that the futility exception no longer applies to the demand requirement as set 
forth in the statute. 
illl ~ Idaho Code§ 30-1-744 governs the dismissal of derivative proceedings. This section 
provides that a proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if a majority 
vote of a quorum of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, or a 
majority vote of a specifically defined committee, has determined in good faith after conducting a 
reasonable inquiry that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
At the initial board of directors meeting on August 9, 2000, the board appointed directors Meisner 
and Durkin to review Bill's compensation and the corporate dividends. The board of directors began to 
review the issues raised in Ron's demand letter at the August meeting. The directors rieeded 
clarification on some of the issues and requested information from Ron's attorney. At the September 
board meeting, the directors continued addressing the issues raised by the letter and clarified that 
they had addressed each claim contained in the demand letter, with the exception of the issues upon 
which the board had requested information from Ron but had **594 *237 not received. The board 
then decided it would not be in the best interest of the corporation to continue the derivative action. 
Ron challenges the independence and good faith of the directors. However, there is nothing in the 
record to show that the directors lacked independence or good faith while making the determinations. 
The record shows that issues surrounding Bill's compensation and the issuance of dividends were 
dealt with solely by the two non-Mccann directors. Further, although Gary Meisner and Bill were long-
time friends, this does not automatically taint Meisner's ability to be independent or to act in good 
faith in discharging his responsibilities. 
The June 9, 2000, letter was the only proper demand served upon the corporation. Consequently, 
this Court upholds the district court's decision that the derivative action failed to conform to the 
requirements of the statute and that the action should be dismissed. 
III. 
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Motion to Amend Complaint 
l11.l !i1 Ron argues that the district court's denial of his motion to amend was clearly erroneous for 
several reasons. He asserts that he had previously raised many of the claims the district court found 
were new and that failed to comply with the 90-day written demand requirement. He contends that 
the "new" claims were based on the same facts that were alleged in the initial complaint. Additionally, 
Ron asserts that the district court erred in determining that a majority of his claims had been resolved 
following the stay. 
The respondents contend that the district court properly perceived this motion as one left to its 
discretion and properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion. The respondents note that the 
district court considered Ron's suggestions of bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue 
prejudice and futility with regard to the proposed amended complaint 
li.51 illiJ ~Atrial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed by this 
Court under an abuse of discretion standard. See Cook v. State Dep't of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 296, 
985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999). Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to 
amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." "In the absence of any apparent 
or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought 
should, as the rules require, be freely given." Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 
Idaho 866,871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999). 
In this case, the district court properly recognized the motion to amend as a matter submitted to 
its discretion. At the time the district court stayed the case, the judge indicated that he would permit 
amendment of the complaint in the future to consider properly-raised claims not resolved by this 
procedure. When the amended complaint sought to add new causes of action, none of which complied 
with LC.§ 30-1-742(2), the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion by denying the 
motion. The district court articulated its rationale in an opinion that showed it had reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason. 
Given the circumstances, this Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying the motion to amend. 
IV. 
Attorney Fees and Costs in the District Court 
llZl lffl' Ron argues that the district court erred in awarding fees and costs because the record 
supports that he had a reasonable cause to commence and maintain this action. 
The respondents argue that the district court properly awarded fees. The respondents point out 
that the district court awarded fees pursuant to LC.§ 30-1-746(2) after determining that the 
respondents were the prevailing party, and the district court did not award all of the fees sought by 
the **595 *238 parties. The respondents further note that the district court found that Ron 
maintained the action without reasonable cause and that the filing of the motion to amend by raising 
new claims was improper. 
The district court awarded attorney fees under LC.§ 30-1-746(2) after finding that this action was 
filed without reasonable cause in light of LC.§ 30-1-742. 
Idaho Code § 30-1-746 provides in relevant part: 
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On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may: 
(2) Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred 
in defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without 
reasonable cause or for an improper purpose. 
11fil. ffi' An award of attorney fees under this statute is discretionary and should be subject to 
review and vacated only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Here, an abuse of discretion has 
not been shown. The district court found that Ron repeatedly sought to circumvent the requirements 
of LC. § 30-1-742. The district court even stayed the proceeding In an attempt to allow the 
requirements to be satisfied. The district court concluded that "[h]ad Plaintiff's counsel not proceeded 
to file a motion for an amended complaint adding new claims, having previously been warned that the 
statute required the corporation have ninety days to first consider the claims before prosecuting the 
same claims in court, this Court would not have been compelled to award fees and costs to the 
defendants. The statute and the facts authorize such an award to each of the defendants as the 
prevailing party in this action." 
After reviewing the circumstances of the case, this Court holds that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding fees to the respondents under LC.§ 30-f-746(2). 
v. 
Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal 
Il2l if Both parties seek an award of attorney fees for this appeal. The appellant, however, is not 
the prevailing party. The respondents argue that they should be awarded their costs and attorney fees 
for defending this appeal under "'-'-"~1·-·"'·"'--'"--!.--'-"'. because the appeal did not present any meaningful 
issue on a question of law or show that the district court misapplied the law relating to the 
requirements of demand under LC. § 30-1-742, but simply invited this Court to second-guess the 
district court on questions of fact. On review, we agree that there was no misapplication of the law by 
the district court, and that the thrust of the arguments presented by the appellant merely seek 
reconsideration of the factual determinations and the exercise of discretion made by the district court. 
Because we uphold the decision of the district court dismissing the action and awarding attorney fees 
to the defendants pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-746(2), we also award attorney fees to the respondents on 
appeal, in an amount to be determined in accord with the provisions of LA.R. 41. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court Is affirmed. Attorney fees and costs OF'l appeal are awarded to 
respondents. 
Idaho,2002. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOI\ID JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______ N_o_rnm_._al_D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_. ) 
FACTUAL OVERVIEW 
No. CV08-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE 
MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
McCann Ranch & Livestock, Inc., was formed in 1974 by the Mccann brothers' 
father, William Mccann, who gifted to each of his sons 36.7% of the shares. And from 1974 
until his death in 1997, senior Mccann continued to control and manage his business 
interests, now held by the corporation. During these years (and before incorporation in 1974) 
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it was Plaintiff who provided hundreds of hours of uncompensated labor - hauling cattle, 
branding cattle, grading roads, making hay, hauling hay and farming - while his brother 
attended law school and then engaged in the fulltime practice of law. Senior McCann formed 
the corporation as a means of transferring his estate to his sons, intending that each benefit. 
It was just shortly before Mr. McCann's death that his son Bill became more actively 
involved in the corporation. And since Mr. McCann's death in late 1997, Bill has been 
president and, together with co-Defendant Meisner, in control of the corporation. They have 
consistently managed the corporation in a manner that it provides no meaningful benefit to 
Ronald McCann. Complaint Paragraphs 1-3, 5-6, 7-10, 18-26. 
McCann Senior's will provides that the stock left in trust for the benefit of his widow 
should be redeemed as necessary and voted in a way to provide her income and what stock 
was not redeemed would be inherited by Defendant Bill McCann at his mother's death. 
Thus, Defendant Bill McCann is motivated to not cause the corporation to redeem her shares. 
Such redemption would provide an equal benefit to Plaintiff. Complaint Paragraphs 15-17. 
So how do Defendants McCann and Meisner provide income to Gertrude McCann, the third 
shareholder? They vote to pay an elderly, retired woman, "consulting fees". They vote to 
have the corporation purchase and/or lease from her, her house and shop, allowing her to 
continue to reside there as always. She gets paid by the corporation for living in her home. 
They cause the corporation to pay her automobile expense and her utilities. They refuse to 
redeem her shares yet they see to it that Gertrude receives substantial cash flow in a manner 
that avoids the declaration of dividends. Of course, if dividends were declared, all 
shareholders would proportionately benefit. Complaint Paragraphs 16, 19 and 25. 
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So shareholder Gertrude McCann is financially taken care of by the corporation, but 
not as a shareholder - instead, as the recipient of phony business transactions - "leases," 
"purchases," and "consulting fees." 
The second shareholder, Defendant Bill McCann, has voted to pay himself an annual 
salary of $144,000 a year, recently increased to $165,000. This is a remarkable salary 
considering that he continues with his fulltime practice of law. Complaint Paragraph 18. 
What does Plaintiff receive? The Defendants refuse to put him on the Board, they 
refuse to have the corporation employ him. Complaint Paragraphs 20-21. What would any 
shareholder in his situation consider to be a reasonable expectation? He owns 36.7% of a 
corporation whose assets have a net value of at least twenty million dollars. Complaint 
Paragraph 15. A one percent rate of return would call for dividends on an annual basis .of 
between $150,000 and $200,000. If Plaintiff were simply receiving a one percent rate of 
return on his proportionate interest in the corporation, he would be receiving between 
$50,000 and $75,000 a year in dividends. He receives essentially nothing. And the bylaws 
prevent him from disposing of his shares for fair value on the open market. Complaint 
Paragraph 27 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to JRCP 12(b)(6), alleging that the 
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted due to the res judicata 
effect of an earlier trial court dismissal, affirmed by the State Supreme Court in McCann v. 
Mccann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002). Defendants also move for dismissal, alleging 
that a minority shareholder in an Idaho closely held corporation, who is subject to 
oppression, may not obtain equitable relief pursuant to the Idaho dissolution corporate 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS -- 3 27&/ 
dissolution statute, nor may he bring an individual action for either damages or equitable 
relief against the oppressors. The Defendants' motion should be denied because: 
ISSUES 
1. In McCann I, Nez Perce County Cause Number CV-2008-01111, the Idaho 
Supreme Court unambiguously ruled that the causes of action asserted therein 
were derivative, not individual. Here, Plaintiff brings individual actions: 
Cause of Action 1, based upon the individual Defendants' breach of fiduciary 
duties owed to him; and Cause of Action 2, a statutory corporate dissolution 
action. Plaintiff seeks as a remedy redemption of his shares for fair market 
value or, in the alternative, dissolution of the corporation, and damages. The 
Supreme Court in the previous action specifically ruled that the dismissal 
therein would not have preclusive effect concerning claims which might arise 
following the dismissal. The present action was not, and should not, have been 
brought in 2000. Therefore, res judicata does not apply. 
2. Idaho law, as set forth in Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510 (1986), 
authorizes a shareholder of a closely held corporation to bring a direct action 
against the controlling shareholders seeking either damages or individual (for 
Plaintiff's benefit) equitable relief. 
3. An oppressed shareholder of a closely held corporation may seek an equitable 
remedy under LC. 30-1-1430, the corporate dissolution statute. 
1. Can res judicata be raised by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal? 
2. What causes of action were brought, and dismissed with prejudice in the 
earlier action? 
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3. What causes of action are plead herein? 
4. Are the necessary elements of res judicata and/or issue preclusion lacking? 
5. Does Idaho recognize an individual action for an oppressed shareholder of a 
closely held corporation? 
6. Analysis of the Idaho Dissolution statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants' bring their motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claim 
Upon Which Relief May Be Granted. Thus, all factual assertions set forth in the Complaint 
and all reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, are to be treated as true. Owsley 
v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, __ (2005). Thus, an initial review of the 
Complaint is in order. Additional review will be set forth in the Argument. 
McCann II - the Complaint herein. 
1. The Defendant corporation was formed in 1974 by William V. McCann, Sr. 
McCann Senior transferred to his newly formed corporation his extensive ranch and timber 
holdings and his undeveloped real estate located in or near Lewiston, Idaho. Over the next 
several years he gifted to each of his sons 36. 7% of the stock. McCann Senior, even though 
he owned the fewest shares, was the controlling director and officer of the corporation until 
his death on October 27, 1997. Complaint Paragraph 5 
2. McCann Senior formed his corporation primarily for estate planning purposes; 
to limit estate and inheritance tax exposure and to facilitate the transfer of his estate to his 
children. McCann Senior had no intention of excluding Plaintiff from enjoying the expected 
benefits from his gifted stock. Complaint Paragraph 6 
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3. Following William McCann Senior's death, Defendant William McCann, Jr., 
in late 1997, took over full control/management of the corporation. Complaint Paragraph 18 
4. Defendant McCann owns 91,700 chares of the 250,000 outstanding shares of 
said corporation, i.e., he owns 36.7% of the common stock. Defendant McCann is 65 years 
old. Complaint Paragraph 2 
5. Plaintiff Ronald McCann is 61 years old. He also owns 36.7% of common 
stock of the corporation. Complaint Paragraph 1 
6. The balance of the stock, 66,600 shares, is held by Defendant Gary Meisner as 
Trustee for the benefit of 92 year old Gertrude McCann, the mother of Ron and Bill. 
Complaint Paragraph 3 
7. Since Defendants McCann and Meisner have assumed control of the 
corporation, they have managed it in a manner where the financial benefits all accrue for the 
benefit of Defendant William McCann, Jr. For example, the net fair market value of the 
corporate assets is at least twenty million dollars. A four percent rate of return, a rate of 
return that can readily be obtained from no risk investments, would provide annual income of 
$800,000. 36.7% of that figure, the percentage of the corporation which Plaintiff owns, is 
$290,000. Instead of receiving $290,000 a year, the only financial benefit Plaintiff has 
received from the corporation in the last twelve years are dividends totaling $25,676. For 
most years, dividends were not declared. Complaint Paragraphs 18-25 
8. Plaintiffs reasonable expectation that following his father's death the 
corporation would be managed in a manner to provide to Plaintiff the benefit intended to him 
by William McCann, Sr., the benefit of his gift/inheritance, has been frustrated due to the 
Defendants' oppression. Complaint Paragraphs 6, 18-24 
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9. The complaint alleges as its "first cause of action" a direct cause of action 
pursuant to Steelman v. Malory, 110 Idaho 510 (1986) asserting that the individual 
defendants have breached fiduciary duties owed to him. Complaint Paragraphs 30-33 
10. As a second cause of action, Plaintiff brings suit as a shareholder pursuant to 
the Idaho corporate dissolution statute, LC. 30-1-1430, alleging the necessary element of 
oppress10n. Complaint Paragraphs 34-40 
11. Plaintiffs prayer for relief requests no relief on behalf of the corporation; 
rather, Plaintiff seeks to have the court order the corporation to redeem his shares at fair 
value as an alternative to corporate dissolution and liquidation of all corporate assets and 
award monetary damages against the individual Defendants 
McCann I. 
12. On June 19, 2000, Plaintiff filed an action in Nez Perce County District Court. 
He styled the action: 
Ronald R. Mccann, individually and as a shareholder of McCann 
Ranch & Livestock, Company, Plaintiff vs. William V. McCann, Jr., as 
an officer, director and shareholder of McCann Ranch & Livestock 
Company., Gary E. Meisner, Trustee of the William V. McCann, Sr. 
Stock Trust, and as a director and shareholder of Mccann Ranch & 
Livestock Company and McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, and 
Idaho corporation. 
A review of the Complaint in McCann I readily illustrates why the Trial Court and Supreme 
Court ruled that Plaintiff in reality brought a derivative, not an individual action. The 
Complaint alleges in Paragraph 3.12: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
. . . defendants have improperly caused expenditure of substantial 
corporate funds for the purchase of vehicles, insurance, homes, and 
other gifts for William McCann, Jr. ... , including but not limited to: 
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... (i) Expenditures totaling $234.35 made by defendant William 
McCann, Jr., for his Mercedes; .... 
The Complaint then alleges some thirty different expenditures which if improper, could be 
remedied by reimbursement to the corporation, i.e., all are derivative claims. 
13. The McCann I Complaint alleged that compensation had been paid to 
Defendant William McCann which was not proper; that Defendant McCann has utilized 
corporate employees and property for personal gain. Complaint Paragraphs 3.13 and 3.14 
The Complaint alleged that the logging policy of the corporation was harmful and should be 
suspended, that mistakes had been made in corporate accounting and tax returns. Complaint 
Paragraphs 3.18 - 3.20 And that despite demand these actions continued - all derivate 
claims. 
14. These were the factual allegations of the first Complaint. The Complaint then 
labels these allegations as causes of action such as negligence or conversion. What is 
undisputed, what is in fact the law of the McCann I case, is that the District Court, affirmed 
by the Supreme Court, definitively ruled that whatever label Ronald McCann's lawyer, Mr. 
Baltins, put on his claims, they were, and only were derivate causes of action. 
15. The District Court, in concluding that Plaintiff's claims were derivative, and 
not individual, carefully reviewed in chronological order the history of the corporation, Bill's 
ascension to control following his father's demise, and, Ron's specific complaints directed to 
the Board for action. And both the District and Supreme Courts noted that the Board in fact 
reversed/remedied a number of the matters complained of: 
The Board responds to all but three of Plaintiff's complaint allegations, 
. . . . The Board votes to, inter alia, continue logging; to adopt 
defendant Bill, Jr.'s report on expenditures to non-employees and to 
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require some reimbursement of the corporation; and to correct 
misidentified employee payments on the books .... And agrees with 
Ron that deferred compensation [to Gertrude] is not warranted. (Trial 
Court's Decision, pages 4 and 5) 
16. Because the trial court evaluated Ron's claims as being derivative, and found 
that Mr. Baltins (Ron's lawyer at the time) had not preceded the lawsuit with the statutorily 
required written demand upon the Board of Directors - 90 days in advance of filing the 
lawsuit - the court stayed the action. It was during this time that the Board responded to a 
number of the complaints and as noted, actually remedied several. However, when Mr. 
Baltins then moved to file an amended complaint, which amended complaint set forth six 
new allegations - all of which the trial court (and later the Supreme Court) characterized as 
derivative, without once again following the 90-day written demand requirement, the trial 
court dismissed the action. Ron appealed to the Supreme Court. 
17. The Supreme Court reviewed the factual allegations and relief sought by 
Plaintiff: 
Ron contends that a shareholder in the closely - held corporation can 
bring a direct action for wrongs committed against the corporation ... 
The District Court concluded that Ron's individual actions were 
derivative in nature and therefore he needed to comply with the 
statutory 90-day written demand requirement which he failed to do. 
138 Idaho 228 at 233. 
There is very little Idaho case law concerning individual or direct 
(derivative actions) .... Ron's allegations appear to be more that the 
corporation is "controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons fails 
and refuses to take appropriate action for its own protection." 
Accordingly, the nature of this action should be considered a derivative 
suit. Id. at 233-234. 
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18. At page 234 the Supreme Court ruled, "This court upholds the district court's 
determination that the causes of action alleged by Ron were derivative rather than individual 
in nature." 
19. Defendants herein, in asserting that the earlier dismissal is res judicata, fail to 
note that the Supreme Court spoke to this very issue, stating in footnote 2, page 32: 
ARGU1v1ENT 
Although the district court's determination that the dismissal would be 
with prejudice has not been directly challenged on appeal, we conclude 
that this dismissal would affect only the claims that Ron attempted to 
pursue in his complaint prior to the dismissal, and would not prevent 
him from properly asserting new, unresolved claims complying with 
LC. § 30-1-742 that may arise following the order of dismissal. 
1. Res judicata is an affirmative defense which should be plead in the 
Defendants' answer and litigated thereafter. 
In a case which predated the rules, Kralick v. Shuttleworth, 49 Idaho 424, 289 P. 74 
(1930), the court stated at page 77: "The plea of res judicata is in the nature of a plea in 
abatement, more properly a plea in bar .... In any event, the defense of res judicata cannot 
be raised by motion to dismiss." 
I.R.C.P. 8(c) provides, "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively ... res judicata." 
And Rule 12(b ), which authorizes certain defenses to be raised by motion, does not 
include res judicata. Nevertheless, Defendants argue that the "incorporation by reference" 
doctrine allows the Court to consider documents that are referenced in the Complaint as to 
which authenticity is admitted. That may well be, but does not address the fact that res 
judicata is not properly addressed by a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 
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F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005), cited by the Defendants was a defamation action based upon a 
photograph and the caption of the photograph on the defendant's website. The document 
itself was the basis for the defamation claim. The court held that in considering a motion to 
dismiss the court could consider the contents of the allegedly defamatory document. The 
case has nothing to do with res judicata. The Defendants do not cite a case that allows res 
judicata to be plead in this manner. 
2. The causes of action plead in the first suit, and dismissed by the trial 
court, said dismissal being upheld by the State Supreme Court, were held by both 
courts to be derivative actions, not individual actions. 
The Supreme Court's ruling in McCann I is binding today on the question of what 
type of action Mc Cann I was. It is irrelevant how Plaintiff may have styled his case caption, 
or what he might have argued in a brief. What is binding on this Court now is the Supreme 
Court's unambiguous determination that the causes of action plead, and dismissed were 
derivative actions, and only derivative actions. The Idaho Supreme Court in McCann I stated 
at page 590: 
A stockholder's derivative action is an action brought by one or more 
stockholders of a corporation to enforce a corporate right or remedy by 
wrong to the corporation in cases where the corporation, because it is 
controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons fails and refuses to 
take appropriate action for its own protection .... 
Each factual allegation alleged in the first Complaint, if established at trial and proven 
to be detrimental to the corporation, would have been remedied solely by reimbursement to 
the corporation. Bill McCann would have paid back the corporate funds allegedly used for 
his personal activity. Again: 
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This court upholds the district court's determination that the causes of 
action alleged by Ron were derivative rather than individual in nature. 
138 Idaho 228 at 234 (2002). 
3. Are the necessary elements of res judicata and/or issue preclusion lacking? 
The claims brought herein were not brought in 2000. 
Without review of their facts, Defendants cite dicta from a number of Idaho and 
federal cases - but when the facts and holdings of these cases are analyzed, it is shown they 
do not support Defendants' position. 
At page 7, Defendants' cite Aldape, Jr. v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (1983), 
for the proposition that "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all 
claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the 
transaction arose." 
In Aldape, the property owners brought a second quiet title action based on a theory 
of accretion after losing the first action based on a theory of adverse possession. The court 
states at page 256, "the doctrine [res judicata] has two components - claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion .... " Citing federal authority, "Under these rules of claim preclusion, the 
effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between 
the same parties, whether or not raised at trial." "Collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion" ... 
bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated .... The contested issue must have 
been litigated and necessary to the judgment earlier rendered." 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The 
appellate court ruled that claim preclusion applied - that the facts in support of plaintiffs 
claim in the second case, accretion, were available, even though not brought forward in the 
first action based on adverse possession. 
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The court notes that the much earlier case of Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 
35 Idaho 549 (1922), was consistent with the first Restatement of Judgment. And the court 
stated at page 257: 
Our Supreme Court has recognized the limits of the Joyce rule where 
matters raised in the second litigation were not ripe for adjudication in 
the prior action. See, e.g. Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751 
(1983); Gaige v. City of Boise, 91 Idaho 481 (1967). Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has carved out an apparent exception to the Joyce rule 
for cases in which mandamus and damages are sought as an alternative 
or cumulative forms of relief. [Citing] Heaney v. Bd of Trustees of 
Garden Valley School Dist. No. 71, 98 Idaho 900 (1978). [emphasis 
supplied.] 
First, Ron McCann clearly did not bring individual actions for equitable relief or 
damages in his first case - as the Supreme Court has ruled, he brought a derivative action 
seeking reimbursement on behalf of the corporation for expenditures alleged not to have 
been in the interest of the corporation. 
Second, a claim for oppression - seeking direct relief against the oppressors and/or a 
court ordered redemption of his shares under the dissolution statute, pursuant to the Court's 
equitable power, would have been premature in 2000, i.e., "not ripe". As discussed below, 
oppression need not involve mismanagement, fraud or even intentional misconduct. 
Oppression can be found where the reasonable expectations of a minority shareholder are 
frustrated. It would have been premature for Plaintiff to allege in 2000, less than two years 
following his father's demise and the Defendant's ascension to control, that his reasonable 
expectation to obtain the financial benefit of his 36.7% interest was being frustrated. The 
Defendants had only had one full year to declare dividends. They had less than two years to 
make employment opportunities available to Plaintiff. 
Now, continuing the review of Aldape, the court further states at page 258: 
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However, even when the ripeness limitation and the mandamus 
exception are taken into account, it must be acknowledged that our 
Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in its application of the 
Joyce rule. 
And thus, at page 258, the court references the second restatement stating: 
The Second Restatement adopts a transactional view toward claims. 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the 
plaintiffs claim . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the 
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any 
part of the transaction ... out of which the action arose. 
There are exceptions to the bar of claim preclusion. However, they are 
narrowly defined in § 26 of the Second Restatement. ... Exceptions 
may also exist in special types of cases where a plaintiff is 
permitted to sue more than once for recurrent wrongs .... 
We believe the Second Restatement, with its definitive treatment of 
claim preclusion, clarifies the scope of res judicata. We adopt it, 
subject to the ripeness limitation and mandamus exception which have 
been enunciated by our Supreme Court. [ emphasis supplied] 
The Second Restatement gives an example of where a plaintiff is permitted to sue 
more than once for recurrent wrongs. The Restatement of Judgment Second, §24(f): 
Change of circumstances. Material operative facts occurring after the 
decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in 
themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise 
a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not 
precluded by the first. See Illustrations 10-12. 
Illustration (12). The government fails in an action against a defendant 
under an antitrust statute for lack of adequate proof that the defendant 
participated in a conspiracy to restrain trade. The government is not 
precluded from a second action against the same defendant in which it 
relies on conspiratorial acts post-dating the judgment in the first action, 
and may rely also on acts preceding the judgment insofar as these 
lend significance to the later acts. [ emphasis supplied] 
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The Restatement is on point with our situation. The actions plead herein were not 
ripe in 1999. This action primarily relies on evidence that did not even exist at the time of 
the first action. To the extent that Plaintiff has plead facts that existed at the time of the first 
action, that is exactly what the Restatement authorizes: [The plaintiff] "may rely also on acts 
preceding the judgment insofar as these lend significance to the later acts." 
The facts, and reasonable inferences therefrom, plead in the present Complaint, 
deemed to be true when challenged by a Rule 12(b) motion, include the following post-first 
Complaint conduct: 
1. Non-payment of dividends despite sufficient cash flow. 
2. Nonemployment, non-Board membership. 
3. Phony financial transactions between the corporation and Defendant Meisner, 
Trustee for the third shareholder, in order to avoid the redemption of Gertrude's shares, 
which redemption would increase the ownership percentage of Plaintiff, equally with that of 
Defendant Bill McCann. 
4. A refusal, on a part of those in control of the corporation, to carry out the 
intent of the founder of the corporation and the donor of his children's shares: That Plaintiff 
enjoy, not a hypothetical benefit from share ownership, but an actual, present and significant 
financial benefit from this ownership which is in lieu of his inheritance 
5. Management decisions that allow all of the cash flow to be obtained solely for 
the benefit of Bill McCann and Gertrude McCann, but in a manner that provides no benefit 
to the third shareholder, but does preserve for Bill McCann the opportunity to own I 00% of 
Gertrude's shares upon her death. 
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The issue of oppression was not decided in Mc Cann I- and even if the first action had 
not been dismissed, the issue of oppression would not have been decided; that claim simply 
was not pied. Oppression the frustration of the reasonable expectations of a minority 
shareholder in a closely held corporation is a totally different concept than a derivative 
action based upon an allegation that an improper financial arrangement has been made by a 
controlling officer/director. 
The foregoing is summarized in Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright, rvfiller & 
Cooper at page 248: 
Events that are related in origin and nature may nonetheless 
involve clear separation or discontinuities as to create separate 
causes of action without room for dispute. The easiest 
circumstances occur when the second action draws on facts or 
seeks remedies that simply could not have been asserted in the 
first action. 
Federal Cases. 
The Rule of Restatement Second Judgment 24(£) is illustrated in several federal cases 
reviewed below and discussed in Federal Practice and Procedure. Wherein the authors write 
in Section 4409: 
Claim preclusion analysis may be sorely tested by disputes that arise 
out of a number of events. Often issue preclusion is sufficient to 
foreclose subsequent litigation. When issue preclusion fails, however, 
it is necessary to determine whether events that have some elements of 
partial independence give rise to more than one claim or cause of 
action. The resulting problems can be arrayed along a spectrum from 
questions presented by events that were completed before the first suit 
was filed, through events that continued on substantially the same 
course throughout the period of the first suit, to events that recur or 
arise after the conclusion of the first suit. There are no sharp divisions 
between these groups of questions, but they afford a convenient focus. 
Citing Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 359 U.S. 322 (1955). 
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In Lawlor, a federal anti-trust action, the United States Supreme Court held that 
although two suits against accessory motion picture producers arose out of the same course 
of allegedly wrongfully conduct in conspiring to monopolize business, because the plaintiffs 
in the second suit alleged new anti-trust violations, the earlier judgment was not res judicata. 
The court distinguished collateral estoppel from res judicata, stating at page 326: 
. . . no question of collateral estoppel by a former judgment is involved 
because the case was never tried and there was not, therefore, such 
finding of fact which will preclude the parties to that litigation from 
questioning the finding thereafter. ( emphasis supplied) 
Here, defendants fail to accurately explain the necessary elements and limitations of 
claim preclusion as compared to issue preclusion. While the dismissal with prejudice in the 
first action may be considered to be on the merits, said dismissal was based upon a 
procedural shortcoming - the case was never tried, there were no findings of fact and 
therefore cannot be considered issue preclusion herein. 
Continuing with the Lawlor decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated at page 327: 
It is likewise trne that the judgment was unaccompanied by findings 
and hence did not bind the parties on any issue-such as the legality of 
the exclusive license agreements or their effect on petitioners' business-
which might arise in connection with another cause of action ..... 
That both suits involved 'essentially the same course of wrongful 
conduct' is not decisive. Such a course of conduct-for example, an 
abatable nuisance-may frequently give rise to more than a single cause 
of action. And so it is here. The conduct presently complained of was 
all subsequent to the 1943 judgment. ... While the 1943 judgment 
precludes recovery on claims arising prior to its entry, it cannot be 
given the effect of extinguishing claims which did not even then exist 
and which could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case. 
In the interim, moreover, there was a substantial change in the scope of 
the defendants' alleged monopoly. 
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Like the defendants in Lawlor, the Defendants herein, emboldened by the dismissal of 
McCann I, a derivative action, began a pattern of oppression in earnest, hoping that the 
earlier dismissal would confer immunity upon them. They are mistaken. 
Even today, after 11 years of administering the corporation, Defendant Bill McCann 
and Mr. Meisner would assert that there has been no oppression or effort to "squeeze out" 
Ron McCann. Thus it is remarkable to argue that Ron McCann should have perceived 
their motive only two years into their administration. Ron McCann acted properly in 
initially attempting to remedy the situation through a derivative action - and indeed was 
partially successful. As noted by the trial court, during the period of the stay issued by the 
trial court, the Board in fact reversed a number of the improper expenditures - although 
nothing was accomplished, or could have been accomplished in the first action which would 
result in a distribution benefit to Ron. 
Federal Practice also cites Harkins Amusement Enterprises v. Harry Nace Co., 890 F.2d 
181 (1989). The plaintiff was a movie theater owner who brought an anti-trust action against 
movie distributors. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissal, asserting res 
judicata from an earlier action. The appellate court reversed in part. At page 182 the court 
noted, "The period covered in the earlier suit was from September 21, 1973 through 
September 21, 1977." The current suit alleged restraints of trade of 1976 through 1980. The 
court held that for claims arising before September 21, 1977 - the ending date of the first suit 
- res judicata barred re-litigation. At page 182: 
The defendants point out that the complaint in Harkins II alleges that 
the defendants "at least as early as September 1, 197 6 and continuing 
without interruption . . . formulated a plan and have continuously 
pursued a course of conduct intended to unreasonably restrain trade." 
The defendants say that this allegation is an allegation of a conspiracy 
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that was formed at least by September 1, 1976, and the decision in 
Harkins I, holding that there was no conspiracy as to the five claims for 
which summary judgment was given, is a bar to the present action .... 
The defendants' argument has a certain appeal and a certain force. The 
complaint in Harkins II is not a model of clarity. Nonetheless, it would 
be over-technical and contrary to the direction of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to construe the complaint in Harkins II as narrowly as 
the defendants wish. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Fairly read, the complaint alleges 
that the defendants conspired before September 1, 1976 and have 
continued to conspire continuously since that date. The Harkins II 
complaint alleges new antitrust conduct subsequent to September 21, 
1977. Obviously the allegation that the defendants entered into 
conspiracies after the date of the Harkins I complaint was not ruled 
upon by the decision in Harkins I. It is elementary that new antitrust 
violations may be alleged after the date covered by decision or 
settlement of antitrust claims covering an earlier period. [ citations 
omitted] .... Failure to gain relief for one period of time does not 
mean that the plaintiffs will necessarily fail for a different period of 
time .... 
As stated in Harkins, at page 183: "The defendants by winning Harkins I did not 
acquire immunity in perpetuity from the anti-trust laws .... " 
McCann alleges oppression from 1999 through today. While the facts of the 
oppression are somewhat similar to conduct alleged in McCann I, it is in fact different 
conduct; it is elementary that these allegations were not ruled upon in McCann I. And it is 
clear that McCann I was a derivative action and that this is not a derivative action. McCann 
could not have alleged post-2000 conduct in the first action. He could not have in good faith 
sought an equitable buyout or dissolution given only a two year history. And the corporation 
law suggests that one first resort to the less draconian derivative action. See the comment to 
the Idaho Corporate Dissolution statute discussed below -- before a shareholder seeks relief 
thereunder, he should first attempt to remedy the problem through a derivative action. LC. 
30-1-1430, Idaho Reporter's Official Comment. 
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Idaho Cases. 
There are Idaho cases consistent with the Restatement, Federal Practice and federal 
cases just reviewed - which cases Defendants fail to cite let alone discuss. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in Aldape referenced them, stating "We adopted (the Second Restatement of 
Judgment) subject to the ripeness limitation and mandamus exception which have been 
enunciated by our Supreme Court. Aldape at 259. Actually, when one reviews these cases 
they are in fact consistent with the Second Restatement, particularly Rule 24(£) quoted 
above. 
Heaney v. Board of Trustees of Garden Valley School District No. 71, 98 Idaho 
900, 575 P.2d 498 (1978) 
Plaintiff, a former school superintendent, sued the school district for damages for the 
district's alleged breach of employment contract. The district court granted summary 
judgment dismissal, holding that the former superintendent's suit was barred by a previous 
mandamus action which he had brought to require the school district to reinstate him. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the former superintendent had the 
right to join his claim for damages with the petition for writ of mandamus, he did not forfeit 
his claim for damages by failing to do so. 
The Heaney court stated at page 902: 
It is well to note at the outset that although a judgment in a mandamus 
action is certainly res judicata as to issues actually adjudicated in that 
action ... [ citation omitted] this rule does not necessarily require us to 
hold that Heaney's subsequent action for damages was barred by the 
final judgment in his earlier mandamus action. The issues presented by 
Heaney' s damage suit are distinct from the question answered in the 
earlier mandamus action. In reaching its conclusion that Heaney was 
not entitled to reinstatement, the trial court in the mandamus 
proceeding determined only that he was not tenured and consequently 
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Thus: 
had no continuing contractual right to serve as the school district's 
superintendent. However, unlike his right to reinstatement, Heaney's 
right to damages does not tum upon whether he acquired tenure, but 
rather upon other matters such as whether school district wrongfully 
discharged him. . . . The trial court in the mandamus action did not 
address those questions. Nor did Heaney necessarily tender them by 
including in the prayer for relief "such other and further relief as 
he is entitled (to) under the law, including by not limited to 
reinstatement."_[ emphasis supplied] 
The question, then, is whether Heaney's claim for damages is a "matter 
which might and should have been litigated" as part of or in 
conjunction with his earlier mandamus action .... 
As noted, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that res judicata should 
not be applied. Heaney at 903. 
Ron McCann' s present claim for oppression was not and should not have been 
brought in 1999. 
The court in Heaney notes the procedural/timing differences between a mandamus 
and a damage action, stating at page 903: 
It is likely that the aggrieved party will not wish to delay the decision 
on the issuance of the coercive writ until the issues relevant only to a 
damage claim can be tried. 
A derivative action is for the benefit of the corporation and is not an equitable remedy 
for an oppressed minority shareholder. The latter case would usually require years of 
conduct whereas a derivative action can be brought on one matter which the board of 
directors might refuse to remedy. The remedy in a derivative action simply puts money back 
into the corporation. The remedy we are seeking is a liquidation of plaintiffs interest in the 
corporation or dissolution of the corporation. 
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Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 ldaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983) 
In 197 5 the Gun Club brought the first action alleging that the Duthies had trespassed 
by hooking up to the Gun Club's waterline. The trial court dismissed the action on the 
defendant's motion, finding that in fact the Duthies had permission to hook-up to the 
waterline and therefore were not trespassers also, finding that the Gun Club was capable of 
granting a license to this effect. Duthie at 389. 
So, the Gun Club then cut the Duthies' waterline precipitating the second suit, on the 
theory that the defendant had a revocable license. Duthies brought a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the first action, which resulted in a dismissal in their favor, was res 
judicata. The trial court denied the motion, which denial was upheld by the supreme court, 
writing at page 290: 
Even though two actions may arise out of the same operative facts 
between the same parties this Court has also that "[h]owever, 
sometimes a single trial covering all aspects of the case will be 
neither desirable nor feasible. Evidence bearing upon one aspect of a 
case may be unduly prejudicial with respect to another. Or certain 
matters may be ripe for trial while consideration of others would be 
premature." ( citing Heaney) [ emphasis supplied] 
In this case facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that led to the 
filing of the second suit, i.e., the cutting and capping of the waterline. 
Therefore, even though the same facts may be used to determine 
whether the license was revocable as were used in the first action to 
determine whether a license existed, because facts occurred subsequent 
to the first trial that triggered the filing of the second suit, we hold that 
the issue of revocability was not ripe for trial in the first case, but 
rather, was premature until the license was actually revoked. 
By analogy, no claim for corporate dissolution or equitable liquidation of a minority 
shareholder's interest was brought earlier - again, those matters were simply not ripe. 
Concerning the wrongs pled, as noted by the court, several were actually corrected by the 
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board and all resulted in simply a rescission of corporation action or a recovery for the 
benefit of the corporation of monies - there was nothing pled nor sought in the first action 
which would have effected the ownership/liquidation of McCann's interest in the 
corporation. 
Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988) 
A former wife brought action against her former husband to recover for assault and 
battery during marriage. The supreme court held that the divorce judgment was not a res 
judicata bar to the wife's tort action stating at page 462: 
Ordinarily, the doctrine of res judicata requires that all claims or issues 
which were, or could have been, litigated in a previous action between 
the same parties, are barred from later prosecution. . . . Nash's 
allegations could have been litigated during the divorce proceedings. 
However, there are considerations unique to cases such as this which 
compel us to acknowledge a narrow exception to our traditional 
interpretation of the doctrine of res judicata . ... mandatory joinder of 
tort claims with equitable divorce proceedings may be undesirable, as 
well as unfair. If the former wife is forced to bring her claim for 
damages either simultaneously with, or prior to, her complaint for 
divorce, she will be: 
... forced to elect between three equally unacceptable alternatives: (1) 
Commence a tort action during the marriage and possibly endure 
additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in a divorce action and waive the 
right to a jury trial on the tort claim; or (3) commence an action to 
terminate the marriage, forego the tort claim, and surrender the right to 
recovery damages arising from spousal abuse. To force such an election 
would require an abused spouse to surrender both the constitutional 
right to a jury trial and valuable property rights to preserve his or her 
well-being. This law will not do. 
We have an analogous situation. Ron McCann brought a derivative action to remedy 
corporate waste. He now brings a tort action for breach of fiduciary duties and an equitable 
action seeking relief for oppression. These claims are based on a long-time pattern of 
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conduct which did not exist in 2000 - only two years after Bill McCann took control 
following his father's death. 
In 2000 Ron Mccann was attempting to work with the corporation, now he wants out, 
but he doesn't want squeezed out. 
5. The causes of action plead herein are individual, not derivative. Idaho 
allows an individual action by an oppressed shareholder of a closely held corporation. 
The Steelman action is an individual action. 
Most state courts, including Idaho's, have recognized that directors of closely held 
corporations have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders akin to partners in a partnership. 
In Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510 (1986), a shareholder of a close corporation filed suit 
against two directors and the corporation alleging that the these two other director/owners of 
LDK, Inc., a fertilizer spreading business, were trying to squeeze him out. "Steelman alleged 
in his complaint that [the defendants] acted "in violation of their duties as directors of 
defendant corporation, and of plaintiff's rights, conspiring together to wrong plaintiff, and 
unlawfully corruptly and with the intent to appropriate to themselves the funds and business 
of defendant corporation and to take from plaintiff his just and lawful share thereof." 
Steelman at 513. 
Like the Defendants herein, the defendant controlling shareholders in Steelman 
argued that Plaintiff was limited to a derivative action. In squarely rejecting the same 
argument Defendants herein make, the Idaho Supreme Court stated at page 512-513: 
Appellants first argue that Steelman's suit should now be dismissed 
since this action should have been brought as a shareholder's derivative 
suit rather than as a "direct action." 
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The appellants, however, misconstrue the nature of this action. The 
gravamen of Steelman's complaint is that the majority 
shareholders/directors were attempting to squeeze him out . ... 
Following trial, the district court found that the majority 
shareholders/directors had breached their fiduciary duty to Steelman, "a 
minority shareholder who was deprived of any voice in the 
management of the affairs of L.D.K., Inc .... " 
That the directors of a closely held corporation owe a fiduciary duty to 
the minority shareholders is well recognized. 
In the past, some courts have permitted majority shareholders to 
exercise, without any restriction other than good faith, whatever powers 
they had as controlling shareholders under the statutes and the 
corporation's charter and bylaws; and further, they have treated the 
fiduciary duties of the directors as running only in favor of the 
corporation, not to the minority shareholders. This view that the 
controlling shareholders and the directors do not owe fiduciary 
duties to minority shareholders appears outmoded, at least as 
applied to squeeze-outs and other attempts to eliminate minority 
shareholders or to deprive them of their proportionate rights and 
powers without a just equivalent . ... O'Neal, Close Corporations § 
8.07 (2d ed.). 
Since Mallory and Jensen, as directors in this small closely held 
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to Steelman, as a minority 
shareholder, we cannot agree with appellants' contention that this 
case should have been dismissed because it is a "direct action" 
rather than a shareholder's derivative suit. [Emphasis supplied.] 
Defendants' analysis of Steelman is simply inaccurate. Defendants' write at page 20 
of their brief, "Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has even more recently affirmed the 
narrowness of the Steelman decision by continuing to conclude that a cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duties is derivative .... " Citing Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927 at 933. 
Throughout Defendants' brief, they pull dicta from cases with no review of the facts or the 
courts' holdings. Mannos sued the individuals who sold him a minority interest in a closely 
held corporation, alleging that the net value of the corporation was misrepresented. Mannos 
at 930. The court held that in a closely held corporation, the corporate directors indeed owe 
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a fiduciary duty to one another, to the corporation, and to the shareholders, but not to a would 
be purchaser of the stock. Mannos at 933, citing McCann I. To the extent Mannos asserted 
that the controlling shareholders/directors converted corporate assets, the court correctly 
characterized this as a derivative claim, citing McCann I for support. 
In this action, we are not alleging that the Defendants converted corporate assets. We 
are alleging that the way the Defendants manage the corporation eliminates the Plaintiff from 
benefiting from his shareholder status - that he is being squeezed out. And as in Steelman, a 
shareholder in Ron McCann's position has a direct action against the controlling 
shareholders for their squeeze out tactics. The remedy does not run to the benefit of the 
corporation; if successful, Plaintiff receives equitable relief. In this case we seek a court 
ordered redemption for the fair value of his shares. 
Plaintiff herein pleads facts which if established constitute oppression -- the 
frustration of his reasonable expectation to receive substantial economic benefits from 
owning 36.7% of a twenty million dollar corporation. He does not seek the undoing of any 
corporate action, he does not seek on the corporation's behalf reimbursement for any 
expenditures. He seeks by way of remedy a court ordered, equitable buyout, the redemption 
of his shares for fair value and/or in the alternative, dissolution of the corporation which 
would result in sale of the corporate assets and ultimately the redemption of his shares for 
fair value. A suit alleging oppression is an individual action - brought for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff, not the corporation. A suit alleging breach of the duty the controlling shareholder 
in a closely held corporation owes to a minority shareholder is an individual action - the 
remedy sought does not benefit the corporation. 
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What is meant by "oppression"? 
LC. 30-1-1430, Grounds for Judicial Dissolution, provides: 
The Idaho district court ... may dissolve a corporation; ... (2) In a 
proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that: ... (b) The 
directors or those in control of the corporation have acted or are acting 
in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent, and irreparable 
injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered by reason 
thereof. ... [ emphasis supplied] 
The statute does not define oppression. However, this language is taken directly from 
the Model Business Corporation Act and numerous decisions from other states have 
determined the meaning of oppression. 
Belt v. Belt, 106 Idaho 426, 679 P.2d 1144 (1984) involved a shareholder action for 
dissolution of a closely held corporation. The court stated at page 432: 
. . . we recognize that corporate dissolution proceedings are 
fundamentally equitable in nature, 16A Fletcher, supra § 8034.1 (rev. 
perm, ed. 1979). 
The Fletcher treatise cited states in § 8046.1 O; p. 104: 
Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct by directors or those in 
control of the corporation, as grounds for judicial dissolution, are 
elastic terms whose meaning varies with the circumstances presented in 
a particular case. Frustration of a minority shareholder's 
reasonable expectations can amount to oppression sufficient to 
justify dissolution of a corporation. [Citing cases from Alaska, 
Arkansas, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Washington and South Dakota.] [Emphasis supplied.] 
Does oppression exist? 
The Fletcher treatise states at page 103, "Reasonable expectations must be analyzed 
in light of the entire history of the parties relationship." 
McCann Ranch & Livestock, Inc. was formed in 1974 by the Mccann brothers' 
father, William McCann, who gifted to each of his sons 36.7% of the shares. Senior McCann 
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formed the corporation as a means of transferring his estate to his sons, intending that each 
benefit. Today, the corporation has a net value of at least twenty million dollars. Yet, 
Plaintiff has nothing to show for his seven million dollar interest - he's not employed by the 
corporation, he's not on its Board of Directors, he does not receive reasonable dividends. He 
cannot sell his stock. The corporation is managed such that the benefits exclusively accrue to 
Defendant William McCann and to a far lesser extent, consulting fees and the like, not 
dividends, are distributed to the third shareholder, the McCann brothers' mother, Gertrude. 
There is no actual value to Plaintiff from his multi-million dollar gift - his inheritance. Is 
that a reasonable expectation? Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not even entitled to have the 
matter proceed through discovery, let alone to trial - a trial we firmly believe will establish 
oppress10n. 
Should the Defendants exercise of business judgment, resulting in profitability, 
avoid a finding of oppression? 
The Fletcher treatise notes at page 105 that the fact that a closely held corporation 
may be operating profitably does not bar an equitable remedy on behalf of a minority 
shareholder who in actuality does not receive a benefit from the profit. This is consistent with 
Idaho law. 
In Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Company, Inc., 106 Idaho 859, 683 P.2d 
895 (Id. App. 1984), the sole asset of the corporation was a parcel of undeveloped real 
property that was leased for cattle grazing. The corporation was equally owned by two 
widows. One of the shareholders brought suit to dissolve the corporation because the other 
shareholder would not agree to sell the property and split the proceeds. 
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The other 
3tif 
shareholder objected, arguing that the corporation was being operated profitably. In rejecting 
this argument, the court noted at page 862: 
In considering whether to dissolve a corporation, the most relevant 
factor to be considered is the best interest of the shareholders which is 
reflected to a large degree in the profitability of the corporation. 
Because the lease payments only produced an approximate three percent rate of 
return, the Supreme Court approved dissolution of the corporation. Gillingham, at page 862. 
Gillingham clearly brought an independent, not a derivative action. 
Before the 1984 Gillingham case, the Idaho Supreme Court decided Rowland v. 
Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 633 P.2d 599 (1981) - another dissolution proceeding brought by a 
shareholder of a closely held corporation. The Plaintiff was dissatisfied with how the 
corporation was being managed, yet alleged no fraud and acknowledged that it was 
profitable. The court stated at page 540: 
The question of a court's power in the absence of specific statutory 
authority to dissolve a going, solvent corporation is one of first 
impression. . . . most courts today, pursuant to the principles of equity, 
will dissolve going, solvent corporations where there is substantial 
evidence of deadlock, dissension or oppression. See, e.g., Galler v. 
Galler, 32 111.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); Baker v. Commercial 
Body Builders, Inc., 264 or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). (emphasis 
supplied) 
Thus, Idaho case law recognizes that equitable relief may be granted a shareholder 
despite profitability and that relief is not a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation. 
It is an individual action seeking an equitable remedy for the oppressed minority shareholder. 
The Galler case from Illinois, cited by the Idaho Supreme Court was preceded in 1957 
by Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45 (Ill., 1957) in which the 
court stated at page 50: 
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... Plaintiff argues the word "oppressive" does not necessarily savor of 
fraud, and that the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication of 
assets" does not prevent a finding that the conduct of the defendants 
has been oppressive. We agree with the interpretation, and we reject 
defendants' argument that the word is substantially synonymous with 
"illegal" and "fraudulent." Misapplication of assets or mismanagement 
of funds are not, as we read the statute, indispensable ingredients of 
"oppressive" conduct. 
Three years later, the same court said further: "It is not necessary that fraud, illegality 
or even loss be shown to exhibit oppression of plaintiffs and their interest in the 
corporation." Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 at 138. 
Here, Ron McCann's reasonable expectation, to receive current, real financial 
benefits from the corporation, for example, dividends proportionate to a reasonable rate of 
return, has been denied. Instead, the corporation is managed in a way that allows the other 
two shareholders, Defendant William McCann and 91-year old Gertrude McCann, to receive 
financial benefits but not as shareholders. 
Shareholder oppression in a close corporation is often termed a "squeeze-out" or 
"freeze-out". As explained by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the case most cited by 
the legal writers: 
The squeezers (those who employ the freeze-out techniques) may 
refuse to declare dividends; they may drain off the corporation's 
earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the majority 
shareholder-officers and perhaps to their relatives, or in the form of 
high rent by the corporation for property leased from majority 
shareholders ... ; they may deprive minority shareholders of corporate 
offices and of employment by the company; they may cause the 
corporation to sell its assets at an inadequate price to the majority 
shareholders .... " "In particular, the power of the board of directors, 
controlled by the majority, to declare or withhold dividends and to deny 
the minority employment is easily converted to a device to 
disadvantage minority stockholders. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Company of New York, 367 Mass. 578, 588-89 (1975), citing F.H. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDA_NTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
O'Neal and J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business 
Associates, 42 (1961). 
The foregoing precisely and accurately describes Plaintiffs situation. Facts 
constituting oppression, as that Idaho statutory term should be interpreted, have been plead. 
6. Analysis of the Idaho Dissolution Statute. 
Idaho Code §30-1-1430 is substantially similar to the code section on Grounds for 
Judicial Dissolution that is found in nearly every other state and is based on the Model 
Corporations Act. 
There is one substantial addition to the Idaho Code. Idaho Code §30-1-1430(2)(b) 
reads as follows: "The directors or those in control of the corporation have acted or are 
acting in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent, and irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being suffered by reason thereof;" (emphasis added). 
The application ofIC §30-1-1430(2)(b) to a close corporation would be a case of first 
impression in Idaho. 
We assert that in addition to his common law direct action, Plaintiff may bring a 
statutory action seeking an equitable remedy less drastic than court ordered corporate 
dissolution. 
The Idaho Reporter's Comment to IC§ 30-1-1430 offers insight. 
Official Text subsection (2)(b ), providing a shareholder action for 
dissolution when "the directors ... act in a manner that is illegal, 
oppressive or fraudulent," does not include the additional 
IDAHO§97(a)(2) requirement "that irreparable injury to the 
corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof." Our 
predecessor committee added this in the 1979 revision out of concern 
that shareholders have other protective actions such as derivative or 
class action suits and that dissolution should not be ordered solely on a 
showing of improper conduct, but should require a further showing of 
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irreparable injury. We have retained this "irreparable injury" 
requirement in our new subsection (2)(b). [emphasis supplied] 
As stated above, the reason for the additional language was that if shareholders have 
other protective actions available such as derivative or class action suits, dissolution should 
not be ordered. In the context of a publicly traded corporation, these reasons apply and the 
limitation on dissolution makes sense. A dissatisfied shareholder has the option to sell his 
shares. The alternatives to dissolution mentioned in the comment, derivative and/or class 
actions, don't remedy oppression of a minority shareholder of a close corporation. Ron 
McCann cannot sell his shares and exit the corporation. 
(a) A shareholder's derivative action is not an adequate remedy for a minority 
shareholder in a closely held corporation who suffers oppression. 
It is questionable whether a minority shareholder victim of a "freeze-out" in a closely 
held corporation has standing to bring a derivative action. IC § 30-1-741 states "A 
shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the shareholder .. 
. fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the rights of the 
corporation." By the very nature of the "freeze-out", the shareholder represents his own 
interest and not the corporation. 
American Law Institute Principles§ 7.01 states: 
(a) A derivative action may be brought in the name or right of 
a corporation by a holder to redress an injury sustained by, or enforce a 
duty owned to, a corporation. An action in which the holder can 
prevail only by showing an injury or breach of duty to the corporation 
should be treated as a derivative action. 
(b) A direct action may be brought in the name or right of a 
holder to redress an injury sustained by, or enforce a duty owed to, the 
holder. An action in which the holder can prevail without showing an 
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injury or breach of duty to the corporation should be treated as a direct 
action that may be maintained by the holder in an individual capacity. 
Although some discrepancies exist in the case law, most courts have 
properly considered actions such as the following as direct actions: 
... (5) actions to prevent oppression of, or fraud against minority 
shareholders; (6) actions to compel dissolution, appoint a receiver, 
or obtain similar equitable relief. [ emphasis supplied.] 
The recovery of a derivative action is directed to the corporation. A derivative action 
seeks to have the corporation compensated for director wrongdoing. We are not seeking a 
recovery for the corporation. We are seeking a remedy that would benefit solely this 
Plaintiff shareholder. 
(b) A class action suit is not an adequate remedy for a minority shareholder in a 
closely held corporation who suffers oppression. 
The mere fact that the Idaho Reporter's Comment to §30-l-1430(2)(b) names a class 
action suit as a possible alternate remedy for shareholders suggests that the drafters of the 
statute did not have closely held corporations in mind when crafting this exception. There is 
no class action Ron McCann could bring to remedy the oppression he had plead. 
The irreparable harm language added to Idaho Code§ 30-l-1430(2)(b) was intended 
to allow judicial dissolution only in those situations where a shareholder does not have other 
adequate remedies. However, the very explanation offered by the drafters provides evidence 
that they did not consider closely held corporations in drafting this section, since the 
mentioned remedies do not apply to oppressed shareholders in closely held corporations. 
Further, in 1997, Idaho added the Revised :M:BCA's provision allowing the 
corporation to elect to purchase the dissenting shareholder's shares in lieu of dissolution. 
That section is I.C. 30-1-1434. The Idaho Reporter's Comment to that section states, 
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"Academic commentators on the problems of closely held corporations have long favored 
combinations of involuntary dissolution and buy-out to deal with the recurring dilemmas 
caused by deadlock." Thus, Idaho lawmakers recognize case law from around the country 
that alternatives to dissolution exist. 
The purpose of for-profit Idaho corporations is to further the financial interests of 
their shareholders. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 NW 668 (Mich. 1919). The phrase 
"irreparable harm to the corporation" contained in the corporate dissolution action should be 
interpreted as meaning irreparable harm to the financial interest of one or more of the 
shareholders of that closely held corporation. And irreparable harm is harm that cannot be 
repaired by a derivative action. 
It would be consistent with Idaho case law and the dissolution statute to provide 
equitable relief other than dissolution to a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation 
who establishes oppression. Case law from numerous other states is in accord. 
Case law from other states supports the equitable remedy of a forced buyout for 
fair value in lieu of dissolution. 
In Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Texas 1988), a minority shareholder brought an 
action against the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation seeking damages for 
breach of fiduciary duties and a court order requiring the corporation to buy his shares for 
their fair value. The Texas statute only provided for dissolution if oppression was 
established. That portion of the trial court's judgment granting the equitable relief requested 
(forced buyout) was upheld on appeal, with the court stating at page 378: 
The Texas Business Corporation Act does not expressly provide for 
the remedy of a "buy-out: for an aggrieved minority shareholder . . 
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at 379: 
at 381: 
Nor do we find any Texas cases where the particular remedy of a 
"buy-out" has been ordered, unless provided for in a contract between 
the parties. But courts of other jurisdictions have recognized a "buy-
out" as an appropriate remedy, even in the absence of express 
statutory or contractual authority. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. 
Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 
269 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Sons, Inc., 
104 N.M. 523, 724 P.2d 232 (Ct.App. 1986) (granting the option of 
liquidation or "buy-out"); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center 
Co., 108 A.D.2d 81, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1985); Delaney v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977). Alaska, Iowa, New 
Mexico, New York, and Oregon all have statutes that provide for 
liquidation as the remedy for oppressive acts, and, in the above cited 
cases, the courts allowed a "buy-out" as a less harsh remedy. See 
Alaska Stat. §10.05.540(2) (1985); Iowa Code § 496.94 (Supp, 1988); 
N.M.Stat.Ann. § 53-16-16 (Supp. 1987); N.Y.Bus.Corp.Law § 1104-a 
(McKinney 1986); Or.Rev.Stat.§ 57.595 (183). 
"The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the 
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of 
the particular case. . . . "Whenever a situation exists which is contrary 
to the principles of equity and which can be redressed within the scope 
of judicial action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the 
situation though no similar relief has been granted before." .... 
We conclude that Texas courts, under their general equity power, may 
decree a "buy-out" in an appropriate case where less harsh remedies are 
inadequate to protect the rights of the parties .... 
Oppressive conduct is the most common violation for which a "buy-
out" was found to be an appropriate remedy in other jurisdictions. See, 
e.g. Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d 270; Wiedy's, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901; 
McCauley, 724 P.2d 232; Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 
264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). Courts take an especially broad 
view of the application of oppressive conduct to a closely-held 
corporation, where oppression may more easily be found. Skierka v. 
Skierka Bros. Inc., 629 P.2d 214 (Mont.1981). An ordered "buy-out" 
of stock at its fair value is an especially appropriate remedy in a 
closely-held corporation, where the oppressive acts of the majority are 
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an attempt to "squeeze out" the minority, who do not have a ready 
market for the corporation's shares, but are at the mercy of the 
majority. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 273-74; McCauley, 724 P.2d 
at 236; O'Neal, F. Hodge Oppression of Minority Shareholders § 9.05 
(1975). [ emphasis supplied] 
In addition to the cases cited by Davis, the cases of Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 
S.W.2d 351 (:tvfissouri 1976) and Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 
(Oregon 1973) are particularly helpful. Baker is the seminal case on the issue of whether 
alternatives to dissolution exist. It is unclear whether Baker was interpreting the MBCA 
directly, but it was interpreting a statute similar to the MBCA. ORS 57.595(l)(a)(B) 
authorized dissolution for 'illegal, oppressive or fraudulent' conduct. There was not an 
alternative to dissolution provided by statute. Fix was interpreting the MBCA. Baker and 
Fix examined the statutory provisions relating to judicial dissolution and found that several 
alternative remedies to dissolution were available. Each case lists approximately ten 
alternatives to dissolution. Both of these cases also conclude that the degree of oppression is 
very relevant in determining whether to dissolve a corporation. 
The Washington case of Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 148 Wash.2d 701 (2003) cites 
Fix and Baker favorably for the proposition that a court interpreting the MBCA may order 
remedies other than dissolution. In Scott, the trial court dissolved the corporation. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed and actually remanded 
the case to the trial court and ordered the trial court to consider alternative remedies to 
dissolution. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants' motion pursuant to res judicata should be denied. The present 
claims were not brought nor should they have been brought at the time of the first action. 
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Further, the Supreme Court in the first action specifically held that the Plaintiff would be 
entitled to bring a derivative action based upon events which might occur thereafter. The 
Supreme Court would not apply res judicata to direct actions which weren't brought in the 
first action yet authorize a later derivative action, having just dismissed a derivative action 
with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs direct action against the controlling shareholders 1s authorized by the 
Steelman case. 
A corporate dissolution action is inherently equitable in nature. Under the Court's 
equitable power it should be able to grant a remedy such as a court ordered corporate 
redemption of the Plaintiff's shares as an alternative to complete dissolution of the 
corporation. If the Court believes that corporate dissolution is the only remedy upon a 
finding of oppression, then that remedy should be enforced herein. 
r1 . ·-f 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this /J,.!_ day of Jt j> 2008. 
By 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF l\JEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. :MEISNER, individually 
as a director ofMcCann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
shareholder of McCann Ranch & 
Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
Trustee of the William V. Mccann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & 
LIVESTOCK CON.IP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No. CV-08-01226 
A:MENDEDCO:MPLAil~TFOR 
EQUITABLE RELIEF AND 
DAMAGES 
Fee Category: A( 1) 
Fee: $88.00 
1. Plaintiff Ronald R. Mccann is a resident of Lewiston, Idaho. He is 61 years old. 
He is a shareholder of Defendant Mccann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. He 
owns 91,700 shares of the 250,000 outstanding shares of said corporation, i.e., he 
owns 36.7% of the common stock. 
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2. Defendant William V. McCann, Jr., is the president and chief operating officer of 
the corporation and one of its directors. He also owns 91,700 shares of the 
common stock, the same amount as his brother, the Plaintiff. Defendant William 
McCann, Jr. is 65 years old. 
3. Defendant Gary Meisner holds as trustee, for the benefit of Gertrude Mccann, the 
balance of the common stock - 66,600 shares. Defendant Meisner, besides being 
a shareholder in his trustee capacity, is also a director of the corporation. Gertrude 
Mccann, the mother of Plaintiff and Defendant McCann is almost 92 years old. 
This Trust, the William V. McCann, Sr. Stock Trust, was established by William 
V. McCann, Sr. in his Last Will. 
4. Defendant McCann Ranch & Livestock, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with its 
principal place of business located in Lewiston, Idaho. This Complaint is not 
directed against misconduct of the corporation itself. The corporation is included 
as a nominal party as required by LC. §30-1-1430, et seq. 
HISTORY OF CORPORATION 
5. The Defendant corporation was formed in 1974 by William V. McCann, Sr. 
McCann Senior transferred to his newly formed corporation his extensive ranch 
and timber holdings and his undeveloped real estate located in or near Lewiston, 
Idaho. Over the next several years he gifted to each of his sons 36.7% of the 
stock. McCann Senior, even though he owned the fewest shares, was the 
controlling director and officer of the corporation until his death on October 27, 
1997. 
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6. McCann Senior formed his corporation primarily for estate planning purposes; to 
limit estate and inheritance tax exposure and to facilitate the transfer of his estate 
to his children. McCann Senior had no intention of excluding Plaintiff from 
enjoying the expected benefits from his gifted stock. 
7. Throughout Plaintiff's adult life, both before and after formation of the Defendant 
corporation, he provided huge amounts of uncompensated labor for the benefit of 
his father's business interests, and, after the formation of the corporation, for the 
benefit of the corporation. During winters he dozed and graded roads, hauled 
cattle, branded cattle; during summers he made hay, hauled hay and hauled cattle 
and farmed. When his father was injured or sick, Plaintiff would take time off 
from his own occupation (he worked primarily as a teamster) to assist with the 
farming and ranching operations. He took an entire month off to do the ranch 
work the year his father suffered a broken back. 
8. Defendant William McCann, Jr., provided much less physical labor. 
9. For the first two decades of the corporation's existence neither son received any 
type of remuneration . 
10. In the year or two before William Senior's death, in 1997, Defendant William 
McCann, Jr., who had been engaged in the fulltime private practice of law, 
became more involved in the management of the corporation. 
11. The assets of the corporation include approximately thirteen commercial sites 
which have been improved with the completion of buildings which are then leased 
to various corporations, for examples, Shari's restaurant, Staples, Hollywood 
Video. These commercial sites are located in Lewiston. 
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12. In addition to the commercial sites, the corporation owns and manages timberland, 
ranchland and a substantial cattle heard. And the corporation owns undeveloped 
property located in Lewiston which could be converted to commercial sites. 
13. The fair market value of the corporate assets is over twenty-five million dollars. 
The corporation has a long term loan against its commercial sites which had a 
principal balance as of year end 2006 of five million two hundred twenty-two 
thousand dollars ($5,222,000). For the fiscal year 2006 (ending December 31, 
2006), the corporation had positive cash flow after payment of expenses, taxes and 
debt reduction, but before payment of any kind to any shareholder, in excess of 
$320,000. 
SENIOR'S WILL 
14. Following Mr. McCann's death, his will was admitted to probate in Nez Perce 
County District Court. His will bequeathed the 66,000 shares that he had not 
gifted to his sons, in trust to Defendant Gary Meisner, for the benefit of Mr. 
McCann's spouse, Gertrude McCann. 
15. The terms of William McCann, Sr.'s Will provided that the trustee, Defendant 
Meisner, was to vote the stock in the corporation in a manner to provide an 
income to the beneficiary of the trust, Gertrude Mc Cann, and further, if in order to 
provide her with sufficient income, the stock could be redeemed. 
16. Thus, if the corporation redeemed any of Gertrude's stock, such act would 
increase the ownership interests of Plaintiff Ronald McCann and Defendant 
William McCann, Jr., equally. And further, if the corporation declared dividends 
in order to provide income to Gertrude, all shareholders would receive dividends 
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proportionate to their ownership, i.e., Plaintiff Ronald McCann and Defendant 
William McCann, Jr., would also receive dividends. 
17. McCann Senior's Will provided that upon the death of Gertrude McCann any 
stock remaining in trust, which had not be redeemed, would become the property 
of Defendant William McCann, Jr. Although this favored Defendant William 
McCann, Jr., McCann Senior wrote his will knowing he had already provided well 
for his youngest son, Plaintiff, through previous stock transfers. 
SQUEEZE-OUT 
18. Following McCann Senior's death, Defendant Mccann took over full 
control/management of the corporation and caused his salary to increase from 
$48,000 a year to $144,000 a year, yet he continues to maintain his law practice. 
19. Since McCann Senior's death, the corporation has been controlled by Defendants 
Meisner and Bill Mccann. These Defendants have not redeemed any of 
Gertrude's stock because such redemption would provide a benefit to Plaintiff, 
proportionate to the benefit thereby provided to Defendant Bill Mccann, 1.e., 
increase equally their ownership. 
20. Defendants McCann and Meisner caused the number of directors to be changed, 
removing Plaintiff from the Board of Directors. 
21. Defendants McCann and Meisner have refused to authorize the corporation to 
employ Plaintiff. 
22. Since Defendants McCann and Meisner assumed control of the corporation, they 
have refused to declare a reasonable amount of dividends despite sufficient profit 
and cash flow. Dividends have only been declared three times in the last twelve 
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years. The Plaintiff received the following dividends $3,668 for year 2004, $9,170 
for year 2006, and $12,838 for 2008. The net fair market value of the corporate 
assets is at least 20 million dollars. An annual four percent rate of return (a rate 
readily obtained from a no risk investment) on $20,000,000 would equal $800,000 
per year. Instead of receiving over $290,000 in one year, Plaintiff has received 
$25,676 in twelve years. 
23. The paltry dividends which have been declared, were declared in response to the 
fact that Plaintiff resorted to legal counsel in an effort to obtain honorable 
treatment or to extricate his interest from the corporation. A shareholder of a 
closely held corporation should not need to retain counsel in order to receive a 
reasonable rate of return on his interest. The fact that the corporation has declared 
paltry dividends in response to his efforts is further evidence of Defendants' 
determination to squeeze-out Plaintiff and is evidence that the squeeze-out will 
continue unless Plaintiffs prayer for relief is granted. 
24. For year 2007, the corporation failed to hold an annual shareholder meeting as 
called for by the corporate bylaws. 
25. Rather than declaring dividends, which would benefit Plaintiff, Defendants 
McCann and Meisner have annually voted for the corporation to engage in phony 
financial transactions to benefit Gertrude. For example, they have caused the 
corporation to enter into purchases and/or leases with her concerning her home 
place and shop. They vote to have the corporation pay substantial 
bonuses/consulting fees to the elderly woman. Recently, Defendant McCann has 
been transferring money to Gertrude from his own pocket, because he has figured 
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out that would be cheaper for him in the long run than for the corporation to 
declare reasonable dividends or redeem her stock, which actions would 
necessarily benefit Plaintiff. 
26. To summarize, since William V. McCann, Jr., assumed control of the corporation 
following his father's death on October 27, 1997, and in particular, since January 
5, 2001, the date an Opinion and Order was entered in Nez Perce County Case 
Number CV-00-01111, referred to as McCann I, Defendants McCann and Meisner 
have jointly exercised their control of the corporation: 
a) to not pay dividends despite sufficient cash flow; 
b) to not provide corporate employment to Plaintiff; 
c) to not provide Board membership to Plaintiff; 
d) to vote for and/or otherwise authorize the corporation to engage in phony 
financial transactions with Gertrude McCann in order to avoid taking action to benefit 
her as an equitable shareholder because such would necessarily benefit all 
shareholders proportionately, including Plaintiff; 
e) to :frustrate the intent of the founder of the corporation and the donor of his 
children's shares, that Plaintiff enjoy, not a hypothetical benefit from share 
ownership, but an actual, present and significant financial benefit from this 
ownership, which was intended by Senior McCann to be in lieu of direct inheritance; 
and, 
f) to make management decisions that allow all of the cash flow to be obtained 
solely for the benefit of Defendant McCann and Gertrude McCann, but in a manner 
that provides no benefit to the third shareholder, the Plaintiff, but does preserve for 
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Defendant McCann the opportunity to own 100% of Gertrude's shares upon her 
death. 
27. Defendants McCann and Meisner are the only directors who are shareholders and 
who control the Board and have continuously controlled the Board since the death 
of Williams McCann, Sr. 
28. These actions of Defendants Bill McCann and Meisner constitute a squeeze-out of 
Plaintiff. They are an effort to force Plaintiff to sell his stock to the corporation 
for a fraction of its true value. 
29. The bylaws of the corporation contains Article VI, Section 4 which reads: 
Section 4. Restriction on Repurchase. No stockholder shall have the 
right or power to pledge, sell or otherwise dispose of, except by will, 
any share or shares of capital stock of this corporation without first 
offering the said share or shares of stock for sale to the corporation at 
the book value of such stock at the time of offering as determined by 
the corporation's certified public accountant. Such offer shall be made 
in writing signed by such stockholder and sent by mail to the 
corporation at its principal place of business, and such offer shall 
remain good for acceptance by the corporation for a period of thirty 
(30) days from. the date of mailing of such notice. These provisions 
shall be binding also upon any executor, administrator or other legal 
representative of every stockholder in case of a sale or pledge of any 
share or shares of stock by such executor, administrator or other legal 
representative of any stockholder, and every certificate of stock to be 
issued by the corporation shall have printed on and em.bodied in such 
certificate the following words: 
''The transfer of the shares represented by this certificate is restricted by 
the By-Laws of the corporation and a copy of the complete provisions 
of such restriction rn.ay be obtained from. the corporation upon request." 
The corporation, if it desires to accept such offer from. any stockholder, 
shall within thirty (30) days from. the date of mailing of such notice by 
the stockholder, accept such offer by depositing in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, an acceptance of the offer addressed to the 
offering stockholder(s) at his last known address. The stockholder shall, 
within fifteen (15) days after such letter of acceptance is placed in the 
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United States mail, as above set forth, surrender his certificates 
representing the stock offered to the corporation and shall receive from 
the corporation in cash, a check drawn on the corporation account, or 
cashier's check, ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and an 
installment note for the balance of the purchase price payable in sixty 
(60) equal monthly installments, the first of which shall commence 
thirty (30) days after surrender of the certificate(s) as set forth above, 
with like payments in each consecutive month thereafter, such note to 
bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%). 
The book value claimed by the corporation for all of its assets as of December 31, 
2006 was, $1,426,707. This limitation effectively prevents Plaintiff from 
disposing of his shares for their true value. This Section, of course, only limits 
Plaintiff. The controlling two shareholders do not have to comply with this 
because they can amend it away whenever it suits them. 
30. On June 19, 2000, Plaintiff filed an action in Nez Perce County District Court, 
Cause Number CV-00-01111, naming William McCann, Gary Meisner and the 
corporation as defendants. By an Opinion and Order entered by Judge Reinhart 
on January 5, 2001, the action was dismissed because Judge Reinhart found that 
the plaintiff had failed to comply with the statutory requirements for a derivative 
action. The matter was appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the dismissal 
in an opinion filed December 31, 2002, reported at 138 Idaho 228. The Supreme 
Court at page 234 of decision held, "this court upholds the district court's 
determination that the causes of action alleged by Ron were derivative rather than 
individual in nature." 
31. Herein, the Plaintiff explicitly and solely brings individual causes of action. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES -- 9 3Z3 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
32. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the case of Steelman v. Malory, 110 Id. 510, 
716 P .2d 1282 (1986) that a direct cause of action exists on behalf of a minority 
shareholder m a closely held corporation against the controlling 
shareholders/directors if they breach the fiduciary duties they owe to the minority 
shareho Ider. 
33. A controlling director/shareholder in a closely held corporation owes a fiduciary 
duty to the minority shareholders akin to what a partner owes his fellow partner in 
a partnership, including utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty and in particularly 
management decisions that provide a current and fair rate of return/benefit to the 
minority shareholder. 
34. Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty by management decisions and 
artifices which deprive Plaintiff of any real benefit from his more than five million 
dollar asset and effectively transfer to Bill McCann the benefit of Plaintiffs asset. 
35. The Court has the equitable power to right this wrong by entering orders as 
requested in the prayer for relief. The Court has legal power to award damages as 
requested in the prayer for relief. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: PLED AS AN ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION IF 
NECESSARY: 
36. Idaho Code Section 30-1-1430 provides that a shareholder of an Idaho corporation 
may bring suit to have the corporation dissolved if the directors or those in control 
of the corporation have acted in an oppressive manner, and irreparable injury to 
the corporation is threatened. 
AMENDED COMPLATI\JT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES -- 10 
37. The Idaho statutes do not define the term oppression. Case law has established 
that it is not necessary that fraud, illegality, or even loss be shown to establish that 
a mino1ity shareholder and his interest in the corporation are subject to 
oppress10n. Case law, and the leading legal auth01ities provide that oppression, 
within the meaning of Idaho Code 30-1-1430, is best defined in the terms of the 
reasonable expectations of the mino1ity shareholders and in particular the 
circumstances at hand. 
38. A minority shareholder in a closely held corporation such as the corporation in 
this case would have, and Ronald McCann has, reasonable expectations that the 
corporation be managed in a manner which would provide him current and 
significant benefits based upon his ownership interests. 
39. Plaintiff has suffered oppression under the management decisions of the 
controlling Defendants since the death of his father. 
40. The corporation does not provide benefits to its shareholders consistent with their 
reasonable expectations. This does threaten irreparable harm to the corporation. 
41. Nevertheless, a review of the history of the Idaho dissolution statutes indicates 
that the clause "irreparable damage" is limited in application to publicly traded 
corporations and should not apply to block an equitable remedy for a shareholder 
in a closely held corporation who can establish oppression. 
42. Idaho District Courts have equitable power to provide a remedy to a shareholder 
of a closely held corporation who establishes oppression, including the remedy of 
a forced buyout of his shares for their fair market value, without discount for his 
minority position. 
AMENTIED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF Al'ID DAMAGES -- 11 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: 
1. 
a) Corporate dissolution supervised by the Court pursuant to the 
provisions of LC. §30-1-1430 et seq., or, in the alternative, 
b) A Court ordered buyout by the Corporation of Plaintiffs shares for their 
fair market value, or, in the alternative, 
c) A Court order which establishes a process to provide an equitable 
reorganization of the corporation such that a tax free spin-off is accomplished. 
A subsidiary corporation should be organized and initially owned by the 
Defendant corporation. 36.68% of the fair market value of the corporate assets 
should be transferred to the subsidiary corporation. The stock of the 
subsidiary corporation should then be transferred to Plaintiff in redemption of 
his stock in the Defendant corporation. 
2. Damages should be awarded against Defendants McCann and Meisner in an 
amount that will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for sums Plaintiff should have, 
but did not receive. 
3. The Court should order that Defendants McCann and Meisner pay for Plaintiffs 
court costs, attorney fees and any expert witness fees and consulting fees 
necessary to provide appropriate equitable relief. 
4. The Court should provide such other and further equitable relief and/or damages 
as the Court determines to be appropriate. 
DATED: This ;!/!2ay of (2,,t 2008. 
Libey,~ser & Nelson 
By ~ss@-
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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/,{/~ 
STATE OF IBAAtJ'" ) 
Countyof W'~ 
) ss 
) 
Ronald R. McCann, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: That he is the 
Plaintiff above-named; that he has read the above and foregoing Amended Complaint for 
Equitable Relief and Damages, knows the contents thereof and that the same is true as he 
does verily believe. 
2008. 
/ ~ 1 ·:;;!/ 1 " L--, ( a l', J )~ -;· q// 5/~ 
' ¼".'. /,,~,I . 
Ronald R. McCann 
Signed and sworn to before me on the / ~/12_-y of /Y C- f 
Notary Public in and~ th~.State of 
,--------...,r""'At<Jho, residing at / v /1/"h,trz . 
TIMOTHY ESSER M 'T appointment ex'pires ____ _ 
STIUE OF WASHINGTON 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COivlMISSION EXPIRES 
12-01-08 
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Hawley Troxel 1 10/ 2008 10:46 PAGE 2/4 (208)342-3829 
Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
Will Wardwell, ISB No. 7043 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3 829 
Email: mwc@hteh.com 
jash@hteh.corn 
wwar@hteh.com 
Attorneys for Defendant William V. Mccann, Jr. 
f ILE~D 
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Il\J" THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and GARY E. ) 
MEISNER, ) 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED 
COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE 
RELIEF AND DAMAGES 
The above named Defendant, William V. McCann, Jr., by and through his counsel of 
record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss with 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED CO:MPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND 
DAMAGES - 1 < 2Ji 
401 OD.0006~25756.1 
Hawley Troxell 10/ /2008 10: 46 PAGE 3/4 X: (208)342-3829 
prejudice Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint For Equitable Relief and Damages pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), LR.C.P. 23(f), I.C. § 30-1-741 and I.C. § 30-1-742. 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief a11d Damages should be dismissed 
for the reasons set forth in Defendant William V. McCann Jr.' s Motion to Dismiss and the 
supporting memorandum, filed July 14, 2008. 111e Motion and Dismiss and supporting 
memorandum, filed July 14, 2008, are hereby incorporated by reference. 
DATED THIS~y of October, 2008. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By_,#-~~'--------------
. Clark, ISB No. 1026 
ttomeys for Defendant William V. McCann, 
Jr. 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND 
DAMAGES-2 321 
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Hawley Troxell 10/4 /2008 10:46 PAGE 4/4 X: (208)342-3829 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~ay of October, 2008, I caused to be C'P..-uPri a true 
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COJ\!1PLAIN"T FOR EQUITABLE 
RELIEF AND DAMAGES by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Timoth Esser 
LIBEY ENSLEY ESSER & NELSON 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, WA 99163 
[Attorneys for Plain.tiff} 
Andrew Schwam 
SCHW AM LAW FIRM 
514 South Polk, #6 
Moscow, ID 83843u 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROVfl\f 
3 21 13 th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 510 
(Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner] 
Charles F. McDevitt 
McDEVITI MILLER 
420 West Bannock 
P .0. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Nominal Defendant] 
/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Telecopy 
/u .S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Telecopy 
/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Telecopy 
/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Telecopy 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND 
DAMAGES-3 330 
40100.0006, 1325756,1 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
32113thStreet 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and ) 
GARY E. MEISNER, ) 
) 
Defendants, ) 
) 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK ) 
COMPANY, INC., ) 
) 
Nominal Defendant. ) 
Case No: CV 08-1226 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant Gary E. Meisner moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
I.R.C.P., Rule 23(f) LR.C.P., Idaho Code § 30-1-741 and Idaho Code § 30-1-742 to 
dismiss the Amended Complaint of the plaintiff on the grounds that the Amended 
Complaint fails to state a claim against this defendant upon which relief can be granted 
33! 
MOTION TO DISMISS -1-
and on the grounds that the Amended Complaint fails to comply with the requirements 
ofRule 23(f) I.R.C.P., and on the grounds that the Amended Complaint violates§ 30-1-
741 and§ 30-1-742, Idaho Code. 
This defendant joins in and adopts theMEMORAJ\TDUMIN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS of co-defendant William V. McCann, Jr., filed in support ofhis 
motion to dismiss the original complaint. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2008. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: ~LOM MICHAELE.McNCH0LS 
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MOTION TO DISMISS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of October, 2008, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Timothy Esser 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, WA 99163 
Facsimile: (509) 334-2205 
Charles F. McDevitt 
Dean J. Miller 
Mc Devitt & Miller, LLP 
P .0. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 336-6912 
X U.S.MAIL 
--
HAND DELIVERED 
---~-
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
-----
----TELECOPY (FAX) 
Andrew Schwam 
Schwam Law Offices 
514 S. Polk, Ste. 6 
Moscow, ID 83 843 
Facsimile: (208) 882-4190 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3 829 
rvlichael E. McNichols 
MOTION TO DISMISS ,.., -_J-
10-24-08;10:49AM; 
Chas. F. McDevitt (ISB No. 835) 
Dean J. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2564-83701 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel.: 208-343-7500 
Fax.: 208-336-6912 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
;2083366912 
F'/ LED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R McCANN, 
Plainti~ 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and GARY E. 
MEISNER, 
Defendants 
McCANN RANCH & LNESTOCK 
COMPANY, INC. 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) Civ. No. CV 08-01226 
) 
) 
) MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE 
) RELIEF AND DAMAGES 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The above named Nominal Defendant, Mccann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc., by 
and through its counsel of record, McDevitt & Miller LLP, respectfully moves this Court to 
dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's Amended Complaint For Equitable Relief and Damages 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), I.R.C.P. 23 (f), I.C.§ 30-1-742. 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages should be dismissed 
for the reasons set forth in Defendant William V. Mccann Jr. 's Motion to Dismiss and the 
supporting Memorandum, filed July 14, 2008. The Motion to Dismiss and supporting 
Memorandum, filed July 14, 2008, are hereby incorporated by reference. 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES Page 1 
# 2/ 4 
33'-I 
10-24-08;10:49AM: ;2083366912 # 3/ 4 
Respectfully submitted thi~~day of October. 2008. 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
By:~-d-~~ 
Chas F. McDevitt 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES Page 2 
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10-24-08;10:49AM: ;2083366912 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the Motion to Dismiss Am.ended Complaint for Equitable Relief and 
Damages by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following: 
Timothy Esser 
LIBEY ENSLEY ESSER & NELSON 
520 Main Street 
Pullman. WA 99163 
Andrew Schwam 
SCHW AM LAW FIRM 
514 South Polk #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Michael McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROWN 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
Merlyn Clark 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
X 
'{ 
, 
J. 
U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E~Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
E-Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Ovemi ht Mail 
facsimile 
E-Mail 
MCDEVITT & MlLLERLLP 
# 4/ 4 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES Page 3 
3sc, 
Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
Will Wardwell, ISB No. 7043 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: mwc@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
wwar@hteh.com 
Attorneys for Defendant William V. McCann, Jr. 
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DEPUTY 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and GARY E. ) 
MEISNER, ) 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY 
DISCOVERY 
MERLYN W. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
-1 337 
40100,0006, 1321030, 1 
1. I am counsel for Defendants William V. McCann, Jr. in this matter. I make this 
affidavit based on my own knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate copy of Plaintiffs First 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of Documents To Defendant William V. McCann, 
Jr. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of Plaintiffs First 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of Documents To Defendant Gary Meisner. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and accurate copy of Plaintiffs First 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of Documents To McCann Ranch & Livestock 
Company, Inc. 
5. A request was made to Plaintiff to stipulate to a stay of discovery until after the 
pending motions to dismiss have been resolved. Plaintiff rejected that request. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 10th day of November, 2008. 
r--·-·-..... 
·, 
·--::··..,c:;L~·;:.:_;::::.:~-..,.--..._V') ~"-
'• 
Name: Tammy N. Miller '-
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Ada County 
My commission expires: 5/30/2014 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of November, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN S1JPPORT OF MOTION 
TO STAY DISCOVERY by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Timoth Esser /u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LIBEY ENSLEY ESSER & 1\lELSON Hand Delivered 
520 East Main Street __ Overnight Mail 
Pullman, WA 99163 E-mail 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] __ Telecopy 
Andrew Schwam V---u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
SCHW AM LAW FIRM Hand Delivered 
514 South Polk, #6 __ Overnight Mail 
Moscow, ID 83843" E-mail 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] __ Telecopy 
Michael E. McNichols / U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLEMENTS BROWN Hand Delivered 
321 13th Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1510 E-mail 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 __ Telecopy 
[Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner] 
Charles F. McDevitt 
McDEVITT MILLER 
420 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2564 
V---u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand D eh vered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy 
[Attorneys for Nominal Defendant] 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
2 
-3 ~3~ 
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Exhibit "1" 
PLAINTJFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
DEFENDANT W1LLIAM V. McCANN 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
McCann vs_ McCann (CV 08-01226) 
Affirlavit ofMerlvn W_ Clark in Support of Motion to Stay Discovery 
3t/o 
Timothy Esser #6770 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509) 332-7692 
Fax: (509) 334-2205 
Andrew Schwam #1574 
Schwam Law Firm 
514 South Polle #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______ N_o_m_in_a_l_D_e_fe_n_dan_t._ ) 
TO: Defendant William McCann, Jr. 
No. CV0S-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANT 
WILLIAMV. McCANN, JR. 
AND TO: Merlyn Clark, attorney for Defendant for William McCann, Jr. 
Plaintiff Ronald McCann, pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36 I.R.C.P. requests Defendant 
William McCann, Jr. to answer the following interrogatories and produce documents as 
requested below: 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORlES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS T031 f( 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR. -- 1 ~ 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: ~'bat financial benefits, if any, have you received from the 
Defendant corporation since your father's death, including benefits to your law practice, wife, 
and step-children. 
ANS\VER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce all correspondence generated since January 1, 
1997 between you and: 1) Gertrude McCann; 2) Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co.; 3) Gary 
Meisner; and 4) James Schoff. And by correspondence we mean emails, facsimile transmissions, 
letters, communications of any nature. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Detail all :financial transactions between the corporation and 
Gertrude Mccann since January 1, 1997 through the present. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Produce all documents that refer to, evidence, explain 
or are otherwise relevant to each financial transaction between the corporation and Gertrude 
McCann since 1997, including: 
a) Schedules and any other documents from tax returns. 
b) Correspondence between the corporation and Gertrude McCann, including 
correspondence between the directors and Gertrude McCann. 
c) Ledgers, account statements, leases, purchase and sale documents, payments 
made on behalf of Gertrude Mccann. 
d) Minutes of any meeting at which transactions with Mrs. McCann were discussed. 
RESPONSE: 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO jl/2._ 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR. -- 2 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Where are the prior Wills and Codicils of William McCann, Sr., 
including those itemized in his Last Will dated May 6, 1996, presently located? 
ANS\VER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Produce copies of all William McCann, Sr.'s Wills and 
Codicils executed before his Last Will. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Itemize all attorney fees and costs paid on your behalf concerning 
this case and state the source and if not paid from your own funds the authority you rely on: 
ANSWER: 
DATED: This 10th day of October 2008., 
Libey, En~& Nelson 
By 
j/fe)~ 
Tuii~y Esser #6770 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 3 '-13 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR. -- 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 10th day of October 2008, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served by mail, postage prepaid, to the following addresses: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Charles F. McDevitt and Dean Miller 
McDevitt & Miller, LLP 
P.O. Box2564 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1501 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORlES A-ND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUJ\1ENTS TO 3lf t/ 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR. 4 
Exhibit "2" 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCli\1ENTS TO 
DEFENDANT GARY MEISNER 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
McCann vs. McCann (CV 08-01226) 
Hfirbvit r,f Merlvn W. Clark in Support of Motion to Stay Discovery 
345' 
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Timothy Esser #6770 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509) 332-7692 
Fax: (509) 334-2205 
Andrew Schwam #1574 
Schwam Law Firm 
514 SouthPolk#6 
Moscow, ID 83 843 
Phone: (208) 882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND TTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff: ) 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Nominal Defendant. ) 
-------------
TO: Defendant Gary Meisner 
No. CV08-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANT 
GARY MEISNER 
AND TO: Michael McNichols, attorney for Defendant Gary Meisner 
Plaintiff Ronald Mccann, pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36 I.R.C.P. requests Defendant 
Gary Meisner to answer the following interrogatories and produce documents as requested 
below: 
AFFIDAVIT OF ! fERL'LN W;.::CL;ARK IN SUPPORT 
.-.eo,e,- ~ l~ S::-\ /7 
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PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION(~i_!;)o<L_~~ T6J '-f\/) 
GARY MEISNER-- 1 =·-
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: What financial benefits, if any, have you received from the 
Defendant corporation whether or not as a result of or in any way related to you serving as a 
director for the corporation. · 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce all correspondence generated since January 1, 
1997 between you and: 1) Gertrude McCann; 2) McCann Ranch & Livestock Co.; and 3) 
William Mccann, Jr. And by correspondence we mean emails, facsimile transmissions, letters, 
communications of any nature. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Detail all financial transactions between the corporation and 
Gertrude McCann since January 1, 1997 through the present. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Produce all documents that refer to, evidence, explain 
or are otherwise relevant to each financial transaction between the corporation and Gertrude 
McCann since 1997, including: 
a) Schedules and any other documents from tax returns. 
b) Correspondence between the corporation and Gertrude Mccann, including 
correspondence between the directors and Gertrude McCann. 
c) Ledgers, account statements, leases, purchase and sale documents, payments 
made on behalf of Gertrude McCann. 
d) Minutes of any meeting at which transactions with Mrs. McCann were discussed. 
RESPONSE: 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ST A Y DISCOVERY 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIBS AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 54 7 
GARY MEISNER-- 2 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Itemize all attorney fees and costs paid on your behalf concerning 
this case and state the source and if not paid from your own funds the authority you rely on. 
ANSWER: 
DATED: This 10th day of October 2008. 
Libey, E~er & Nelson 
By ___ ,r /~· ________ Jiij~, i/-
~6770 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 10th day of October 2008, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served by mail, postage prepaid, to the following addresses: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Charles F. McDevitt and Dean Miller 
McDevitt & Miller, LLP 
P.O. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1501 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FORPRooucnoN OF DOCUMENTS To3lfZ 
GARY MEISNER-- 3 
Exhibit "3" 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
DEFENDANT McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
Mccann vs. McCann (CV 08-01226) 
Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark in Support of Motion to Stay Discovery 
· Timothy Esser #6770 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson 
520 East Main Street 
Pµllman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509)332-7692 
Fax: (509)334-2205 
Andrew Schwam#1574 
Schwam law Firm 
514 South Polk #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208)882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. :MEISNER, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Nominal Defendant. ) 
--------------
No. CV08-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO McCANN RANCH 
& LNESTOCK COMP ANY, INC. 
TO: Defendant Mccann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. 
AND TO: Charles F. McDevitt and Dean Miller, attorneys for Defendant Mccann Ranch & 
Livestock Company, Inc 
Plaintiff Ronald McCann, pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36 I.R.C.P. requests Defendant 
McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. to answer the following interrogatories and produce 
d::::~;;;::::~o~~ARKINSUPPORTOFMOTIONTOS~Yi 't61T " 3 " 
l.C~ (Q) I~ \f- ,r; 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FORPRO-~lifTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 3~v 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC. -- 1 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Detail all financial transactions between the corporation and 
Gertrude McCann since January 1, 1997 through the present. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce all documents that refer to, evidence, explain 
or are otherwise relevant to each financial transaction between the corporation and Gertrude 
McCann since 1997, including: 
a) Schedules and any other documents from tax returns. 
b) Correspondence between the corporation and Gertrude McCann, including 
correspondence between the directors and Gertrude McCann. 
c) Ledgers, account statements, leases, purchase and sale documents, payments 
made on behalf of Gertrude McCann. 
d) Minutes of any meeting at which transactions with :Mrs. McCann were discussed. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2.: Attached is an April 17, 2007, letter to the corporation from its 
· CPA, Dorothy Ann Snowball. 
a) What is the definition of "book value" as that term was meant in said letter? And, 
applying that definition, provide the book value of the corporation for each year, 
1997 through the present. 
b) Allocate the "book value" to each parcel of real estate owned by the corporation 
for the years in questions. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Provide a detailed inventory of the corporate assets and debts. 
And, for each asset state the present fair market value of the asset. By fair market value, we 
mean that price the corporation could expect to obtain if it were to sell the asset, utilizing 
r~~'f~OO,~ffl,9..full.~cgm>~~<tkt~&Y~riod. 
PLAINTIFF' s FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCU1v1ENTS TO 3t;; 1 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COW ANY, INC. -- 2 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Itemize all appraisals performed of corporate assets. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: To the extent not previously provided, provide copies 
of the appraisals referenced in response to Interrogatory No. 4. 
RESPONSE: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: What annual rate of return, either increase or decrease, has the 
corporation achieved for each year since 1997? By annual rate of retum we ask that you start 
with the fair market value of the corporation assets as of January 1, 1997, and state how that fair 
market value has increased/decreased in the intervening years. 
ANSWER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Produce copies of the transcript& of all hearings 
conducted in the McCann I action, including oral argument before the Supreme Court. 
RESPONSE: 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY 
PLAINTIFF'S FJRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 3s;z_ 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC. -- 3 
· INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Itemize all attorney fees the corporation has paid on behalf of 
William Mc<;;ann, Jr. and/or Gary Meisner in r~lation to this action, including any and all fees 
paid before this action was filed, related to this case. And describe what authority the corporation 
relies upon in making these expenditures. 
ANS\VER: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Produce the minutes of all meetings of Defendant 
corporation's directors, whether special or annual, since January 1, 1997. 
RESPONSE: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Produce the minutes of all meetings of Defendant 
corporation's shareholders, whether special or annual, since January 1, 1997. 
RESPONSE: 
DATED: This 10th day of October 2008. 
Libey,~&Nelson · 
~8f--By 
Timothy Esser #6770 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 10th day of October 2008, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served by mail, postage prepaid, to the following addresses: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Charles F. McDevitt and Dean Miller 
McDevitt & Miller, LLP 
P.O. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P .0. Box 1501 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
timothy Esser 
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Timothy Esser #6770 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson 
520 Main Street 
Pullman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509) 332-7692 
Fax: (509) 334-2205 
Andrew Schwam #1573 
Schwam Law Firm 
514 South Polk #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
W1LLIAMV. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, individually 
as a director of Mc Cann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
shareholder ofMcCann Ranch & 
Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
Trustee of the William V. McCann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & 
LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Nominal Defendant. ) 
-------------FACTS 
No. CV08-01226 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
1. The Complaint was filed herein on June 10, 2008. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed July 14, 2008. 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 355 
DISCOVERY -- 1 
RULE33 
3. An Amended Complaint was filed October 15, 2008. 
4. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint were filed October 23, 
2008 and October 24, 2008. 
5. On June 30, 2008, Defendant Meisner served his 1st Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production on Plaintiff which Plaintiff answered on August 7, 2008. 
6. On September 18, 2008, Defendant Meisner served Requests for Admissions, 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Plaintiff which 
Plaintiff answered on October 2, 2008. 
7. Finally, after the Plaintiff had been served and answered the discovery 
promulgated by Defendant Meisner, Plaintiff promulgated discovery, which 
Defendants have not answered nor have they filed specific objections against. 
Rule 33(a)(2) provides: 
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in 
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the 
reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
The Defendants have filed no objections. They have simply filed a motion to stay, 
arguing that if their motion to dismiss is granted, answering plaintiff's discovery would be moot. 
DISCUSSION 
Despite Defendants' contrary assertion, it must be remembered that we are not re-
litigating McCann I, we are not bringing a derivative action. We have brought a corporate 
dissolution action pursuant to the Idaho Corporate Dissolution statute alleging the statutory 
elements and seeking the statutory relief. In addition, we have brought an action alleging a 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAil\JTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
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squeeze out (Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510 at 513 (1986)), seeking damages and/or 
equitable relief. 
The defense argues in their memorandum that: 
What is important for the purposes of this Motion to Stay 
Discovery is that two 12(b )(6) Motions to Dismiss are already 
pending .... 
Those motions are dispositive and, if successful, should result in 
dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint will render moot any 
discovery requests." (Memorandum pages 4 and 5) 
However, the defense memorandum goes well beyond argmng the obvious - that 
dismissal would render the discovery moot. The defense memorandum makes a number of 
factual representations which are inaccurate, contrary to the factual assertions of the amended 
complaint and contrary to the law cited in the Plaintiffs responsive memorandum to their 
motions to dismiss. For example, the defense argues 
... the key factual allegations in the McCann complaint included 
the payment of consultation fees and other money to Gertrude 
McCann and various other wrongful transactions entered into by 
the Corporation . . . . Plaintiff has now brought a second action 
(McCann II) which asserts the same facts and legal theories . . . . 
Plaintiffs discovery seeking documents and information on the 
very same facts alleged in McCann I proves conclusively that 
Plaintiff is now attempting to re-litigate McCann I. (Memorandum 
pp.2,4) 
In fact, Plaintiff herein alleges that the phony financial transactions the Corporation has 
engaged in with Gertrude McCann commenced following Bill McCann's ascension to corporate 
control following his father's death in 1997 and have continued until the filing of the present 
complaint. (Amended Complaint Paragraph 26) Between 1997, and the dismissal of McCann I 
the Corporation paid phony consulting fees to this elderly widow. Since McCann I, the 
Corporation has continued its schemes by now having the Corporation purchase Mrs. McCann' s 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
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residence and allowing her to live there rent and providing maintenance. The corporation 
provides Mrs. McCann's automobile expenses and utilities 1• Mrs. Mccann is paid by the 
Corporation to live in her home. (Amended Complaint Paragraphs 25 and 26) And as alleged in 
the present complaint the purpose is to avoid paying dividends, which would necessarily benefit 
all shareholders, and, to avoid redeeming Gertrude McCann's shares which would necessarily 
increase Plaintiffs ownership percentage proportionate to Defendant William McCann's 
percentage. As alleged in the amended complaint, emboldened by the dismissal obtained in 
McCann I, a derivative action, Defendants oppression of Plaintiff, a substantial minority 
shareholder, began in earnest and continues today. 
While Defendants claim to simply be seeking a stay of discovery because said discovery 
may arguably be moot, they in fact suggest they have no intention of providing complete and 
responsive answers to the discovery should their motions to dismiss be denied. They argue that 
it would be burdensome to provide correspondence between Director Meisner and the 
Corporation even though they have had five months to work on it. They suggest that it is 
irrelevant what occurred between 1997 and the dismissal of McCann I. Defendants are in error. 
As reviewed at pages 13 and 14 of our Responsive Memorandum to Defendants, Motion 
to Dismiss concerning the issue of res judicata, Idaho has adopted the Second Restatement of 
Judgments, which provides in §24(f): 
Change of circumstances. Material operative facts occurring after 
the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter 
may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent 
facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a 
second action not precluded by the first. See Illustrations l 0-12. 
1Paying $50,000+ in consulting fees to an elderly widow, and then paying her living expenses, and utilizing these 
expenditures as deductions against the Corporation's tax liability, obviously raises an issue of tax fraud and 
irreparable harm to the corporation. 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
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Illustration (12). The government fails in an action against a 
defendant under an antitrust statute for lack of adequate proof that 
the defendant participated in a conspiracy to restrain trade. The 
government is not precluded from a second action against the same 
defendant in which it relies on conspiratorial acts post-dating the 
judgment in the first action, and may rely also on acts preceding 
the judgment insofar as these lend significance to the later acts. 
[ emphasis supplied] 
The Defendants, in obtaining a Supreme Court determination that McCann I was a 
derivative action and properly dismissed for failure to comply with procedural conditions 
precedent, did not obtain immunity from a corporate dissolution action, nor authority to squeeze 
out Plaintiff. As noted in our earlier memorandum, the Idaho Supreme Court in McCann I 
explicitly noted that its decision did not preclude relief for later misconduct. McCann v. 
McCann, 138 Idaho 228 at 232 (2002). 
CONCLUSION 
The discovery sought is relevant. There is no showing that to answer would be unduly 
burdensome. Defendants' motions to dismiss argue/infer a number of matters contrary to the 
factual allegations of the amended complaint. By filing their motions to dismiss, they have for 
six months prevented the Plaintiff from obtaining their answer and conducting discovery. 
Plaintiff expects that following denial of their motions to dismiss the Defendants will re-package 
their motions as ones for summary judgment. Plaintiff needs, and is entitled to, conduct 
discovery in the manner and time permitted under the rules. The Court is asked to order 
Defendants to provide complete and responsive answers to each of our first set of interrogatories 
and requests for production within fourteen days of our hearing. 
We want to learn what Director Meisner and Director McCann had to say to each other 
and the Corporation when they initially authorized the Corporation to engage in tax fraud in 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 3c-q 
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order to oppress Ron McCann - a course of conduct that continues to this day, causing 
i1Teparable harm to Ron McCann and to the Corporation. 
We want to know why this Corporation cannot afford to provide benefits to all its 
shareholders despite having a net worth of twenty million dollars or more. 
DATED: This/ .j:~y of December, 2008. 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson 
Attomey~iff _ 
j/ r/r --By 
I Timothy Esser #6770 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ;11.ay of December 2008, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Charles F. McDevitt and Dean Miller 
McDevitt & Miller, LLP 
P.O. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brown McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Email 
---
___ Telecopy 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Email 
---
___ Telecopy 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Email 
---
___ Telecopy 
~ -·r--/kPZ &/r 
.,-Timothy Esser 
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Timothy Esser #6770 
Libey, Ensley, Esser & Nelson 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509) 332-7692 
Fax: (509) 334-2205 
Andrew Schwam #1574 
Schwam Law Firm 
514 South Polk #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______ N_o_m_in_a_l_D_e_fe_n_da_n_t._ ) 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WHITMAN ) 
No. CV08-01226 
AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY ESSER IN 
SlJPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
Timothy Esser being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiff. The discovery at issue are the interrogatories and 
requests for production attached to defense attorney Clark's Affidavit. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY ESSER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL-- 1 3/JI 
2 • As Mr. Clark states, discussions did occur between counsel for the Defendants 
and the Plaintiff concerning this discovery dispute. Because Defendant Meisner 
promulgated and demanded answers to interrogatories and request for production, 
which Plaintiff provided, all of which occurred after the Defendants filed their 
motions to dismiss, we did not agree to their request for a stay of our discovery 
promulgated thereafter. 
DATED: This /f1:;:fDecember2~ 
~p/__./ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this i5~h day of December 2008. 
(Print Nam~ 
--'--'--\-t--'+-tc-..L..-1.=c..i_-' 
Notary Public in for e State of 
Idaho. Residing at ·-17'PJ:1 ~ 
My appointment expires 7 1-~lJ-ot\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of December 2008, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Charles F. McDevitt and Dean Miller 
McDevitt & Miller, LLP 
P.O. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83702 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brown McNichols, P .A 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Email 
---
___ Telecopy 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Email 
---
___ Telecopy 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Email 
---
___ Telecopy 
~~--
i?mothyEsser 
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Merlyn W. Clark, !SB No. 1026 
D. John Ashby, !SB No. 7228 
Will Wardwell, ISB No. 7043 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: mwc@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
wwar@hteh.com 
Attorneys for Defendant William V. McCann, Jr. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) WILLIAMV. McCANN, JR., and GARY E. ) 
MEISNER, ) 
Defendants. 
McCAl\TN RANCH & LNESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant William V. McCann, Jr., by and through his counsel of record, Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs new lawsuit is no more than an improper attempt to re-litigate McCann I under 
a new legal theory. The new lawsuit is barred by res judicata because it is based on the same 
facts asserted in Mc Cann I and Plaintiffs new legal theory could have and should have been 
litigated in Mc Cann I. Plaintiffs argument against application of res judicata is that his new 
claim for dissolution pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-1430 was not "ripe" for adjudication in 
McCann I. However, Plaintiffs new dissolution theory is based on the same facts alleged in 
McCann I, and therefore could have and should have been litigated therein. In fact, not only 
could it and should it have been litigated, but Plaintiff actually did litigate his dissolution theory 
in Mc Cann I. Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint in McCann I to assert a claim for 
dissolution pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-1-1430, but the District Court denied that motion and 
dismissed Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. In addition to being barred by res judicata, 
Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with 
the written demand requirements for a derivative action set forth in Idaho Code § 30-1-742. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Res Judicata Bars Plaintiff's New Lawsuit 
1. Res Judicata May Be Raised In A 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss 
Plaintiff asserts that "the defense of res judicata cannot be raised by motion to dismiss." 
This argument finds support only in a 1930 case, Kralick v. Shuttleworth, 49 Idaho 424,289 P. 
74 (1930), which even Plaintiff concedes is so old that it "predates the rules." See Plaintiffs 
Responsive Memorandum to Defendants' Motion To Dismiss ("Plaintiffs Opposition"), p. 10. 
While the Kralick decision does make such a statement, that statement was not based on Rule 
12(b )(6) or any other Rule of Civil Procedure, but instead was based on former Idaho Statutes C. 
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S. § 6683 and C. S. § 6694. Id., 289 at More importantly, any holding that res judicata 
cannot be raised on a motion to dismiss has since been overruled by implication by the Idaho 
Supreme Court's more recent cases affirming 12(b)(6) dismissals on res judicata grounds. See, 
e.g., Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223,225 (1997) 
( affirming the trial court's granting of motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds); Rodriguez v. 
Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001) (same). 
Cases in other jurisdictions have similarly held that a complaint may be dismissed 
pursuant to rule 12(b )(6) on res judicata grounds, and that the court is free to take judicial notice 
of prior proceedings. See, Briggs v. Newberry County School Dist., 83 8 F.Supp. 232, 234 
(D. S.C. 1992) (granting 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and explaining that "[w]hen entertaining a 
motion to dismiss on the ground ofres judicata or collateral estoppel, a court may judicially 
notice facts from a prior judicial proceeding"); Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992) 
("Generally res judicata is an affirmative defense to be pleaded in the defendant's answer .... 
However, when all relevant facts are shown by the court1s own records, of which the court takes 
notice, the defense may be upheld on a Rule 12(b )(6) motion without requiring an answer.'). 
All facts necessary to conclude that res judicata bars Plaintiffs current complaint are 
contained on the face of the Complaint and within the Court's prior record in McCann I, of 
which the Court can take judicial notice. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 20l(c). Notably, Plaintiff 
has not opposed Defendant's request for judicial notice. Thus, the res judicata issue can be 
resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
2. Plaintiff's Causes of Action For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty And For Judicial 
Dissolution Due To Shareholder Oppression Are Both Barred By Res Judicata 
Res judicata serves several fundamental purposes: it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter 
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were twice litigated to inconsistent results; it serves the public interest in protecting the courts 
against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and it advances the private interest in repose from 
the harassment ofrepetitive claims. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). 
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action, three requirements must be satisfied: 
(1) there must be a valid final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) involving the same parties; 
and (3) involving the same claim. Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P .2d 762, 
767 (1994). In the present case, all three requirements are satisfied. Plaintiffs response does not 
separately address the elements ofres judicata, but it appears that the first two elements are 
conceded.1 Plaintiff apparently contends that this new lawsuit does not satisfy the third element 
of res judicata - that it involve the "same claim" as McCann I. 
As to the question of whether this new lawsuit involves the "same claim," the Idaho 
Supreme Court has explained that the "transactional concept of a claim is broad." Ticor Title Co. 
v. Stanion, 157 P.3d 613,620 (2007) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he 'sameness' of a cause 
of action for purposes of application of the doctrine of res judicata is determined by examining 
the operative facts underlying the two lawsuits." Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 
754, 663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983). 
1 As to the first element - a final judgment on the merits - the McCann I action was dismissed 
"with prejudice" and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. See McCann I, 138 Idaho 228, 
238, 61 P.3d 585, 595 (2002). Such a dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the 
merits of the plaintiffs claim. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 912, 42 P.3d 698, 705 (2002). 
The second element - that the two cases involve the same parties - is also satisfied because 
both cases were brought by Plaintiff against William V. McCann, Jr., Gary Meisner and 
McCann Ranch & Livestock Co. 
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As set forth previously, the factual allegations asserted by Plaintiff in his new lawsuit are 
the very same factual allegations asserted by Plaintiff in McCann I Defendant previously 
provided the Court with a chart comparing the factual allegations in McCann I to the factual 
allegations in this new lawsuit. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. 
That chart clearly demonstrates how this new lawsuit is based on the same facts asserted in 
McCann I, and it will not be repeated herein. 
Plaintiff offered no response to the factual comparison of McCann I and this new lawsuit, 
and instead baldly asserts that his new lawsuit is based on "new" facts. Despite Plaintiffs 
assertions to the contrary, it is clear that Plaintiffs new lawsuit arises out of the same transaction 
or series of transactions out of which the McCann I lawsuit arose, and it is therefore bared by res 
judicata. 
3. The Ripeness Exception Does Not Apply 
Plaintiff argues that the current claims were not "ripe" at the time of McCann I. While 
Idaho Courts have recognized a "ripeness" exception to resjudicata, that exception has no 
application here. The ripeness exception to res judicata is set forth in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun 
Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983). In Duthie, the Lewiston Gun Club brought an action 
alleging that the Duthies had trespassed by hooking up to the Gun Club's waterline. The trial 
court dismissed the action, finding that (1) the Duthies had permission to hook up to the 
waterline and, (2) the Gun Club was capable of granting a license to the extent of its interest in 
the property; and (3) the Duthies had not trespassed. Id., 104 Idaho at 753. New facts occurred 
subsequent to the first action, which resulted in the filing of a second action. Specifically, the 
Gun Club requested that the Duthies contribute funds for maintenance of the water line. When 
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the Duthies refused, the Gun Club cut off the Duthies' water line and took the position that the 
license had been revoked. 
Based on these new facts, the Duthies filed a second lawsuit seeking injunctive relief. In 
the second lawsuit, the Duthies argued that the Gun Club should be precluded from claiming in 
the second action that the license was revoked because that issue ofrevocation should have been 
raised in the first action. The Court held that res judicata did not apply because the issue of 
revocation was not ripe until the license was actually revoked, which did not occur until after the 
first trial. 
In this case facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that led to 
the filing of the second suit, i.e., the cutting and capping of the 
waterline. Therefore, even though the same facts may be used to 
determine whether the license was revocable as were used in the 
first action to determine whether a license existed, because facts 
occurred subsequent to the first trial that triggered the filing of the 
second suit, we hold that the issue ofrevocability was not ripe for 
trial in the first case, but rather, was premature until the license 
was actually revoked. 
Id. at 754 (emphasis added). 
Unlike Duthie (and the other "ripeness" cases cited by Plaintiff), this case does not 
involve any new factual allegations not already asserted in McCann I. In an attempt to 
characterize this new lawsuit as being based on new facts, Plaintiff asserts that "[t]his action 
primarily relies on evidence that did not even exist at the time of the first action." See Plaintiffs 
Opposition, p. 15. He then goes on to broadly describe five categories of new "post-first 
Complaint conduct." Id. However, all of the so-called "new" facts were asserted in McCann I, 
as demonstrated by the following chart: 
So -Called "new" allegations in McCann II Allegations raised in McCann I 
1. Non-payment of dividends despite "June 9, 1999 .... The Board asks directors 
sufficient cash flow Durkin and Meisner to investigate whether the 
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So -Called "new" allegations in McCarm II 
2. Nonemployment, non-Board membership 
3. Phony financial transactions between the 
corporation and Defendant Meisner, Trustee 
for the third shareholder, in order to avoid the 
redemption of Gertrude's shares, which 
redemption would increase the ownership 
percentage of Plaintiff, equally with that of 
Defendant Bill McCann. 
Allegations raised in McCann I 
Corporation should declare dividends, at 
• Plaintiffs request .... September 6, 2000 .... 
• The Board declines to pay dividends in light of 
the costs and expenses being incurred in 
defending the corporation and directors from 
the Ronald McCann lawsuit." See McCann I 
District Court Opinion, p. 2, 5. 
"The Corporation has declared no dividends 
during the preceding three (3) years." See 
McCann I, Proposed Amended Complaint, 
,f 3.56. 
"September 6, 2000 .... The shareholders 
meet and elect to remove Ronald McCann as a 
director of the Corporation." See McCann I 
District Court Opinion, p. 4. 
"June 9, 1999 .... The Board declines to hire 
Ron to help manage the corporation, citing no 
need for another manager and the apparently 
poor personal relationship between the 
brothers." See McCann /District Court 
Opinion, p. 2. 
"The removal of plaintiff as a member of the 
board of directors." See McCann I, Proposed 
Amended Complaint, ,r 3.59(f) 
"December 1998 .... The Board votes to pay 
Gertrude an annual consultation fee of 
$48,000. The Trustee (Meisner) does not 
redeem any stock." See McCann /District 
Court Opinion, p. 2. 
"3.31 Income for Mrs. McCann has not been 
obtained by redemption of the corporate stock 
as authorized by William V. McCann, Sr.'s 
Will. 
3 .32 In an effort to prevent depletion of 
defendant William V. McCann Jr.'s future 
stock ownership, defendants ... committed the 
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So -Called "new" allegations in McCamt II 
4. A refusal, on a part of those in control of 
the corporation, to carry out the intent of the 
founder of the corporation and the donor of his 
children's shares: That Plaintiff enjoy, not a 
hypothetical benefit from share ownership, but 
an actual, present and significant financial 
benefit from this ownership which is in lieu of 
his inheritance. 
Allegations raised in McCanri I 
follmving acts ... [listing alleging improper 
"consultant's fees," "deferred compensation" 
and "leases"]. See McCann /Proposed 
Amended Complaint, ,r,r 3.31-3.32. 
"[Defendants devised] a new plan to distribute 
money to Mrs. McCann without redeeming the 
• Trusts' stock .... This distribution ... was the 
culmination of two earlier attempts to funnel 
money out of the Corporation to Mrs. Mccann, 
circumventing the authorization in Mr. 
McCann, Sr.'s Will to redeem the shares held 
for Mrs. McCann's benefit in trust." See 
• McCann /Proposed Amended Complaint, 
,r 3.47. 
This allegation does not state any "post-first 
Complaint conduct," but instead merely states 
Plaintiff new legal theory. In any event, the 
same legal theory was asserted in _McCann I 
along with the same facts now being alleged. 
"Contrary to the terms of [McCann Senior's] 
Will, this income [for Mrs. McCann] was not 
obtained from the trustee's vote of the 
corporate stock so as to create income insofar 
as possible for Mrs. McCann .... 
The defendants' conduct in causing the 
Corporation to loan $81,000 and pay a wage of 
$48,000 per year to Mrs. McCann is a violation 
of the terms of the Will, and is not in the best 
interests of the Corporation and/or plaintiff." 
See McCann I Complaint, ,r,r 3.9-3.11. 
"In such a position of control, the defendants 
have engaged in a pattern of self-dealing 
intended to confer corporate benefits upon 
defendant McCann, Jr., Mrs. McCann and 
selected third parties to the exclusion of 
plaintiff as a minority shareholder, and have 
conspired between themselves and others to 
deprive plaintiff any voice in the Corporation's 
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So -Called "new" allegations in McCann II Allegations raised in McCann I 
management, all with the intent of oppressing 
plaintiff and rendering his interest in the 
Corporation virtually worthless." See _McCann 
' 
I Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, p. 7. 
" .... McCann, Jr. has successfully controlled 
and dominated the Corporation to appropriate 
corporate funds for the majority shareholders 
and 'squeeze out' the plaintiff. The amended 
complaint clearly sets forth defendant 
Meisner' s actions in conspiring with defendant 
McCann, Jr. to deny plaintiff participation in 
the Corporation's management, and to render 
plaintiffs corporate interest virtually 
worthless." See McCann I Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend Complaint, p. 17. 
5. Management decisions that allow all of the This allegation does not state any "post-first 
cash flow to be obtained solely for the benefit Complaint conduct," but instead merely states 
of Bill McCann and Gertrude McCann, but in a Plaintiff new legal theory. In any event, the 
manner that provides no benefit to the third same legal theory was asserted in McCann I 
shareholder, but does preserve for Bill McCann along with the same facts now being alleged. 
the opportunity to own 100% of Gertrude's 
shares upon her death. "[Defendants] have sought to appropriate for 
themselves the funds of the Corporation and to 
'squeeze out' the plaintiff, the third minority 
shareholder." See McCann I Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend Complaint, p. 12. 
"[Defendants], in there capacities as 
shareholders, directors, and an officer, came up 
with several improper devices of providing 
income to Ms. McCann without redeeming 
shares." See McCann I Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend Complaint, p. 5. 
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As demonstrated by the above chart, Plaintiff does not allege any post-McCann I conduct 
that "triggered" a new cause of action that was not ripe for adjudication in McCann I. 
Plaintiff focuses his ripeness argument on his cause of action for judicial dissolution due 
to shareholder oppression. In no uncertain terms, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that his oppression 
cause of action arises out of new facts and cou Id not have been asserted in McCann I. At page 
13 of Plaintiffs Opposition, he states that "Ron McCann clearly did not bring individual actions 
for equitable relief or damages in his first case" and "a claim for oppression - seeking direct 
relief against the oppressors and/or a court ordered redemption of his shares under the dissolution 
statute ... would have been premature in 2000, i.e., 'not ripe."' At page 16, Plaintiff states that 
"the issue of oppression would not have been decided; that claim simply was not pled." At page 
19, Plaintiff even goes so far as to state: 
While the facts of the oppression are somewhat similar to conduct 
alleged in McCann I, it is in fact different conduct .... He could 
not have in good faith sought an equitable buyout or 
dissolution given only a two year history. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs assertion that his oppression cause of action was not - and could not have been 
- asserted in McCann I is categorically false. Plaintiff did, in fact, move to amend his Complaint 
in Mc Cann I to add a claim for dissolution pursuant to Idaho Code § 3 0-1-143 Cl based on alleged 
shareholder oppression. On November 1, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum In 
Support Of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, which attached a proposed Amended 
Complaint (the Supplemental Memorandum and proposed Amended Complaint are attached as 
Exhibit 3 to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss). That proposed 
Amended Complaint contained multiple causes of action against Defendant, including purported 
direct claims brought by Plaintiff individually and derivative claims brought by Plaintiff on 
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behalf of the corporation. The proposed Amended Complaint contained an entire section entitled 
"Defendants' Continuing Oppression of Plaintiff as a Minority Shareholder" supporting his 
"oppression" theory with the same factual allegations asserted now. That section of Plaintiffs 
proposed Amended Complaint is over two pages long and asserts that the defendants in McCann 
I "have engaged in a course of conduct intended to oppress plaintiff and render plaintiffs interest 
in the Corporation virtually worthless." See McCann !Proposed Amended Complaint, ,r,r 3.48 -
3.60. 
Not only did the proposed Amended Complaint contain factual allegations supporting a 
claim for oppression, but, just as he does now, Plaintiffs proposed Amended Complaint 
specifically prayed for judicial dissolution pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-1430 due to alleged 
shareholder oppression: 
5. That pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-l-1430(2)(b), McCann 
Ranch & Livestock Co. be ordered judicially dissolved based upon 
the oppressive conduct of the controlling shareholder/directors 
toward the minority shareholder which has caused and is causing 
irreparable damage to the Corporation. 
The District Courtultimately dismissed the McCann I Complaint with prejudice and held 
that Plaintiff would not be allowed to file any amended complaint. See January 5, 2001 Opinion 
and Order, p. 8 ("For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint 
must be denied. Furthermore, because Plaintiffs counsel failed to follow the dictates of LC. 
§ 30-1-742 for a second time, this Court is forced to use its discretionary authority to dismiss this 
action with prejudice."). Thus, Plaintiff has already pled his claim for dissolution, and it is now 
barred by claim preclusion. See, e.g., Carter v. Money Tree Co., 532 F.2d 113, 115 (8th Cir. 
1976) ("If, upon dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended 
complaint and such leave is denied with prejudice, the denial is res judicata as to any claim made 
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by plaintiff in that amended complaint."); US. v. McGann, 951 F.Supp. 372,383 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997) (explaining that a party cannot re-litigate claims asserted in a proposed amended 
complaint; "the fact that plaintiff was denied leave to amend does not give him the right to file a 
second lawsuit based on the same facts"). 
The very fact that Plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint to add a claim for judicial 
dissolution due to shareholder oppression conclusively demonstrates that Plaintiffs new 
oppression cause of action was ripe at the time of McCann I and arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transaction. It is, therefore, barred by res judicata. 
Plaintiffs assertion that his new lawsuit is supported by "new facts" of the same kind 
asserted in McCann I does not mean that his claims were not "ripe" at the time of McCann I. 
Additional evidence of the same kind does not equate to being unripe. The crux of McCann II is 
that Plaintiff is not receiving the dividends he thinks he should, that he is not on the Board of 
Directors, that he is not employed by the corporation and that the Corporation has not redeemed 
any of Mrs. McCann's shares. See Plaintiffs Opposition, p. 15 (categorizing the purported "new 
facts" upon which he bases his new lawsuit). These same facts were alleged in McCann I. The 
"new facts" in plaintiffs new lawsuit are simply that Plaintiff still is not getting the dividends he 
wants, still is not on the Board of Directors, still is not employed by the corporation and that the 
corporation still has not redeemed Mrs. McCann's shares. An allegation that these same basic 
facts continued does not mean his new legal theory was "unripe" during the time of McCann I. 
Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,403,913 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996) ("Resjudicata 
precludes the relitigation of the same claim even if there is new evidence to support it."); Kawai 
Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992) (same). 
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Under Plaintiff's theory, he could re-litigate his claims forever. Even if this Court 
dismisses McCann II just like McCann I, Plaintiff would not be barred from bringing McCann III 
a few years from now. He could argue that McCann III would be based on "new evidence," i.e., 
that Plaintiff still is not getting the dividends he wants, still is not on the Board of Directors, still 
is not employed by the corporation and that the corporation still has not redeemed Mrs. 
McCann's shares. 
The present case is strikingly similar to C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 181 P .3d 485, 145 
Idaho 559 (2008). There, Donald C. Campbell and C Systems, Inc. brought an action against 
McGee, the former president, director and shareholder of C Systems. The action requested 
declaratory relief and damages for McGee's alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Although not 
alleged in the original complaint, C Systems alleged in a March 14, 2001 affidavit by Donald 
Campbell that McGee diverted assets to Imbris, Inc. The district court ultimately granted 
summary judgment in favor of McGee. 
Subsequent to summary judgment being granted in favor of McGee, C Systems filed a 
second action against McGee and others. The complaint alleged that McGee attempted to divert 
assets from C Systems, and that McGee diverted C Systems customer checks to an Imbris bank 
account. McGee defended the second action on grounds ofres judicata. 
Invoking the same "ripeness" argument Plaintiff asserts here, C Systems argued that the 
facts alleged in the second action occurred after the filing of the first action and did not arise out 
of the same "transaction or series of transactions" out of which the first action arose. Id., 181 
P.3d at 488. Thus, according to C Systems, the second action could not be barred by res judicata 
"since the case was not ripe in 1999." Id. 
The Court rejected this argument, explaining: 
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Tri.is case involves an allegation that McGee unlawfully 
diverted assets to Imbris, Inc. As noted above, this allegation 
clearly was made in the first suit .... 
Therefore, this issue "should have been litigated in the 
first suit." It is part of the same transaction as the first suit and 
is barred by res judicata . ... It is clear that C Systems contended 
in the first suit that McGee in fact transferred assets to Imbris 
without any authorization by the Directors of C Systems and in 
violation of the court's order in that case. The same issues and 
allegations are raised in this case when in fact they not only 
should have been litigated in the first suit, but actually were 
litigated and decided in favor of McGee by summary 
judgment. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Just as was the case in C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, Plaintiff is arguing that tr.tis new lawsuit 
was not "ripe," even though it is based on the same facts alleged in Mc Cann I. In the words of 
the Idaho Supreme Court, the facts (and legal theories) presented in this new lawsuit "not only 
should have been litigated in the first suit, but actually were litigated and decided" in McCann I. 
4. PlaintifPs Claim for Dissolution Might and Should Have Been Litigated In 
McCannI 
Even if Plaintiff had not moved to amend his Mc Cann I complaint to seek dissolution, 
Plaintiffs current claim for dissolution is based on the same allegations as the breach of 
fiduciary duty cause of action in both McCann I and McCann II. Therefore, it should have been 
brought in McCann I and is now barred by claim preclusion. 
Res Judicata does not bar only causes of action that were actually litigated in a prior 
action. Rather, "the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter 
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and 
should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 
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434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1993) (emphasis added). As explained in Moore's Federal 
Practice: 
All available legal and equitable relief resulting from a transaction 
or series of transactions comprises a single claim. As a general 
rule, the plaintiff must seek all available relief in the first action, 
and a judgment in that action bars a second suit seeking additional 
relief 
18 Moore's Federal Practice§ 131.21[ 4] (2003). 
Idaho law makes clear that a party cannot bring a claim on one legal theory and then, if 
that theory proves unsuccessful, bring a second lawsuit on a different legal theory. See e.g., 
Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257,668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing the Restatement 
of Judgments for the proposition that "a plaintiff who lost a lawsuit would not be permitted to try 
again on the basis of new evidence or a different legal theory"); Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co. 
of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223,225 (1997) ("In filing the declaratory relief action, 
the Walters were simply attempting to raise a new legal theory to seek a remedy for acts arising 
out of this transaction. Claim preclusion (res judicata) bars this attempt."); Eastern Idaho 
Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402,407, 987 P.2d 314, 319 (1999) (explaining 
that res judicata "bars EIACA's attempt to reargue the sufficiency of the 1992 notice under a new 
theory in the present action"). 
Plaintiffs new lawsuit is no more than an attempt to re-litigate McCann I on a new legal 
theory. When Plaintiff decided bring suit in Mc Cann I, he had several options. He could have 
brought a derivative action against the defendants after complying with the statutory derivative 
demand requirements. He could have attempted to bring a true direct action (if one existed) 
against the defendants. He could have brought an action for dissolution pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 30-1-1430 based on alleged shareholder oppression. Plaintiff chose not to follow any of these 
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routes. Instead, alleging the same facts he alleges now, Plaintiff brought directly what the Court 
determined to be a derivative action. When the Court informed him that his action was 
derivative in nature, Plaintiff "failed to follow the dictates ofl.C. § 30-1-742 for a second time," 
forcing the Court to "use its discretionary authority to dismiss this action with prejudice." See 
Mc Cann I District Court Opinion, p. 8. Plaintiff attempted to amend the Complaint to add a 
claim for dissolution pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-1-1430 based on alleged shareholder 
oppression, but the Court denied Plaintiffs request for leave to amend the complaint. Id. 
Even if Plaintiff had a valid cause of action against Defendant (which he does not), 
Plaintiff chose to bring it under an invalid legal theory. Because of Plaintiffs refusal to follow 
the dictates of Idaho law and the direct orders from the District Court, Plaintiffs claim (based on 
the same facts he now alleges) was dismissed with prejudice. Res Judicata bars him from now 
bringing a new lawsuit alleging the same facts under a different legal theory. See Aldape, 105 
Idaho at 257 ("a plaintiff who lost a lawsuit would not be permitted to try again on the basis of 
new evidence or a different legal theory"). 
Several statements in Plaintiffs Opposition brief hint that the blame for pursuing 
McCann under the wrong legal theory should be placed on Plaintiffs prior counsel. See, e.g., 
Plaintiffs Opposition, p. 8 ("whatever label Ronald McCann's lawyer, Mr. Baltins, put on his 
claim, they were, and only were derivative causes of action"). Plaintiff cannot escape the bar of 
res judicata by arguing that it was his former lawyer's fault that he asserted an invalid legal 
theory. As explained in Moore's Federal Practice § 131.21 [3][b ], "[t]he fact that plaintiffs 
counsel in the first action didn't happen to think of the theory advanced in the subsequent action 
will also fail to avoid preclusion." See also Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, 
Inc., 188 P.3d 854 (2008) (court rejected argument that summary judgment should be vacated 
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because appellant's attorney failed to adequately respond to it, stating, "[f]or over 100 years this 
Court has held that a party is not entitled to relief from a judgment on the ground that the 
judgment was entered due to the negligence or unskillfulness of the party's attorney") citing 
Goodman v. Lathrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 P .3d 818 (2007) and Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600, 
606, 88 P. 82, 83 (1906) (a party "voluntarily chose her attorney and cannot avoid the 
consequences of any failure on his part to advise her of the applicable law.")). 
5. Issue Preclusion Bars Re-litigation Of Whether Plaintifrs Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty Claim Is A Derivative Action 
Regardless of whether true res judicata ( claim preclusion) applies, it is abundantly clear 
that issue preclusion bars re-litigation of whether Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim is a 
derivative cause of action. Even a cursory comparison of the breach of fiduciary duty claims 
brought in Mc Cann I and this new lawsuit demonstrates that they are based on the same legal 
theory and factual allegations. More importantly, Plaintiff is attempting to re-litigate the very 
question answered in McCann I - whether Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is 
derivative or direct. 
Plaintiff argues now that "a direct cause of action exists on behalf of a minority 
shareholder in a closely held corporation against the controlling shareholders/directors if they 
breach the fiduciary duties they owe to the minority shareholder." Complaint, ~ 30. This is 
exactly the same argument that Plaintiff made to the Idaho Supreme Court in McCann I, in 
which he argued "the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ronald McCann's individual causes of 
action because Idaho law specifically allows a shareholder in a closely-held corporation to bring 
a direct action." Appellant's Brief, p. 12. In fact, the Court in McCann I rejected the very same 
argument Plaintiff now asserts - that his case falls within an exception set forth in Steelman v. 
Malory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986). Paragraph 30 in Plaintiffs new Complaint 
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asserts that Steelman controls this case. Plaintiff made that same argument in McCann Iby 
arguing that"[ t]he facts of Steelman are nearly identical to those before this Court." See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 14. Plaintiff now argues that "as in Steelman, a shareholder in Ron 
McCann's position has a direct action against the controlling shareholders for their squeeze out 
tactics." See Plaintiffs Opposition, p. 26. Again, this was the same argument that was made and 
rejected in McCann I. See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend, p. 12 ("This case, as in Steelman, involves a closely held corporation wherein 
[defendants] have sought to appropriate for themselves the funds of the Corporation and to 
"squeeze out" the plaintiff, the third minority shareholder."). The District Court and the Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected Plaintiffs arguments, distinguished Steelman and held that Plaintiffs 
breach of fiduciary duty claim was derivative. See McCann I, 138 Idaho at 233-34. Plaintiff 
cannot now re-litigate the same issue decided in Mc Cann I. 
B. Plaintif rs First Cause Of Action For Breach Of Fiduciary Duties Must Be 
Dismissed Because The Action Is Derivative, Not Individual 
Plaintiffs first cause of action asserts that the Defendants have breached certain fiduciary 
duties. As set forth previously, despite Plaintiffs attempt to characterize his action as direct, his 
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is purely derivative. See also Mc Cann I, 13 8 Idaho at 
233, 61 P.3d at 590; Mannas v. 1-V.oss, 143 Idaho 927, 933, 155 P.3d 1166, 1172 (2007). This 
case does not fit within the narrow exception set forth in the Steelman case. This analysis was 
provided in Defendants' opening brief and will not now be repeated. 
More importantly, as set forth above, both the District Court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court have already held that Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties is 
derivative, and dismissed Plaintiffs case with prejudice. Both Courts expressly rejected 
Plaintiffs argument in reliance on Steelman. That issue cannot now be re-litigated. 
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C. PlaintifPs Second Cause Of Action Should Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Has 
Failed To Plead Facts Satisfying All Elements Of The Dissolution Statute 
Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, a claim for dissolution under LC.§ 30-1-1430, must 
be dismissed because it fails to plead facts satisfying the required statutory elements. Idaho 
Code § 30-1-1430 provides for dissolution of a corporation only under limited and specified 
circumstances. That statute provides: 
The Idaho district court ... may dissolve a corporation: 
(2) In a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that: 
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have 
acted or are acting in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or 
:fraudulent, and irreparable injury to the corporation is 
threatened or being suffered by reason thereof ... 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Thus, dissolution requires two elements: (i) Defendants must have acted or be acting in a 
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or :fraudulent, and (ii) as a result of such conduct, irreparable 
injury to the corporation must be threatened or in fact be suffered. Id. Plaintiff fails to plead 
facts establishing the second element. Instead, Plaintiff asserts only alleged harm to a 
shareholder, not irreparable harm to the corporation. See Complaint, ,r 38 (alleging that that the 
Corporation "does not provide benefits to its shareholders consistent with their reasonable 
expectations. This does threaten irreparable harm to the corporation." Plaintiff, however, offers 
no logical connection between "shareholders" not having their "reasonable expectations" met 
and the supposed threat of irreparable harm to the Corporation. 
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In response to Defendant's showing that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts establishing 
irreparable harm to the corporation, Plaintiff does not even contend that he can establish 
irreparable injury to the corporation. Instead, he argues that the Court should write that 
requirement out of the statute. Plaintiff suggests that the "history of the Idaho dissolution 
statutes indicates that the clause 'irreparable damage' is limited in application to publicly traded 
corporations and should not apply to block an equitable remedy for a shareholder in a closely 
held corporation." See Complaint, i139. 
As an initial matter, the "history" of the statute is irrelevant. A Court cannot write an 
exception into a statute based on the history of the statute. Instead, the Court must apply the 
statute as written. As explained in State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102P.3d1115, 1117 
(2004), the interpretation of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the statute, those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed 
as a whole." Id. "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct 
it is legislative, not judicial." Id. 
Even if the Court could look to legislative history, that history and the statutory scheme 
as a whole establish that the "irreparable injury to the corporation" requirement applies to all 
corporations, regardless of whether they are publicly traded. If the legislature intended the 
"irreparable injury to the corporation" provision to apply only to publicly traded corporations, 
the legislature would have so provided. In fact, the legislature has specifically provided for a 
different procedure (although not different substantive rules) for dissolution with regard to 
corporations whose shares are not publicly traded: 
Within ten (10) days of the commencement of a proceeding under 
section 30-1-1430(2), Idaho Code, to dissolve a corporation that 
has no shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly 
traded in a market maintained by one (1) or more members of a 
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national or affiliated securities association, the corporation must 
send to all shareholders, other than the petitioner, a notice stating 
that the shareholders may be entitled to avoid the dissolution of the 
corporation by electing to purchase the petitioner's shares under 
section 30-1-1434, Idaho Code, and accompanied by a copy of 
section 30-1-1434, Idaho Code. 
Seel.C. § 30-1-1431(4). 
Thus, the Idaho legislature has enacted a slightly different dissolution procedure 
depending on whether a corporation's stock is publicly traded. Having specifically recognized 
some distinctions in the dissolution statutes based on whether a corporation's stock is publicly 
traded, if the Idaho Legislature intended the "irreparable injury to the corporation" requirement 
to apply only to publicly traded corporations, it would have written that exception into the 
statute. 
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts establishing irreparable injury to the corporation, and he 
has essentially conceded that he cannot do so. The cause of action for dissolution under 
LC.§ 30-1-1430, therefore, must be dismissed. 
D. Dismissal Should Be With Prejudice, Without Leave To Amend 
In light of Plaintiffs repeated attempts to bring derivative claims as direct causes of 
action, the dismissal of Plaintiffs claims should be with prejudice and without leave to amend. 
As was concluded by the trial court in McCann I, and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
dismissal with prejudice is appropriate given Plaintiffs repeated attempts to bring a derivative 
actions without following the dictates ofldaho Code§ 30-1-742: 
[B]ecause Plaintiffs counsel failed to follow the dictates of LC. § 
3 0-1-742 for a second time, this Court is forced to use its 
discretionary authority to dismiss this action with prejudice. 
Otherwise, the purpose behind Section 30-1-742 et seq. will be 
thwarted, and the shareholders will never be forced to cooperate 
with each other in the corporate context as anticipated by the 
statute. This Court believes it is only encouraging controversy by 
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allowing this action to proceed, at the cost of the corporation's and 
the individual parties' pocketbooks. 
McCann I, 138 Idaho at 234. 
The justification for dismissal with prejudice is even stronger now that this is Plaintiff's 
third refusal to follow the dictates ofl.C. § 30-1-742. Notably, since the time that William V. 
McCann filed this Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief 
and Damages ("Amended Complaint"). The Amended Complaint, however, does nothing to 
prevent dismissal of Plaintiff's action with prejudice. The only substantive addition in the 
Amended Complaint is to add the following allegations: 
26. To summarize, since William V McCann, Jr, assumed 
control of the corporation following his father's death on October 
27, 1997, and in particular, since January 5, 2001, the date an 
Opinion and Order was entered in Nez Pelee County Case Number 
CV-00-01111, referred to as McCann I, Defendants McCann and 
Meisner have jointly exercised their control of the corporation: 
a) to not pay dividends despite sufficient cash flow; 
b) to not provide corporate employment to Plaintiff; 
c) to not provide Board membership to Plaintiff; 
d) to vote for and/or otherwise authorize the corporation to 
engage in phony financial transactions with Gertrude McCann 
in order to avoid taking action to benefit her as an equitable 
shareholder because such would necessarily benefit all 
shareholders proportionately, including Plaintiff; 
e) to frustrate the intent of the founder of the corporation and 
the donor of his children's shares, that Plaintiff enjoy, not a 
hypothetical benefit from share ownership, but an actual, 
present and significant financial benefit from this ownership, 
which was intended by Senior McCann to be in lieu of direct 
inheritance; and, 
f) to make management decisions that allow all of the cash 
flow to be obtained solely for the benefit of Defendant McCann 
and Gertrude McCann, but in a manner that provides no benefit 
REPLY MEMORANDlJM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 22 3Z5 
40100.0006.1293446.2 
to the third shareholder, the Plaintiff, but does preserve for 
Defendant McCann the opportunity to own 100% of Gertrude's 
shares upon her death. 
27. Defendants McCann and Meisner are the only directors who 
are shareholders and who control the Board and have continuously 
controlled the Board since the death of Williams McCann, Sr. 
See Amended Complaint, ,I 26-26. 
Thus, the only change to the Amended Complaint was to add the same so-called "new" 
facts that Plaintiff asserts in his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss as the "new" facts showing he 
is not attempting to re-litigate McCann I. However, as explained in the chart above at 6 
through 9, all of these so-called "new" facts were asserted in McCann I. Plaintiffs cause of 
action is both an improper attempt to re-litigate McCann I and a derivative action that does not 
comply with Idaho Code § 30-1-742. For either reason, it should be dismissed with prejudice 
and without leave to amend. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED THIS 
r 
3( day of December, 2008. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By__,r,<,--1--,,,.......,"-_ _,c;_ ________ _ 
Merl . Clark, ISB No. 1026 
Attorneys for Defendant William V. Mccann, 
Jr. 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
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V. 
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GARY E. MEISNER, individually 
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Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
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Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
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Sr. Stock Trust, 
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) 
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) 
_______ N_o_m_i_na_l_D_e_£_en_d_a_n_t._ ) 
No. CV08-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM (dated 12-31-2008) 
The defendants' two briefs contain two fatal omissions: 1) the defendants fail to cite a 
single case, from any jurisdiction, in which dismissal of a derivative action was given res 
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judicata effect; and 2) they fail to mention, let alone distinguish the Idaho Supreme Court's 
footnote in McCann I that the dismissal with prejudice would not bar a later action. The 
defendants' omissions are readily explained by the fact that the causes of action herein were not 
brought before. 
Defendants acknowledge that a necessary element of res judicata is that the plaintiff 
seeks to litigate in the present action the identical claim unsuccessfully pursued in the previous 
action. Defendants' Memorandum, p. 9. Defendants assert that plaintiff herein is in actuality 
pursuing the same derivative causes of action dismissed in McCann I, and, further, the denial of 
plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint in Mc Cann I allege oppression constitutes a final 
judgment on that claim, precluding plaintiff from reasserting it herein. Defendants ignore the 
controlling holdings made by the Supreme Court in McCann I. 
1. All causes of action plead, or attempted to be plead in McCann I, including 
the claim for oppression in the amended complaint were held to be derivative. 
In Mccann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228 (2002) ("McCann I") the Supreme Court first 
reviewed the "Facts and Procedural Background" specifically noting that plaintiffs initial 
complaint "alleged both derivative and individual claims" and thereafter, plaintiff "filed a motion 
to amend his complaint". (McCann, p. 231) 
Defendants herein argue that in McCann I Ron McCann attempted to excuse non-
compliance with the derivative claim notice requirement by characterizing his amended 
complaint as adding an individual claim. That may be true, but irrelevant. What is relevant is 
how the defendants in McCann I responded to that attempt, and in particular the Supreme 
Court's ruling in that regard. 
We have obtained and filed herein a copy of the brief the defendants filed with the 
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Supreme Court in McCann I. On this issue - whether the amended complaint arguing oppression 
was a derivative claim, or, as defendants now attempt to characterize it, an individual claim, the 
defendants in McCann I argued to the Supreme Court: 
The District Court correctly held that Plaintiff was attempting to 
assert individual claims which were actually derivative claims 
belonging to the Corporation. (R. Vol. I, p. 178). The District Court 
also correctly found that Plaintiff's additional claims in the 
requested Amended Complaint for self-dealing, negligence, breach 
of duties, conversion and waste likewise derivative claims and could 
not be asserted by Plaintiffs allegations in the Complaint, and 
Proposed Amended Complaint, asserted no losses he had which 
were separate and distinct from that of the other stockholders in the 
Corporation. The Plaintiff's alleged wrongs, if true, would be 
wrongs against the Corporation alone. Thus, Plaintiff's individual 
claims for relief were correctly dismissed by the District Court. 
Respondent's Brief in McCann I, p. 14-15, attached to Affidavit of 
Timothy Esser filed herein. 1 
The Supreme Court accepted the defendants' argument that all claims asserted by Ron 
Mccann, including those sought to be asserted in his amended complaint, were in fact derivative: 
An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of 
the complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the whole body 
of its stock or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual 
interest as a stockholder. .. 
Ron's allegations appear to be more that the corporation is 
"controlled by the wrongdoers or for other reasons fails and refuses 
to take appropriate action for its own protection." Accordingly, the 
nature of this action should be considered a derivative suit. 
This court upholds the district court's determination that the causes 
of action alleged by Ron were derivative rather than individual in 
nature. McCann at 233. 
And further: 
1Defendants have filed herein the plaintiff's brief filed in McCann I. As suggested, what is particularly relevant 
herein is the defendants' McCann I brief and the Supreme Court's agreement with the position the defendants then 
took - that all claims, including the allegation of oppression, were derivative. Just as the defendants have asked this 
court to take judicial notice of the plaintifPs Supreme Court briefing, we ask the court to take notice of the 
defendants' Supreme Court briefing. 
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At the time the district court stayed the case, the judge 
indicated that he would permit amendment of the complaint 
in the future to consider properly-raised claims not resolved 
by this procedure. When the amended complaint sought to 
add new causes of action, none of which complied with LC. 
§ 30-1-742(2) [the 90-day notice requirement of the 
derivative claim procedure statute], the district court acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion by denying the 
motion. (McCann v. Mccann at 138 Idaho 228, 337. 
Thus, the Supreme Court viewed plaintiff's claim of oppression as a derivative action for 
the benefit of the corporation and all of its shareholders. LC. § 30-1-741, 742, the derivative 
claim procedure statutes, require both 90-day notice and a determination that the plaintiff 
adequately represents the interests of all shareholders in enforcing a right of the corporation. 
Herein, we seek to dissolve the corporation or, in the exercise of the court's equitable 
discretion, we seek a court ordered redemption of our shares. We also seek an award of damages 
against the other two shareholders. Obviously, we seek no benefit to the corporation or for the 
other shareholders. We allege2 that the squeeze out employed by those who control the 
corporation negatively impacts only one shareholder, plaintiff Ron McCann; that the other two 
shareholders, Bill McCann and Gertrude McCann through Gary Meisner, through various means 
obtain disguised dividends. 
2. The Supreme Court in McCann I specifically authorized further litigation if 
based upon post-dismissal conduct. 
The Supreme Court was apparently surprised that Ron McCann's then attorneys failed to 
assign error to the fact that the District Court dismissal was with prejudice, the Supreme Court 
stating: 
Although the district court's determination that the dismissal 
would be with prejudice has not been directly challenged on 
2 And for purposes of defendants' motion to dismiss, all allegations and reasonable inferences in plaintiffs amended 
complaint herein are deemed to be true. 
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appeal, we conclude that this dismissal would affect only the 
claims that Ron attempted to pursue in his complaint prior to the 
dismissal, and would not prevent him from properly asserting new, 
unresolved claims complying with I.C. § 30-1-742 that may arise 
following the order of dismissal. (McCann at 232) 
Despite two briefs and sixty-three pages of argument, the defendants fail to even mention 
this footnote or offer an explanation of why it does not trump their res judicata motion. 
If McCann I was a derivative action, and we know that it was because the Supreme Court 
said so, it would be illogical for the Supreme Court to nevertheless authorize a later derivative 
action yet not authorize a direct, individual action. It's true that the plaintiff herein did not 
precede his action with a 90-day demand on the Board. That is because this is not a derivative 
action. If this were a derivative action, that lack of notice would be grounds for dismissal 
without prejudice, but provides no support for defendants' res judicata argument. 
Defendants also fail to respond, let alone distinguish, the two federal cases cited at page 
16 et seq. or our responsive brief, Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 359 U.S. 322 (1955), 
and Harkins Amusement Enterprises v. Harry Nace, Co., 890 F.2d 181 (1989), which are 
factually analogous and directly on point to our situation - an ongoing pattern of misconduct. In 
the federal cases, the fact that an earlier action alleging anti-trust monopoly violations was 
dismissed did not bar a later action for post-dismissal anti-trust misconduct. That both suits 
involve "essentially the course of wrongful conduct" is not decisive. Lawlor at page 327. 
"The defendants by winning Harkins I did not acquire immunity in perpetuity from the 
anti-trust laws. Harkins at 183. 
Defendants offer no reply, they fail to distinguish the Idaho case of Nash v. Overholser, 
114 Idaho 461 ( 1988), reviewed at page 23 of our opening brief. The wife, who had been beaten, 
filed for divorce. After her divorce case, she then filed for personal injuries. The former 
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husband asserted res judicata which was denied, the court stating at page 462: 
Nash's allegations could have been litigated during the divorce 
proceedings. However, there are considerations unique to cases 
such as this which compel us to acknowledge a narrow exception 
to our traditional interpretation of the doctrine of res judicata .... 
mandatory joinder of tort claims with equitable divorce 
proceedings may be undesirable, as well as unfair. If the former 
wife is forced to bring her claim for damages either simultaneously 
with, or prior to, her complaint for divorce, she will be: 
forced to elect between three equally unacceptable 
alternatives: .... 
Consider the Nash holding in view of the specific comments to the Idaho corporate 
dissolution act. A shareholder may petition to dissolve a corporation under LC. § 30-1-1430. 
Plaintiff has so plead herein. The comment, reviewed at page 31 of our opening brief (to which 
defendants offer no response) points out that before such draconian action be taken, a 
shareholder should first consider whether a derivative action or class action suit might remedy 
the situation. Idaho Reporters Comment to IC § 30-1-1430. This is precisely what Ron McCann 
did. 
Many federal and state courts have directly incorporated the question of fairness 
(sometimes referred to as injustice) into their res judicata elements analysis. For example, in 
Safeco Insurance v. McGrath, 42 Wn.App. 58, 708 P.2d 657 (1985), the Washington appellate 
court wrote at page 62: 
In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, 
( 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical 
with the one presented in the second; (2) the prior adjudication 
must have ended in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party 
against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted must have 
been a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation; and ( 4) 
application of the doctrine must not work an injustice . ... 
As shown by the Nash case, Idaho declines to apply the doctrine if it would cause an 
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injustice. Nash is not an isolated Idaho case. See, State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 810, 874 P.2d 
117 (Idaho App, 1993), State Dept. of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, V.I.N. 
573481691, 100 Idaho 150, 158 595 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1979) and Williams v. Christiansen, 109 
Idaho 393, 707 P .2d 504 (Idaho App. 1985). 
It would be unfair to allow the defendants to get away with their squeeze out because 
eight years ago Ron McCann brought a derivative action attempting to remedy certain corporate 
misdeeds, some of which in fact were remedied, but which action was dismissed because of a 
procedural shortcoming. It would be unfair to dismiss these individual direct actions, 
considering the allegations of the complaint which are taken to be true, without the defendant 
having answered nor provided discovery, based upon the dismissal of an earlier action which 
was never answered. 
Defendants resort to bits and pieces of case law in an effort to get around the fact that the 
fundamentals of this case must determine its outcome. Plaintiff has done three things in his 
present amended complaint: 
1. He has brought an individual action against the other two shareholders m a 
closely held corporation. 
2. He has plead facts which establish that since the dismissal of McCann I, the 
defendants have engaged in a squeeze out, a course of conduct designed to 
deprive plaintiff of his inheritance. 
3. He has requested both equitable and legal remedies which if granted would only 
benefit him. These remedies include a request for damages from the other 
shareholders payable only to plaintiff for losses specific to plaintiff, and either 
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dissolution of the corporation or, if the Court agrees, a Court ordered redemption 
of solely his shares. 
The fact is, this action is not identical to McCann I. 
Defendants' motions should be denied and they should be ordered to answer our 
amended complaint and outstanding discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SlJBMITTED this -13.!d"ay of January 2009. 
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